Articulating the Nation: British Conservatism, Race and the 1988 Education Act

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After the election of June 1987, Margaret Thatcher proclaimed that her new government's education bill would be "the key to the future: the biggest and most important legislation of the forthcoming parliamentary session."1 When the bill became law in July 1988, it was seen as both a flagship of radical Conservative social reform and, according to its architect, Kenneth Baker, a worthy descendant of previous Education Acts passed in 1902 and 1944.2 Stealing Thatcher’s metaphor, the 1988 Education Act also offers a key to understanding important aspects of Conservative politics and ideology in the seventies and eighties. First of all, it provides one example of the Conservatives’ contradictory but potent mix of the free market and central power, along the lines suggested by Stuart Hall and Andrew Gamble.3 The Act’s provisions for schools to ‘opt out’ from local authorities, with greater parental control, theoretically encouraged market forces and consumer rights. At the same time, the Department of Education brought greater powers within its own scope, mostly at the expense of local education authorities and teachers.4 One spectacular instance of this came with the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority [ILEA]. The Conservatives’ initiative in education also underlines their interest in bringing the family and the child to the centre of ideological discussion, as Sharon Stephens and Heather Nunn have suggested.5 Again, this shows an interesting and contradictory mix. On the one hand, there was the clear exercise of authority in moving away from progressive ideas of child-centred education. On the other, the Act encouraged greater market forces in education, stressing choice, independence and autonomy for both parents and schools.

Finally, the Act was the product of an interplay in Conservative thought from the 1960s to the 1980s around anxieties about national identity and curriculum. Baker called the establishment of a centrally-controlled national curriculum the “bedrock of our reform proposals”.6 His national curriculum initiative was set in the context of an educational and political consensus based upon a similar, though unrealised commitment made by then Prime Minister James Callaghan in 1976.7 Baker was careful, for instance, to emphasise this bipartisan pedigree in the parliamentary debates of 1987-8. But the Conservative argument for a national curriculum more crucially drew upon a long-standing doubt about national identity apparent in Conservative circles since the late 1950s, a disquiet rooted in the issue of non-white immigration. Reasserting traditional ideas of the nation in the context of national revival and recovery was a touchstone of the Conservative political ethos in the 1980s in

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both the domestic and foreign spheres. Soon after the election of 1979, Margaret Thatcher stated explicitly her desire to put “an end to decline” and “renew the spirit and solidarity of the nation”. Education and, in particular, curriculum provided one arena for the discussion of this question. Discussing the question of “Englishness” or “Britishness” and national identity, Linda Colley has addressed the need to explore ‘frontiers’ between races and nations or within national communities. In post-war, multiracial Britain, it is a truism to point to the frontiers within the nation, which bring out the parameters of the contested discourse of "Englishness" or "Britishness". Among those are education and curriculum, as a number of authors have discussed. In the 1970s and 1980s, education became a limintrophe, a boundary of political mobilisation between forces of left and right. What any examination of the political discussions surrounding curriculum and race in this period underlines is the besieged condition of white "Englishness” or "Britishness” from the contemporary Conservative perspective. In this respect, to adopt a term used by Homi Bhabha and Mary Louise Pratt, this article might be subtitled "domestic transculturation and its discontents." From the perspective of the right, the traditional national identity was an ethos threatened by progressive and, later, radical educational theories and practices, with their emphasis upon questions of race, gender and class. Anna Marie Smith has argued for the centrality of race and sexuality to Thatcherite discourse and populism, not least in the way race was ‘re-coded’ in the 1970s and 1980s. This is also a point made by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall. Discussions of educational curriculum provide one historical example of these arguments.

The present article attempts, first of all, to explore the political roots of the curricular concerns embodied in the 1988 Act and understand in an historical context the connections, within Conservatism, among questions of educational curriculum, national identity, and race. The article examines Conservative ideas on education, not simply in an attempt to think about Conservative policy and education, but also to relate that sphere to the party’s approach to immigration and race. The article builds on discussions of education by Ivor Goodson, Andrew Harnett and Michael Nash, the analysis of *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality* (1994) by Anna Marie Smith and, as already acknowledged, is also informed by the work of Gilroy, Hall and Gamble.

Using a range of unpublished and published sources, this article first considers the Conservatives’ perception of the broad changes in education and race occurring within Britain between the 1960s and the early 1980s. It will then discuss the developments of the 1980s, before concluding with an examination of the prelude to and discussion surrounding Baker’s initiative between 1986 and 1988. Clearly, because of the limited scale of this article, it cannot be a comprehensive survey of educational reform or the issue of race in either Conservatism or British politics. The discussion will concentrate upon Conservative percep-
tions of the relationship between education, curriculum, and race up to 1988. An examination of the discussions on curriculum following the 1988 Act is thus precluded by the scope of the present article, as is an exploration of the related issues of sexual orientation, gender or class in curriculum discussions, notably the debate over Clause or Section 28 concerning homosexuality included in the 1988 Local Government Act. Nonetheless, even a limited examination may deepen our understanding of the Conservative agenda over social reform and its relationship to anxieties about national identity. What this article argues is that the Conservative view of the relationship between education, curriculum and national identity sharpened between the 1960s and the 1980s; by the Thatcher years, the educational system and the curriculum in particular were perceived as critical tools in the articulation of a traditional idea of national identity.

