minutiae of anarchist history as well as his exhaustive reading of the anarchist press is impressive.

Where Goyens falls short of his own stated goal is precisely in the mapping of the New York movement’s geopolitical space announced in the introduction. Despite an effort to do so in the opening chapter — in which he invites the reader “to follow the German anarchist inside the beerhall … and proceed into the back room to join a discussion” — the promised “topography” of anarchism never becomes vividly clear. Notwithstanding Goyens’s claim that his focus is “as much on places and spaces as on ideas and ideals”, he proves himself a more able historian than a geographer (34-35, 7). Indeed, there is an element of tedium to the demographic statistics and street addresses crowding his “Radical Geography” chapter. Although the argument he makes about German anarchist meeting spaces is persuasive — in a nutshell, that they “mirrored the anarchist sensibility” (37) — the spaces themselves, even the best-described (including the editorial offices of Freibit and Justus Schwab’s famous beer hall on the Lower East Side) rarely take on clearly discernible contours.

This is partially the case because the spaces are as obscure as German anarchists themselves, and most have long disappeared. Also, the oft-persecuted movement was itself frequently on the move, an element of impermanence that complicates the task of mapping the loci of anarchists’ experiences. In a much later, excellent chapter on “German Anarchists’ Political Culture in New York,” Goyens acknowledges this transience and, with far greater success, maps German anarchists’ experiential orbit by exploring recreational groups and activities including picnics, outings, rifle clubs, and music and theater performances. It is in this as well as in his concluding chapter, charting the final decline of the movement on the eve of World War I, that Beer and Revolution breaks new ground, offers new research, and thereby earns its place alongside the works of Paul Avrich, Bruce C. Nelson, and other staples of anarchist historiography.

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Thistle traces the demise of the domestic sphere over the past century and a half, focusing particularly on the implications of the transformation in women’s relation to the paid labour market since the 1970s. She argues that as women entered the workforce, the social, political, and legal supports for domestic labour collapsed. Likening women to landless peasants and pre-industrial labourers, Thistle suggests that women lost their traditional “way of life” (25). This loss, she argues, created new hardships as the gendered division of labour broke down. In a discussion
that leaps through time and largely ignores specific historical context, she argues that some women fought to reclaim the old hierarchies while others embraced the new context for their work. The transformation in women’s work created “great material gains,” laying the foundation for the new economy of the twenty-first century—but these gains did not always benefit women themselves.

The transformation of domestic labour, in Thistle’s formulation, took place in three periods. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, she argues, industrial work did not lessen women’s domestic duties. Rather, those duties were supported by what she calls agreements (marriage, the family wage and federal obligations like mothers’ pensions, and later, Aid to Dependent Children) “between fathers, employers, and the state.” While some women became wage labourers, household work remained essential. Thus “male workers repeatedly demanded a “family wage” that could support their wives…and most working-class women preferred marriage…” (25). If the author looked more closely at historical studies of working-class family economies, however, she would have to question how many men actually earned a “family wage.” By the early twentieth century, Thistle says, a few women began to realize “the connection between the performance of household tasks under men’s control…and exclusion from economic and political power”, but most “sought instead to preserve, defend, and, among the more progressive, reform, their domestic economy” (25). That certainly is one way to read the social feminism of women like Jane Addams or Frances Willard. Neither woman, however, romanticized industrial work nor did they accept uncritically the traditional gendered division of labour.

The second phase of historical transformation, Thistle argues, occurred after World War II when women enjoyed a “golden age” of breadwinner and state support. Industrialization decisively entered American homes in this period not only in the form of household technology but via the introduction of technology into the realm of motherhood—birth control and bottled formula—as well. Marriage remained a central, stabilizing pillar in the gendered division of labour, supported, most notably, she says, by ADC and the family wage. (One must seriously question her claims for both of these as significant factors in the lives of most working-class women, black or white.) The baby-boom generation, Thistle argues, did not actively challenge the division of labour. Indeed, most women “fought to prevent its alternation” (57). The implication here is that conservative women in the anti-ERA and anti-abortion movements suffered from a “false consciousness,” and did not comprehend the “real” forces affecting their lives. But feminists too, she says, failed to understand the “true” nature of the domestic realm. Thistle points particularly to the National Organization of Women (NOW) which she says “did not actively challenge the division of labour between the sexes or recognize its role in women’s absence from the labour force” (45). While NOW can be criticized on many fronts, a look at its founding statement clearly suggests that this may be a mis-reading of the organization’s agenda which
included demands for day care and equal pay along with the suggestion that men take greater responsibility in the home.

