

which prostitution regulation was practised but not made explicit; whilst Levine notes the fuzziness of regulationism's legal basis, she treats law as perhaps too abstractly solid, if that is not a contradiction in terms. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is disappointing that Ireland's example, of a colonial site within the metropolitan orbit, is again virtually ignored; this in turn points up the problematic basis of the colonial/metropolitan distinction that Levine otherwise makes abundantly clear. One more thing: as one reviewer has rightly noted, the absence of contagious diseases legislation in some, perhaps the majority, of British colonies is a question that Levine's selection of sites prevents her from properly acknowledging and theorising. The conclusion should be, I think, without taking anything away from Levine's achievement, that the new imperial history must be taken even further in its redrawing of the map of empire. There remains the need for historians of sexuality to consider the empire as an interconnected whole.

The related question of geography and spatial analysis is a second area that has divided reviewers and which remains ambiguous. Professor Levine would be the first to admit that the concluding chapter on the imagination and institutionalisation of geographies of sexuality is indicative rather than conclusive. At the empirical level, much more could be said about the materialisation of sexual and racial ideology. To give but one example, the racial segregation which has entered into the very definition of the colonial city, is straightforwardly acknowledged, as in the discussion of Hong Kong's racially separated brothel districts. But this sexual landscape was the outcome of more convoluted colonial negotiation than Levine indicates. At a larger scale, too, Levine does not really describe the complex and multi-scalar geography of sexuality politics within the British imperial network. These are professional, parochial, and self-serving objections, but there is nevertheless the danger of confirming, despite Levine's best intentions, the analytical divide between metropolis and colonies. Levine is right to point to the impossibility of taking either race or empire in a unitary way, but her selection of colonial sites, and comparative methodology, may serve, at least for the casual and inattentive reader, to reify colonial analysis. It will be a shame if the wealth of detail in *Prostitution, Race and Politics* is reduced to simplistic appropriations and generalisations. It is a book that deserves by contrast close reading, re-reading and constant critical engagement with its methodology and analysis. Levine has produced the fullest and most coherent account of the British colonial regulation of sexuality, and *Prostitution, Race and Politics* will continue for very many years to reward scholars willing to give it this kind of attention.

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Zwia Lipkin, *Useless to the State: "Social Problems" and Social Engineering in Nationalist Nanjing, 1927-1937* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Alexandra Minna Stern, *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

Facing the resurfacing debate on ‘technology versus medical ethics’ in the topics of stem cell research, genetic therapy, anaesthesia and the like, *Eugenic Nation* and *Useless to the State* are two timely works on different approaches of social control targeting certain segments of population presented as ‘deviants’. The former explores the hard-line eugenic approach of hereditarianism aiming at sterilization in the American West; and the latter analyzes urban control in eliminating refugees, shantytowns, rickshaw-pulling, prostitution and beggary in Nanjing in the 1920s and 1930s when the Chinese eugenics movement was still in the mode of intellectual discourse before it was proposed for legal enactment in 1944.

Both books raise the same issue of the emerging biopower within modernity that rendered the imperative to live and the dominance of life over death into the disciplines of individual human bodies and broadened the economic, scientific, and political significance of these disciplines with a claim to help the human species increase its chances of survival and quality of existence. As Foucault suggests, the biopower became the legitimating authority of the modern state to subdue individual bodies and exercise its power at the level of the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

According to a 1924 report on the International Commission of Eugenics published in *Eugenical News*, eugenics was a global interest in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. There were fifteen full members and seven associate members of the Commission including countries in Latin America, North America, Europe, and Australia. This raises an interesting question: why East Asian countries such as China and Japan did not develop eugenics into a full-fledged social movement synchronically with their western counterparts. The answers lie in budgetary expenditures and scientific infrastructures. With meagre sources of funding from membership fees and research grants supported by American Universities and the Rockefeller Foundation, East Asian eugenicists tried to consolidate their ideas into disciplines within the institutional structure of science. To further the local transformation of eugenics under conditions of limited resources and international competition, they favoured the Galtonian biometric strategy over the Mendelian genetic approach, as this enabled them more readily to promote the scientificity of eugenics.