I

From the 1860s to the 1960s, the shape of secondary school curriculum was largely set in a mould that emphasized 'core' subjects and a traditional curriculum in areas such as English and history. The reforms of 1902, establishing local education authorities to provide secondary schooling, also maintained, for instance, that the curriculum in English and history follow the lines of the grammar school model, buttressed by regulations issued by the Board of Education. The idea of cultural 'legacy' or identity was, in many respects, one inherited from Matthew Arnold: A national literature or history built upon the values and tastes of the bourgeois and aristocracy. This was, as the Newbolt Committee on the teaching of English suggested in 1921, as much about defending the "nation" against the threat posed by those same masses, as about transmitting a recognized canon to the masses for their education: "[t]he nation of which a considerable portion rejects this means of grace, and despises this great spiritual influence, must assuredly be heading to disaster." The reforms of 1944 freed up the regulation of curriculum, shifting power largely to local education authorities and teachers. For a time, the traditional character of the curriculum persisted; in English, for instance, it has been suggested that the influence of F.R. Leavis in the 1940s and 1950s helped continue a "discourse of orthodoxy" that ensured a "good" education and national harmony. There was little political dissent on the issue between the three major parties. The Conservative governments of 1951 to 1964 largely left the question alone, though in 1960, David Eccles, the Minister of Education, ventured that he wished to "sally into the secret garden of the curriculum." It has been suggested that what, in part, the Conservatives feared was setting the precedent of government control of curriculum, which might, under a Labour government, be used for political purposes.

At this point, of course, the Conservatives had the luxury of a curriculum that, for the greater part of the century, had projected the "nation" they
themselves might have espoused, one stressing, for instance, a particular English literary canon and a particular English history. By the early 1960s, the "nation" was, of course, far more complicated in its identity that it had been in 1944, 1918 or 1902. The increased immigration of the late 1940s, the affluence of the working class (and the growing cultural presence of that class), and the burgeoning women's movement represented profound challenges to the late nineteenth century notion of an "Englishness" shaped by whiteness, maleness, and the middle class. The retreat from an internal "Englishness" was made even more hasty by decolonization and the Suez adventure. As Bill Schwarz has suggested, Conservatives actively constructed a response to such challenges as a way of shoring up a more traditional idea of the nation. The bewildering manifestation of these changes in the 1960s, which, within the Conservative sphere produced the race obsessions of Enoch Powell, the anti-collectivist "Selsdon Man", and, it could be argued, Margaret Thatcher, was mirrored by changes in education.

The systematic introduction of comprehensive schools begun in 1965 by Anthony Crosland made education a more contentious political issue. In the 1960s, controversy arose from the structural implications of a comprehensive policy. Conservatives objected to the comprehensive policy, not only on the basis that it limited parental choice in the selection of schools, but also that it was a naked vessel of social engineering towards the end of socialist equality. In 1965, for instance, the Education sub-committee of the party's National Advisory Committee on Local Government noted that it "deplore[d] any attempt to treat the education system in this country as a medium for political action or of providing an opportunity to implement ideological theories." In 1967, Crosland's Circular 10/65 was attacked as "doctrinaire socialism."

In the mid-1960s, it was not yet perceived, however, that the secret garden of the curriculum had been disturbed by the comprehensive policy. Advocates of the comprehensive in the 1950s and early 1960s envisaged it as diffusing more widely, rather than displacing the traditional curriculum. The introduction of comprehensive schools ran parallel, however, with shifting ideas of national culture as interpreted by curriculum. Educational progressivism sought to reflect the changing nature of British society through a recognition of issues of class, race, and gender. History and English were particularly important spheres in this regard. In the former, progressivism implied a divergence from a traditional English history, whether through the treatment of subordinate or alternative histories, or in more critical considerations of the legacies of British capitalism and imperialism. In the teaching of English, the move towards a progressive curriculum shifted the emphasis from an accepted objective national canon, to a more subjective point of view, stressing language rather than literature, contemporary relevance rather than tradition, minority rather than dominant perspectives, and with less commitment to the ideal of Standard English.
In part, this was a pedagogical strategy. More broadly, this mirror reflected a very different picture of the nation. As Stephen Ball, Alex Kenny, and David Gardiner point out, it promoted a national image dwelling upon the working, rather than middle class and multiracialism rather than monoracialism: "[h]ere the English teacher was no longer to be a missionary disseminating the values of civilization but an anthropologist mapping and collecting the values and culture of subordinate groups, initially the working class (later girls and blacks)."29 Benchmarks of such changes in English literature came, for instance, with influential conferences at Dartmouth College in 1966 and York in 1971. Though it would be wrong to think that a traditional curriculum had been completely displaced, the currents of progressivism were certainly prevalent in curriculum discussions by the late 1970s, a change underlined in 1975 with the Bullock report on the teaching of English and ten years later with the Swann report on multi-ethnic education, and the traditional curriculum was undoubtedly diluted considerably.

But the Conservative response to curricular change between the 1960s and the 1980s was, however, to suggest that the traditional curriculum, and by implication, the accepted idea of the English nation, had been swept away by a torrent of immigrant narratives, dub poetry, or lesbian histories. The tone of this response reached fever pitch in the 1980s, but it began, admittedly more quietly, in the late 1960s, when Conservative interest in education broadened from the structure of comprehensive schooling, to the content of teaching itself. Particularly suspect, as Angus Maude put it quaintly in 1968, was a younger generation with "a rather 'way out' detached attitude," who flirted not only with shorter hemlines and longer hair, but with new theories of education as well.30 Comprehensives were bad enough; what was considered worse was the perceived ascendancy of progressivism among teachers and educationalists. Such progressivism was invariably tied to political radicalism.

