One possible part of the explanation is that the Canadian experience was also different with regard to the composition of the immigrant waves. Long after British emigration to the US had receded, Scots, Ulster people, and English workers were still coming in large numbers to Canada. This shaped the relative volatility of the reaction because these immigrants were harder to objectify. While they were certainly not welcome, they looked and acted more like most Canadians and often even had familial relations to them. They still caused unemployment and helped to lower wages, Canadian Labour argued, but they blended in more easily.

Canadian Labour could be quite nasty, but they never seemed to match US workers’ penchant for anti-immigrant invective and violence. Riots ran the Chinese out of one industrial town and mining camp after another throughout the US West; the only serious Canadian riot caused embarrassment to many. Canadian labour turned a skeptical eye toward Italian and Slavic “new immigrants,” but their reaction paled in comparison to that in the US where the newcomers were classed as distinctly inferior “races” and viewed with contempt by native born workers and organizers. As in the US, the so-called “new immigrants” were held to be un-organizable. Instead, they poured into unions and launched many of the revolts in both countries in the First World War era. In the US this caused employers and the government to lose a bit of their enthusiasm for immigration. Canada had its own Red Scare with a close equation between the foreign born and radicalism, but immigration soared in the twenties, even as it plummeted in the US American productivity might also have been significant. While the US economy was expanding throughout the twenties, the proportion of workers in manufacturing was actually shrinking. Canadian industries were relatively more labour-intensive and might have suffered more from any drastic reduction in the supply of unskilled workers.

When Canadian immigration was finally cut off in the early Depression, this had little to do with Labour’s efforts and more to do with massive unemployment and increasing social unrest. Again, calls for immigration restriction intensified amidst economic decline. David Goutor’s study of the roots of these sentiments reminds us that a great deal remains at stake in the challenge of creating a multi-ethnic labour movement.

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Having read extensively on the history of US government repression of political dissent, I received a rude awakening to the thing itself when, protesting the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in 2000, I saw police round up dozens of demonstrators in the now-famous puppet house. They were put on
dangerously hot buses, packed into tiny jail cells, psychologically and physically brutalized, and indicted for things they had not even planned to do. The tragedy of Philadelphia, methodically planned by national and local authorities, was reprised in the even more vicious assault on protestors of the proposed Free Trade Area of the America’s in Miami in 2003, and, with greater subtlety, the mass arrests of those at the Republican National Convention in New York City in 2004.

To anyone involved in or who has tracked such episodes, a disturbing reality is apparent: that repression, which played a notorious role in the response to the social movements of the 1960s, has made a comeback, and must figure anew into the calculations of dissidents of all kinds. In this light, Jules Boykoff’s *Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States* is a great service, both to dissidents and to our besieged democracy.

Intent to “shine a light on the underbelly of US history,” Boykoff shows that repression is a constant in state responses to dissent. (10) To organize his study, Boykoff’s parses repression’s differing forms, from “direct violence” to “public prosecutions,” “infiltration,” and “harassment arrests,” and documents their application at different points in the American past. He also broadens our understanding of repression—favoring, in fact, the more capacious term “suppression”—to include not just actions of the security apparatus, but those of the media, who affect social movements by how they frame the issues and the movements themselves. In short, Boykoff wisely includes discursive hegemony in his understanding of state power.

Boykoff implicitly addresses two communities. One is those scholars of social movements who have intermittently described state tactics in their narratives of individual movements but have not, by and large, factored suppression into conceptual models of social movement dynamics. Suppression, Boykoff asserts, matters, and should not be seen as an idiosyncratic quality of American state power. Boykoff also enriches our sense of how and why it matters by, in the first instance, defining suppression as “a process through which preconditions for dissident action, mobilization, and collective organization are inhibited by either raising their costs or minimizing their benefits” (12). Significantly, this model sees the “why bother” attitude among dissidents, often adopted as they see their actions ridiculed or ignored, as an effect of suppression. Boykoff’s insight is especially illuminating with respect to opposition to the Iraq war. Peaking before the war even started, the movement withered and bogged down—one may argue—largely as a result of the indifference of the Bush administration and, eventually, the media, to it.

The second, presumed audience is contemporary dissidents. Boykoff provides them a trove of evidence that that state has used and will use suppressive tactics, as well as a valuable inventory of the state’s arsenal. Activists would do well to look for and actively combat its use against them. However obvious, this imperative has been repeatedly ignored (e.g., four years after the Philly RNC, officials again used the pretext of fears of violence to conduct mass, illegal arrests and pro-
tracted detentions, so as to get protestors off the streets and preserve the partisan media spectacle). Boykoff’s study, which lays suppression bare, only compounds the “fool me twice” quality of activists’ subsequent neglect of state and media machinations.