American eugenics, as *Eugenic Nation* explores in chapters one and two, took a different approach, focusing on race betterment as shown in the Panama-Pacific International Exposition and the institution of quarantine for monitoring the US-Mexican border. This was closely tied to the practice of tropical medicine implemented in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal, and the regime of colonial science. In China, however, under the threat of colonial sci-

ence exercised by imperialist powers to coerce the peripheries and tap the national resources, Chinese local science prioritized the nationalist agenda of ethnological and taxonomical production of frontier zones and territorial claims to the extent that China simply could not keep abreast with international development of genetics and eugenics. Nonetheless, the preventive ‘gatekeeping’ mentality of public health transposed from colonial science informed the Chinese approach to population control. As Lipkin discusses in *Useless to the State*, “The main purpose of relief efforts was to prevent people from leaving their home areas” (63). Despite the imperative of modern governance in the national capital and the conventional moral obligation, relief efforts in Nanjing were doomed to failure because of insufficient budgets and ever-shifting ad hoc policing measures to control increasing inflows of the transient population.

Despite the presence and absence of the hard-line eugenic approach of sterilization in California and China, the imperative of civilizing acts amongst the settlers who arrived in the Pacific West to apply modern science onto a “fertile yet underutilized terrain” and to “graft a new polis onto the Spanish and Mexican past” was shared by the Nanjing urban planners. They demolished shantytowns and squatter settlements and installed the modern idea of hygiene within the capital (85). The dynamic pair of evolution, nature and civilization, informed by Darwin’s law of natural selection, framed a set of criteria determining certain races, nations, ethnicities and classes were more civilized than others, thus justifying their dominating action over lesser peoples. Darwin’s natural selection initially promised the victory of civilization over savagery, but later involved an ambiguity: civilized morality. The acculturated initially inspired sympathy for undesirable elements but later emphasized the pressing institutional need for social intervention/selection to halt the appalling over-civilizing tendency toward racial degeneration. The defeating relief efforts coincided with the successful removal of shanties in Nanjing and expressed the ambiguity embedded in the institutions of a modern state.

Gender is a focal point of eugenics, public health, and social control programs but both books explore this subject from different perspectives. Whereas *Eugenic Nation* locates the issue of male-female dichotomy within the frame of marriage and family and the physiology of sex as women’s procreative capacity being the major concern of the American eugenicists, *Useless to the State* tackles the issue of prostitution in the public domain and that prostitution was a source of the government’s revenue. The prostitution (brothel and prostitute) taxes “were levied to finance Nationalist state-building projects and military expenditures... and amounted at the peak to almost 30% of the municipality’s revenue” (168). However, the imperative of the civilizing act and the eugenics of a strong nation demanded a movement to abolish prostitution which was viewed by ordinary people and women’s groups from the Women’s Relief Institute as a threat to spread venereal diseases and a violation of women’s rights. As the movement for banning

prostitution steered toward a comprehensive program of eliminating ill habits such as gambling and fortune-telling, the ban ended up a failure. The Women's Relief Institute shared the same defeating factor of insufficient finance with the entire municipal relief system, since the Institute was simply unable to provide shelters, health clinics, and rehabilitation facilities. When Japan invaded Nanjing, the city's former prostitutes became heroes by working as comfort women for Japanese soldiers "in order to protect the chastity of fellow 'good commoner' women" (199).

The absence of beggary discussion as a category of social deviance in *Eugenic Nation* amplifies the fact that the United States and China were in different stages of modernization and their status of state-building was subject to different historical contingencies. Comparing different states' measures of social control in California and Nanjing, explored in *Eugenic Nation* and *Useless to the State*, it seems that the targeted deviants in Chinese society enjoyed more space and thus more agency than their American counterparts to negotiate with the state for their social status, means of livelihood, definition of work, and profession. Interestingly, the return of eugenics via the institution of Chinese population policy in the 1980s and 1990s coincides with the weakening of the Chinese state. The result of which might be considered a blessing in the international history of eugenics and humanity.

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