From the late 1960s, the term "comprehensive" became political shorthand for a cluster of Conservative anxieties about education: social engineering of a structural kind; the circumscription of choice for parents; the introduction of progressive theories into schooling; and the undermining of a cherished tradition and form of English education. From this context emerged the influential Black Papers on education, largely the work of Rhodes Boyson, then headmaster of Highbury Grove School and chairman of a Tory pressure-group, the National Council for Educational Standards, and later Conservative MP for Brent North. The first was published in 1969 and spawned a number of sequels, all articulating the various criticisms of education in the 1960s and 1970s. Anxieties over the state of education found resonances among the Conservative rank-and-file by the 1970s. In 1976, for instance, education attracted the most constituency resolutions at the annual conference, with delegates particularly disturbed about falling standards in state schools as a result of curricular change, whether in
terms of literacy or discipline. There was a resolve to recapture the initiative in education. "The time has never been more propitious than the present," wrote Norman St John Stevas (then shadow pokesman on education) in 1974, "for a radical restatement of Conservative education philosophy and policy." The result was a "new 'common sense' about schools." This common sense was, in many ways, a demonology of anarchic educational radicalism, whose victims were students, parents, and national standards and ideals. The happy irony is, of course, that the Heath government and its Education Secretary, Margaret Thatcher, had done little to reform education between 1970 and 1974, except to increase the number of comprehensive schools.

Anxiety about education in the 1970s was not, of course, limited to the Conservative party. The publication of the Bullock report on English, well-publicized controversies about falling school standards such as those surrounding the William Tyndale school, and, perhaps most importantly, James Callaghan's sponsorship of a 'Great Debate' on education and curriculum in the fall of 1976 all highlighted deepening disquiet with the state of education and educational standards. Nonetheless, there was a distinctive Conservative perspective on the question.

First of all, one can point to the fear that progressives or radicals in local education authorities were using curriculum as a means of political indoctrination. That the most flagrant examples of "peace studies", anti-racism, or the promotion of "alternative" lifestyles and sexual orientations were either apocryphal or limited in number to particular areas boroughs within the ILEA did not dampen the intensity of Conservative emotion on the subject in the 1970s and 1980s. "Schools are for schooling," intoned the editors of the 1975 version of the Black Paper, "not social engineering." This became associated, as a Conservative Research Department pamphlet was to suggest in 1986, with "campaigning against traditional moral standards and in favour of minorities." Issues such as class and pacifism rankled Conservatives, but the most irksome were the constellations of sexuality and race. These were the minority perspectives cutting away the fabric of traditional "Englishness," as suggested by Smith.

Race was a particularly tender point for the Conservatives. Comments at party conferences in the 1970s indicate an apparently shared unease at the perceived thrust of the curriculum towards the reflection of a multiracial society, rather than upon the assimilation of minority communities into a dominant British or English culture. At the same time, it should be noted, the Labour party, both at the national and local level, was moving towards a more radical espousal of multiculturalism in education.

These concerns over education in the 1970s must, as well, be placed in the context of Conservative views of race and national identity in the same period. In political terms, the question of race had, since 1957, been a question of
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colour, prompted by non-white immigration from the "new" Commonwealth. As such, the issue had long troubled the Conservative party, particularly owing to constituency pressure.39 Enoch Powell's notorious "rivers of blood" speech in April 1968 and the reaction to it from within the Conservative party was simply the culmination of the difficulties the party had with the question of non-white immigration. Through the 1960s, the party's policy was based upon tightening controls on non-white immigration, while promoting integration. There could be little disguising, however, the profound discomfort the party's rank-and-file still felt with the entire question.

A crucial element of this was the threat that non-white immigration was perceived to pose to traditional ideas of the national community.40 The acceptable face of this discomfort was the sense of difference and threat articulated by a constituency delegate in 1961: "[t]hese immigrants are not necessarily inferior to us but they are different -- different not only in colour but in background, tradition and habit."41 In September 1968, for instance, in a speech which otherwise disowned Powell's comments of the previous April, Edward Heath acknowledged this sense of white Britons being threatened or besieged by the transformation of multiracialism: "[t]hey felt that here was a situation out of hand, which would work to the detriment of their children and of future generations. That here was a crisis unresolved, which could change their way of life and the very nature of society in their own native land."42 In 1968 and 1972, there were highly-charged and divisive debates on immigration and race at the party's annual conference.43 What underlay much of the discussion was, once again, the sense of threat to the traditional nation felt by Conservative party members. In 1972, for instance, even a delegate speaking in favour of allowing the right of entry for Ugandan Asians gave away the feeling of threat:

We have something worth preserving, and please God we will preserve it. We will take these Asians in. We will look after them. But we can not absorb half the new Commonwealth. Let us cry halt. Let us cry it now.44

Pressure on education by immigrants was one aspect of this threat, whether through language difficulties or through growing proportions of non-white students in schools. Discussions on these points within Conservative policy committees (on both education and immigration) revealed particular apprehension at the latter, and it was agreed in 1965 that the party "should go firm on a maximum 30 per cent content of coloured immigrants per school," even if this meant busing children following the American example of busing children into different neighbourhoods to adjust the demographic profile of certain schools.45 This proposal featured in a Conservative Political Centre pamphlet of the same year, buttressed with the admonition that "a concentration of immigrant children in a school is socially and educationally undesirable."46 In the 1970s, concerns about the relationship between education and race shifted to the curriculum,
intertwined with the fear of declining standards in schools and of social engineering by local education authorities. Increasingly, there was an argument for rolling back progressive education and reasserting what Rhodes Boyson called 'traditionally directed and winnowed methods'.