The book’s dual voicing, however, also creates problems. Chiefly, it contributes to a “neither fish nor fowl” cast to the book that may leave scholars and activists alike disappointed. With respect social movement studies, Boykoff mostly provides a taxonomy of different kinds of suppression; he offers, as a result, little specific guidance as to how suppression can be operationalized as an analytic variable. His descriptive/schematic approach, moreover, provides little sense of change over time, either with respect to what ideologies drive suppression and which tactics are favored in what circumstances. And there is no good reason, in a study on suppression as constitutive of state power, to restrict oneself, as Boykoff does, to the suppression of the political left. Perhaps an account of the suppression of the right by the American state, or an analysis of suppression by left wing regimes, would cause Boykoff to broaden or reshape his model.

Finally, Boykoff proceeds from a flawed premise: that in democratic societies raw physical power is both rare and largely unnecessary, given the efficacy of forms of soft power; in “totalitarian” societies, by extension, repression functions through direct violence. But in totalitarian societies as well, suppression often works through the voluntary servitude to or complicity with power, whether in the form of ideological compliance, inertia, the lure of personal gain, fears of personal disadvantage, and so on. Boykoff’s model is antedated, and makes no use of what has been learned about power’s operation since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.

With respect to the activist audience, the problems are more straightforward. First, Boykoff spends so much time labeling and documenting suppression that he offers little in the way of overt advice on how to combat it. Activists must draw practical lessons largely by inference. By the same token, his synopses of historic episodes of suppression remains too clipped to be viscerally compelling. Indeed, the devil is often in the details, and thicker historical descriptions of state power would likely do more to awaken in readers the sense of horror and “emergency” Boykoff clearly favors.

Finally, there are weaknesses in Boykoff’s presentation that may trouble equally academics and activists. Boykoff’s most original section is an analysis of media coverage of global justice protestors, both those at the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle in 1999 and at the World Bank/International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, DC in 2000. Chiefly, Boykoff contests the research of other scholars asserting that provocation at least attracts media attention and that this attention, even if initially negative, at least gives publicity and legitimacy to the protestors’ cause. Boykoff’s content analysis of “prestige media” suggests that their coverage remained largely negative, mitigating or altogether voiding the benefits of attention.
One could easily conclude from Boykoff that protesters should play by the rules, as provocation yields little apparent gain given the power and practices of the media. This is an extremely awkward lesson, given Boykoff’s militant commitment—evident especially in the book’s last section—to radical change. Boykoff seems, in short, stuck by his own research with a case for moderation. But one can also challenge his core analysis. Whatever Boykoff’s data, the global justice movement’s critique of neoliberalism quickly moved from the margins to the mainstream. Indeed, ample evidence indicates that the neoliberalism is now in real trouble, for which demonstrators on this and other continents can likely take significant credit. By this long view, the breaking of Starbucks windows in Seattle may still have been effective.

Boykoff ultimately falls prey to the danger of imputing too great a power to his object of analysis. Trained on the suppression, he is scarcely able to understand how and why state and elite hegemony sometimes fails, whether in the case of neoliberalism or the Iraq war. As a corollary, he gives dissidents too little credit in understanding structures of power and adapting their protest to these structures. Hyperconscious of media tropes, the Billionaires for Bush styled themselves during the 2004 campaign in deliberate contrast to leftwing archetypes. Packaging their serious message in glamorous and abjectly clever political theatre, they resisted dismissal as a dangerous fringe or shaggy nay-sayers. The result was incessant and remarkably favorable coverage; four years later, their critique of class domination has found at least mild expression in the populist rhetoric of a new election cycle.

Boykoff misses the dynamism not only of social movement actors but of the media context in which they exist. The web and various forms of user-generated content have provided unprecedented means for creating multiple and alternate narratives, of proliferating different facts and frames. This greatly complicates the work of ideological hegemony, if not limits the power of the weapons of suppression Boykoff describes. To be sure, there is something refreshingly “old school” about his attention to state and media repression; but at times the approach is so “old school” as to risk the subtle miseducation of those he means to enlighten.

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There are so many books now appearing about the 1960s that some are bound to be dreadful. This one is not the worst, because the author does not seek, as some neoconservatives do, to repudiate practically everything interesting. (Bill Kaufman, noted paleconservative, is among the most insightful, stressing anti-corporate localism and opposition to military globalism that young people in parts of