The final phase of transformation in the domestic realm came in during the waning years of the twentieth century. The unprecedented entry of women—including mothers—into the wage labour market finally loosened the ties between women and domesticity. Thistle's argument is at its strongest when she addresses the implications of these most current developments. She suggests that the move from household to paid work shifted women's central means of support from their husbands to themselves. This meant that marriage became less valuable as both women and men could now purchase domestic services. However, the decline in marriage without a corresponding opening of lucrative employment opportunities for women, created a new realm of poverty. While the media focused on race and the "feminization of poverty", Thistle argues that the real dynamic was the withdrawal of support by employers and the state (and husbands as well) for women's domestic labour. Employers no longer cared about paying a family wage, the state no longer had an interest in welfare, and husbands could buy the services they required. Thistle argues that all lingering legal, economic, and even cultural, supports for domestic work disappeared. (One must question her claim that there had ever been a strong "belief that women's household work deserved government support" [71].) The consequences of the decline of support for domestic work affected women differently depending most notably upon educational level, race, and single motherhood, as marriage no longer carried with it any social or legal benefits. Indeed, she argues, women's poverty used to be caused by an absence of a husband but now it is women's inabilitys to support themselves that creates most female/family poverty.

Ultimately, Thistle's thesis, while intriguing, is weakened by the unspecific and ambiguous nature of historical evidence. For example, she ignores issues of age and life cycle in shaping opportunities and expectations for women, particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, while she contrasts the work, family, and educational experiences of black and white women, she largely ignores questions of immigration and ethnicity. Finally, her explanation for contemporary political alliances seems contradictory. She asserts that women "are coming to perceive their interests as wage workers more clearly" (153). I'm not sure where the evidence for this statement comes from or, similarly, what is behind her assertion that men now "have wives in the labor force and therefore see policies that ease the difficulties of combining home and work as being in their own interests" (154). At the same time she attributes the rise of conservative politics to, again, a false consciousness in which "many white male workers formed alliances not with African American men or with the growing numbers of women workers of either race, but with employers and the New Right" (64).

The book ends with a very general overview of the global economy and calls for a "revolution in social policy" that would include new ways of commit-
t ting employers and the state (as well as husbands) to child care, new definitions of citizenship that would recognize the right of every adult to “both a good job and to time for caregiving” (165). She insists that women’s rights should be based not on their difference from men “but on the fact of the movement of labor out of the domestic realm” (142). Her points are well taken, but more work needs to be done to give those goals concrete shape.

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In Susan K. Cahn’s imaginative exploration of modern Southern history, if 1960’s student sit-in movement represents the New South’s coming of age, the decades prior represent its adolescence. And what better way to study the adolescent South, she posits, than through the history of Southern adolescents, or more specifically its female adolescents? In order to understand the growing pains of the New South, as modernity battled with cultural traditions and legal structures, Cahn navigates the terrain of young womanhood, a stage on which played out dramas over not just sex, but race, class, and modernity itself.

Cahn argues that adolescent women were a flashpoint in the struggles of a developing New South since “the sexuality of teenage girls struck an important political nerve, one connected to a larger regional crisis of identity” (20). Cahn’s study runs from the “problem” white flappers of the 1920s up to the black teenage girls who desegregated white schools in the mid- to late 1950s. Cahn makes her argument decade by decade through a series of disparate case studies that explore both the lived experience of black and white adolescent girls and the social management of their sexuality. Chapters are devoted to eugenic sterilization programs, adolescent consumers, reform programs for sexual delinquents, dancing, World War II pickup girls, and the young women who were part of the first wave of black students to integrate formerly white schools. It is a wide-ranging landscape that Cahn covers well, marshalling an impressive array of evidence including diaries, court records, and oral histories. Her strongest work, such as that on the eugenics program, is that in which she can dig her teeth into a case study rather than trying to diagnose larger and more diffuse sociological patterns, like black female sexuality.

Cahn begins with the movement of rural black and white women into the urban workforce in the 1920s and 1930s, and the fear this engendered on the part of ruling men. While this phenomenon was not unique to the region—much has been written about the similar situation of mill girls of Lowell, Massachusetts—Cahn argues that the South was different because its “moral panic about adoles-