It can be suggested, finally, that the Conservative perspective on education was consciously placed in a general context of reconstructing the traditional nation. One element of this clearly touches upon the importance of training to the national economy, but it is also part of a largely Conservative rhetoric of national revival in the 1970s, a revival in the truest sense: the resuscitation of an older idea of the English nation. This was caught in the comments made to the party conference of 1975 by the Conservative spokesman on education, Norman St John Stevas. St John Stevas emphasized a return to traditional methods and standards at the national level and infused this proposal with rhetoric tying educational reform to the revival of the nation. In 1975, he remarked, for instance:

Where better to start this renewal than in our schools? What place is more propitious to exorcise the demons of cynicism and hopelessness which are destroying the nation? Our duty, and it is a high one, through our educational policies and principles is to inspire the next generation with a sense both of the nation's historic achievements and of the mission which is yet to be accomplished.

A year later, St John Stevas maintained that education was "the only way ultimately we shall renew and revive our nation."

But, at this point, Conservatism lacked a particular focus. Alongside anxieties about race, the threat of progressivism was certainly developing, but a well-defined target was not yet apparent. This may be, in large part, because multi-culturalism or multi-ethnicity still seemed in the 1970s, if not precisely a welcome addition to the curriculum, at least not radical enough to attack easily. This changed very quickly in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Labour-controlled local authorities, particularly within London, increasingly embraced a more radical form of curriculum.

II

In July 1981, the ILEA decided to move from a policy of encouraging multiculturalism or multi-ethnicity in education (formally in practice since 1977) to one that emphasized a more radical and determined campaign of anti-racism through the schools. There was a sense of exasperation with a policy of mere multiculturalism, as a publication by the Camden Committee for Community Relations suggested in 1985: "ILEA have at last [author's italics] accepted that racism is a powerful factor in education...[a]s one example, ILEA accepts that many materials and texts used in schools are full of cultural and racial prejudice, ignoring and degrading minority people." Such analysis was also applied to class and sexual discrimination. The change coincided, of course, with the
establishment of a Labour controlled Greater London Council under Ken Livingstone. Clearly, a shift had occurred in educational politics among some local education authorities, particularly within London, when multiculturalism of the kind espoused by the Swann report of 1985 was no longer enough. Multiculturalism was perceived, as was remarked later, as "the velvet glove concealing the iron hand of the status quo."52

The shift to foregrounding race as a primary issue in the curriculum by local education authorities offered a more defined and, clearly, more horrifying source of Conservative worries about the relationship between education and race. It was, in many ways, the last straw, as a brief survey of what could be called Conservative intellectual opinion in the period between 1981 and 1988 shows. Conservative think tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies and the Social Affairs Unit, and journals like the Salisbury Review do not, of course, necessarily reflect the state of party opinion. However, they do represent the intellectual gloss of the emerging "common sense" about education in the 1980s. Though this is not always a homogeneous group in its views on all issues (the Review tended to be more independently right-wing in outlook), there is a remarkably common approach on education. Membership of right-wing pressure groups on education such as the Hillgate group (which included the editor of the Review, Roger Scruton and published Whose Schools? A Radical Manifesto in 1986), the Educational Research Trust (of which Lady Cox, a prominent Conservative spokeswoman in the Lords, was a member), and the National Council for Educational Standards often overlapped with the pool of those contributing to the CPS and the Salisbury Review.

In such circles, education was stressed as an overriding national issue in the 1980s, particularly in its relationship to the rescue and revival of the nation: "[n]o issues touch the national interest as nearly as those of education and foreign policy," remarked the Salisbury Review in January 1987, while, the previous year, a contributor to a collection published by the Social Affairs Unit speculated that the decline of education was linked to the decline of "civil order in this once famously law-abiding society."53 The governments of 1979-1987 had not been quick to respond to such disaffection. Though White Papers were published in 1980 and 1985, the first two Conservative ministers of education, Mark Carlisle and Keith Joseph, did little to alter either the structure of education or that of curriculum. Ferdinand Mount was one influential insider within the Downing Street Policy unit in the early 1980s interested in Conservative reform of education.54 But the tone of the Conservative approach to education only changed significantly with the tenure of Kenneth Baker as Education Secretary between May 1986 and July 1989. Consequently, up to 1987, an underlying frustration with the government's failure or "chronic apathy" in educational and, specifically, curriculum reform was apparent among Conservative educationalists.55 An editorial in the Salisbury Review complained in 1984 that the
government was doing nothing to reform curriculum, even in the face of 'those schools controlled by bodies such as the ILEA, which have made no secret of the fact that they seek to impose an anti-traditional, progressivist and essentially politicized curriculum upon the schools within their care.']"56

A common touchstone was outrage at the replacement of a traditional curriculum and the destruction of a recognized national canon (particularly in English and history) by one that emphasized progressive issues.57 Progressivism in education was dismissed as a "mish mash," promoting cultural diversity as a "relativistic mélange."58 Much effort was spent in attacking the new creeds of Peace Studies, Black Studies, "anti-sexism," "anti-racism," and what Roger Scuton and others called the "shambling neo-Marxism that lies behind the radicalized curriculum."59 Contributors to the debate were tireless in chronicling every perceived excess of educational authorities, particularly the ILEA.60

What is more striking is the way education intersected with broader thought on the race question in Britain; indeed, it is difficult to separate the two. The crisis in education was linked to a determination to recover authority within the curriculum and to restore it to a traditional base, particularly in English and history. A curriculum dominated by race issues, or those of sex and class, was perceived to be a threat to the importance of teaching the "literary and cultural heritage" of the country.61 One critic, writing on history, suggested, for instance, that anti-racism and a belief in the nation were diametrically opposed: "[h]atred for the institutions, beliefs and character of the British people is deeply ingrained in the race-relations industry."62 This sense of irreconcilability between race and nation within the curriculum was clearly evident in the pages of the Salisbury Review, for which the race question was an over-riding preoccupation in the 1980s, particularly as it intersected with education. Ray Honeyford was a headteacher in a Bradford school with a high proportion of students of Asian descent. His controversial comments eventually led to his leaving the teaching profession. He argued, for instance, that, with other threats, a multicultural curriculum, one that might include the writing of dub poet Linton Kwesi Johnston "alongside the works of Shakespeare and Wordsworth," one that made "colour and race significant, high-profile issues in the classroom" brought "fragmentation and discord" into the national education system.63 This found resonances with other contributors in the Review between 1983 and 1987. The sense generally was one of defensiveness and threat, particularly from left-wing educational authorities and minority groups. The thrust of the argument was to return education, and, in particular, the curricula of English and history, to traditional bases whether by stressing Standard English, a recognised traditional canon of literature, and British history, as a way of assimilation--"English is relevant since the object of the exercise is, or ought to be, as fast as we can, so to assimilate our immigrants that they become English or Scots or Welsh who just happen to have skins of a minority colour"--or reinvigorating a traditional
national morality—"Schools must return to genuine responsible religious and moral education, where traditional values and the sense of obligation, whether to family, community or nation are inculcated." Even an apparently moderate voice such as John Bowis stressed the dichotomy between race and nation:

Of course one is happy to see good race relations promoted, just as one is happy to see sensible work to break down the traditional stereo typing of the sexes in terms of their role-playing and subject choices. One is happy to see an understanding of minority sexual orientations, just as one is happy to see an understanding of minority interests of all sorts.

However, when such minority interests are given such prominence and majority interests are taught as being mere aberrations, then the correction of the balance has gone too far... Those who use our education system within the ILEA for their own campaigns to break down the free capitalist democracy that has been our guarantee of genuine individual freedom in this country for generations, are not working for the true education of the children of London.

What may be ironic is the stated determination that the right were reacting against the politicization of education: "It is categorically not 'a means to a more equal society' or any such left-liberal nonsense. Again, paradoxically then, our approach must never become overtly or unnecessarily interventionist, except of course when reversing the damage done by the Left." As had been earlier suggested in the Review, freedom and non-intervention did not extend to the reform of education with a particular intent: "Conservative freedom does not entail 'liberating' children from their national and religious inheritance."

Thatcher herself later expressed some reservation at a French-style centralised curriculum, but noted that reaction had been prompted by the political radicalism of the left: "the propaganda was coming from left-wing local authorities, teachers and pressure groups, not us." These attitudes are, of course, as much about a sense of threat to a particular tradition of Englishness as they are about education. The perceived threat came from the attempt to accommodate the reality of a multiracial nation through a progressive curriculum. The imperative from the right was to restore, or at least shore up the traditional nation through a legislated national curriculum. One can see, in this, a continuity with, and development of earlier Conservative concerns, rooted particularly in the discomfort with race. What the right found in the 1980s was an unholy alliance in education between progressivism and the problem of race. This provided a much more well-defined object of criticism; the "enemy" was better-recognised.

In the same period, newspapers such as the Sun and Daily Mail fostered a myth of ludicrous, but threatening, left-wing radicalism, particularly within the ILEA, which helped popularize the arguments made by Conservative intellectu-
Brent and Haringey were as much creations of the mind as geographic locations, areas where, according to the *Daily Mail*, children were "educated into the lesbian way of life," where "[i]n place of discipline and skill in basics we now have peace studies and anti-racism," where "silly theories" reigned.\(^6^9\) Such views were not confined to the Conservative-leaning press. In the same year, the *Daily Mirror* complained that "[f]or years dogma has ruled education."\(^7^0\) What the papers' coverage of education in this manner did, of course, was to render the arguments found in the Centre for Policy Studies, the *Salisbury Review*, and the Social Affairs Unit, into a popular mythology of multiculturalism gone mad. It did not seem to matter, as a left-leaning education pamphlet suggested, that "when such charges have been investigated, almost none has been made to stick."\(^7^1\) The riots of 1981, 1985 and 1987 gave rise as well to a media representation that, for instance, encouraged an idea of a disordered, alien non-England in exactly those areas – the inner cities – that had already been identified as the heartlands of educational progressivism.\(^7^2\)

Whether this mythology actually had a popular basis is more questionable. The evidence from opinion surveys such as those conducted for the annual studies of *British Social Attitudes* is at best ambiguous concerning public attitudes toward the curriculum issue. The question about which level of government should control the curriculum is a case in point. In 1985, the majority of those polled, 53\%, believed that control of the curriculum was best left to local education authorities, against 39\% who wished it transferred to the central government.\(^7^3\) In 1986, this proportion was essentially unchanged, but by 1988, the gap narrowed significantly, with 48\% in favour of local authority control and 47\% in favour of central government control.\(^7^4\) As one of the contributors to *British Social Attitudes* noted, there were several possible reasons for this shift: The predominance given to the question by the Conservative government, the unpopularity of the teachers' strike between 1986 and 1987, and, not least, the critical discussion in the Conservative-dominated press, particularly during 1986-1987.\(^7^5\) Nonetheless, it is still worth noting that local education authority control of the curriculum still enjoyed majority support, however narrow that majority was. It was not until 1990 that a majority of those polled (48\% to 46\%) favoured central control of the curriculum.\(^7^6\) It should also be stressed that multicultural education remained acceptable to a majority. When asked, in 1988, whether all children should be taught about the "history and culture" of immigrant countries, 74\% agreed. What was opposed was any radical multiculturalism or sense of separate education or treatment for minority children, whether through separate religious or language instruction, or permitting children to wear traditional dress.\(^7^7\) Despite the ambivalence over the control of the curriculum, this might suggest the existence of an opportunity for the Conservative government to pursue an initiative in education against policies such as "anti-racism," buoyed up by the media characterization of local education authorities.
III

This opportunity was taken up in December 1986 when Kenneth Baker, Keith Joseph's successor as Education Secretary, made clear his determination to pursue a major reform of education, including the introduction of a national curriculum. These plans had been set out in speeches to educationalists in the winter of 1987. The Conservative election manifesto of 1987 also featured high profile educational proposals such as allowing state schools to opt out of local control, increasing parental control, and establishing a national curriculum. As already suggested, the proposals for opting-out and greater parental control enhanced the idea of market forces being brought to bear on education and on the Conservatives' sustained attempt to reduce the sway of the welfare state in British life.78 It is clear that Baker shared many of the assumptions on education present in Conservative circles. In 1979, for instance, he had chaired a committee of London Conservatives which looked at education in the capital and recommended winding up the ILEA. His memoirs stress his belief in a traditional curriculum, particularly in English and history, against the "ideologues who had captured much of the education world".79 One story he recounted about the "political indoctrination" of the ILEA is particularly telling. Visiting a school off the Edgware Road, he witnessed a re-enactment of the 1889 dockers' strike by students, an exercise which he felt was biased against capitalists: "[w]hen I remonstrated and argued for impartiality, I was bluntly told that there was no other version of history which was true. No, ILEA was incapable of reform. It had to go.780

As will be suggested below, Baker's proposals did speak to long-standing Conservative anxieties about national identity and education. But it was not a naked articulation of right-wing intent. A desire to roll back progressive education and restore a traditional "nation" through schools was certainly a subtext of Baker's attempt, but it was more explicitly framed in a language of consensus. This combination is, in many respects, the most interesting aspect of this particular Conservative social reform.

Baker certainly benefitted from a rough agreement on the need for a national curriculum. Though the Labour party had serious objections to the plans for "opting out," it was not against the idea of a national curriculum. After all, it had been a Labour prime minister who first suggested it and the principal Labour spokesmen on education in 1987 and 1988, Jack Straw and Giles Radice, both supported some kind of national curriculum.81 Labour did promote multiculturalism in education, but this was apparently never seen as something that was irreconcilable with a national curriculum.82 Similarly, it is clear that, within the Labour party, there was a vacuum of thought about alternatives to a Conservative national curriculum.83 This is perhaps surprising, given the groundswell of opposition to, or at least caution about the curriculum proposals among educationalists.
During the parliamentary debates on the Education Act between July 1987 and July 1988, Baker was careful to appear moderate and to play to a consensus on the curriculum. "In all revolutionary change, there is a powerful strand of evolution," he claimed in October 1987, setting his proposals in the context of an initiative begun in 1976 by James Callaghan. Similarly, with a few exceptions, Conservative back-benchers were muted in their attacks on progressive education during the parliamentary debates, though there were occasional remarks such as "Look at Haringey" or heartfelt laments that "Charlie and the Chocolate Factory...is considered racist." The proposal to abolish the ILEA did offer one forum to vent the Conservative "common sense" on education. In February 1988, for instance, Baker included, as part of the rationale for abolition, the comment that "[t]he political leaders of ILEA...over the years have done a great disservice to education in London by following a series of fads." But he did not criticize multicultural education as such, only its excesses.

The curriculum question was largely passed over by Labour participants, who generally concentrated on attacking the proposals for opting out. Labour spokesmen did criticize the "dangerously authoritarian" centralization of power over the curriculum with the Department of Education and Science, and the appearance that the national curriculum would be a "state syllabus rather than a national core curriculum." But the defense of multicultural education and, indeed, of Labour education authorities was most effectively taken up by others. Edward Heath's contribution was notably brisk in this regard: "[w]e are going through the whole of this process because of the madness of Brent, Haringey and two or three others out of more than 100 education authorities." The relationship between national identity and curriculum was aired only by a Plaid Cymru MP, Dafydd Elis Thomas. Thomas touched on the wider issue of nation and identity: "[t]he other approach that is undermined by the subject-led curriculum is the commitment...to education for a multi-cultural society...[t]hat has been neglected by the Government and this approach of a subject-based curriculum will prevent the sort of innovations in multi-cultural education that we require."

Baker's approach may have been moderate within parliament, but there are signs of how he and others were willing to hint at the subtext of race and nation in Conservative language about education. This was particularly striking in Baker's comments outside Westminster between 1987 and 1989 on history and literature and on the abolition of the ILEA, included as part of the Education Act in February 1988. Baker used the introduction of the reform proposals to criticize, however subtly, progressive education. Concerning history, for instance, he stated clearly that he was "not entirely given to the notion of teaching contemporary history to everybody and drew attention to the way that it has been somewhat abused in some parts of the country in terms of bias"; that same month, January 1987, he told the London Society of Education...
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Officers that "much history teaching was 'unbalanced.'"92 Where Baker prodded delicately at the threat of progressive education, Thatcher was happy to wield a sledgehammer, telling the Conservative conference of October 1987:

Too often, children did not get the education they needed and deserved. In the inner cities, too often that opportunity was snatched from them by hard left education authorities and extremist teachers. Children who needed to count and multiply were learning anti-racist mathematics -- whatever that might be. Children who needed to be able to express themselves in clear English were being taught political slogans.

Children who needed to be taught to respect traditional moral values were being taught that they had an inalienable right to be gay.93 Similarly, Thatcher made much of two controversies surrounding education in Brent and Haringey, one suggesting teachers had used the curriculum to promote "terrorism in South Africa," the other that teachers in Brent had been promoting homosexual videos.94 Baker's hope to restore a traditional idea of the nation through the curriculum can be evinced further through other comments, particularly on what he wished to see included in the history and English components of the national curriculum. In the first weeks after his announcement of a national curriculum, he spoke of the need for a clear understanding of the "national past" by ensuring that the history curriculum have "at the core the history of Britain, the record of its past, and, in particular, its political, constitutional and cultural heritage," as "the foundation stone of citizenship and democracy."95 When the history working party presented its interim report in July 1989, Baker was happy with its movement towards traditional teaching methods in history, but less pleased with the lack of emphasis on British history.96 In the sphere of literature, he stressed the "great works" approach, publicly citing Dickens and Shakespeare.97 More generally, he was quick to emphasise the importance of a "national" education, one linked to the achievements of the nation; in February 1988, he remarked for instance, in the midst of an interview in which he also praised the views of the late Allan Bloom: "[p]art of [curriculum] is teaching certain basic skills: literacy, numeracy, and oracy. But over and above that, children should have an understanding of the literary and artistic background of this country as well as of the historical and geographical roots from which they come."98 It is, perhaps, less than surprising that such comments found a direct parallel on the Conservative right; welcoming the proposals for a national curriculum in December 1987, the Salisbury Review noted: "it is first and foremost a knowledge of British history which restores the lost dimension of British experience...it also reinforces the loyalty on which our survival depends."99

The Act received Royal Assent in July 1988. The debate about the curriculum has continued since that point. On the right, the sense certainly was of
a victory, marking the beginning of a mopping-up operation in foreign territory, as the language of a CPS pamphlet of October 1991 suggests: "the schools we inherited clearly belonged to a well-defined system of collectivist values which had more to do with conditioning pupils socially than improving them intellectually." John Patten's later tenure as Education Secretary during the ill-fated "Back to Basics" campaign to revive Tory fortunes continued this traditionalist turn. From the side of the defeated, left-wing educationalists lamented the beginning of the "cultural phase of [the government's] restructuring programme" but the Labour party failed to mount a coherent challenge.¹⁰¹

IV

The question of curriculum reform in the 1980s says much about Conservative attitudes towards race, nation and education. It is an example of how, to use Anna Marie Smith's term, race and nation were "re-coded" in the seventies and eighties as a critical aspect of Conservative ideology and how, thinking of Gilroy and Hall, this revealed both the growing authority of Conservatism and its anxieties. It is clear that from the mid-1960s, the Conservatives were increasingly disturbed by the transformation of the national community implied, firstly, by immigration and, secondly, by the progressive tone of education. Restrictions on immigration resolved one part of the problem. What was left were the implications of a multiracial society, in other words, the internalization of the problem of race. In the 1970s and 1980s, the focus therefore shifted more forcefully to education. Limitations on non-white immigration shored up one frontier for the nation, but the clarification of internal frontiers remained to be accomplished. What changed in this agenda between the 1960s to the 1980s was the tone of Conservative discourse on education, moving from a defensive and amorphous disaffection with developments in the curriculum to a much more confident and focused attack upon what were perceived as threats to the reconstruction of the nation. Policies such as "anti-racist" education forced the issue for the Conservatives and the right, offering as well a way to reassert the idea of a traditional nation. Through this change, long-standing Conservative anxieties over race and education could be salved. Ivor Goodson has remarked that the effort in 1987-1988 was to save one English nation "at risk -- that of 'elite and middle class groups."¹⁰² This judgment seems credible after a historical examination of Conservative and right-wing attitudes. Discussing the statutory curriculum, Anthony Hartnett and Michael Naish have used the term "regressive Utopianism," which, similarly, gets at one of aspect of Conservative educational reform, the elevation of a curriculum which, "irrespective of cultural or other differences," projects as unifying a traditional Englishness.¹⁰³

One can, of course, question how unifying this process can be in a multiracial society. Because of the long-standing anxiety about race, education, and nation, the Conservative attempt to articulate the nation through a national
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"Articulate," as Stuart Hall has pointed out, is an odd word, a verb that can mean discursive as well as divisive, "to speak distinctly" and "to mark with apparent joints." "Articulating the nation" through a single national curriculum showed the Conservatives in the 1980s simultaneously speaking distinctly about one, ideal, unified nation -- an older, more traditional one -- and making a clear division between that nation and a multiracial one.

Notes
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1 Quoted in the Independent (London), 17 July 1987; see also Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 570.

2 See Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123 (1 December 1987), c. 771.


6 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123 (1 December 1987), c. 773.


10 Linda Colley, address to the North American Conference on British Studies,
Montreal, 1 October 1993.

11 See, among others, Robert Colls and Philip Dodd, eds., *Englishness: Politics and
Culture 1880-1920* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Terry Crowley, *The Politics of
Discourse* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Brian Doyle, *English and Englishness*
(London: Routledge, 1989); James Donald, "Cultural Analysis and the

12 See Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994) and
Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York:

13 Anna Marie Smith, *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality* (Cambridge:

14 Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack* (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987), Chapter Two; Stuart Hall, *Policing the Crisis* (London:

15 Among the most useful on Conservatism and education are *Education Limited*
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1991); Brian Simon, *Bending the Rules* (London:
Lawrence Wishart, 1989) and Richard Johnson, "Thatcherism and English
Education: Breaking the Mould or Confirming the Pattern?" *History of Education*

16 See Ivor F. Goodson, "Nations at risk' and 'national curriculum': Ideology
and Identity" in S.H. Fuhrman and Betty Malen, eds., *The Politics of Curriculum
and Testing: The 1990 Yearbook of the Politics of Education Association* (London:
Falmer, 1991); Anthony Hartnett and Michael Nash, "The sleep of reason

17 See Smith, *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality*.

18 See, for instance, Stephen Heathorn, *For Home, Country and Race: Constructing
Gender, Class and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880-1914* (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000); Philip Dodd, "Englishness and National
Culture"; and Peter Brooker and Peter Widdowson, "A Literature for England," in
Robert Colls and Philip Dodd, eds., *Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920*
(London: Croom Helm, 1986); 1-28, 116-163.

April 1921), 21.

20 See Clyde Chitty, "Central control of the school curriculum, 1944-87," *History of
Education* 17 (1988): 321-34.

21 Stephen Ball, Alex Kenny, and David Gardiner, "Literacy, Politics and The
Teaching of English," in Ivor Goodson and Peter Medway, eds., *Bringing English
to Order* (London: Falmer, 1990), 55.

22 See Dennis Dean, "Preservation or Renovation? The Dilemma of

23 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fifth Series, 620 (21 March 1960), col. 52.

24 Dean, "Preservation or Renovation."


29 Ball, Kenny, and Gardiner, "Literacy, politics and the teaching of English," 58.


31 See National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations [hereafter NUCUA], Annual Conference (1976), 28-34; see also CPA, CCO 505/1/3, Minutes of the National Advisory Committee on Education, 1973-75 in particular.


33 Education Group, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Unpopular Education: Schooling and social democracy in England since 1944 (London: Hutchinson, 1981), 205.


36 Smith, New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality.

37 See, for example, NUCUA, Annual Conference (1971), 89.


43 See NUCUA, Annual Conference (1968), 65-73; and NUCUA, Annual Conference (1972), 72-80.

44 NUCUA, Annual Conference (1972), 77.

45 CPA, CRD 3/16/1. PG9/65/21, Immigration Policy Group Manifesto Points, 7 July 1965; see also PG9/65/10, Immigration Policy Group minutes, 30 April 1965.


48 NUCUA, Annual Conference (1975), 22.

49 NUCUA, Annual Conference (1976), 34.


51 Camden Committee for Community Relations, ILEA’s Anti-Racist Policy (London, 1985), 4; see also ILEA, Race, Sex and Class (London: ILEA, 1983).


54 See Nunn, Thatcher, Politics and Fantasy, 115.

55 Salisbury Review 4.2 (January 1986), 49.

56 Salisbury Review 1.6 (Winter 1984), 2.

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59 Roger Scruton, Angela Ellis, and Dennis O'Keefe, Education and Indoctrination (London: Education Research Centre, 1985), 11.
62 Geoffrey Partington, "History: Re-Written to Ideological Fashion", in Ibid., 80; see also John Marenbon, English our English (London: CPS, June 1987); Alan Beattie, History in Peril (London: CPS, February 1987); and Sheila Lawlor, Correct Core: Simple Curricula for English, Maths and Science (London: CPS, 1988).
66 Morgan, "The 'Right' Approach to Education," 6; see also leader in same issue, 2.
68 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 590-591.
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77 British Social Attitudes: 8th Report, 26-27.
78 See Wagg, "Don't Try to Understand Them."
80 Baker, Turbulent Years, 224.
84 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 121 (26 October 1987), col. 87.
85 Neil Hamilton and Maureen Hicks in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123 (1 December 1987), cols. 794 and 802; see also comments by Baroness Cox, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Sixth Series, 488 (30 June 1987), cs. 179-181.
86 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 126 (4 February 1988), c. 1182.
87 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 126 (4 February 1988), c. 1188.
88 Giles Radice in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 118 (1 July 1987), c. 583.
89 Jack Straw in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123 (1 December 1987), c. 788.
90 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123/55 (1 December 1987), c. 794.
91 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Sixth Series, 123/55 (1 December 1987), c. 832.
93 The Times, 10 October 1987.
96 The Times, 10 July 1989.
102 Ivor F. Goodson, “‘Nations at risk’ and ‘national curriculum’,” 227.