globalization as an independent variable to which unions have to adjust. Framing the debate about the politics of labour in this way is self-defeating because it doesn’t leave any room for unions, or other workers’ organizations, to be an active force of change. And it points at another missing piece in the book. If globalization, neoliberal or other, is taken as a point of reference one would at least expect some thought about the relations between the Canadian and other national labour movements, if not about the potential for a truly international movement. The silence on this matter is particularly striking because debate about these issues figured prominently on the agenda of progressive unionists and intellectuals prior to the Great Recession and the ensuing phase of stagnation and instability. This brings me to my last point. Economists consistently point at the correlation between employment levels and bargaining power and employers confirm to this point by aggressively trying to roll back labour standards that unions had negotiated prior to the crisis. Seen from this angle, unions appear as a ‘sort of Sisyphus’, to use Rosa Luxemburg’s term. If this is the case, the equation of politics of labour with a subset of union practices renders such politics powerless since the economic crisis undermines union power in the workplace without which it doesn’t have much clout outside the workplace either. Therefore, politics of labour should be redefined in a much broader way including any efforts workers, employed and unemployed, could possibly make to improve their living and working conditions. What overall assessment follows from this critique? Two thumbs up for drawing a thorough balance sheet of the politics of labour, meaning: unions, in Canada today. Plus three question marks behind the rethinking of these politics; one concerning the unmaking and remaking of the working class, one regarding the relations between workers in Canada and elsewhere, and one behind the possibilities of building strong workers’ movements in times of economic crises.

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I first read Randall Wakelam’s study of Aircraft procurement in Canada when it was in its original form as a Masters manuscript. Indeed, I used his work to provide historical context in my own subsequent work. As the book’s roots are a Masters thesis, the study is fairly short, but this does not undermine its success as a solid description of the events of Canada’s ambitious quest to design and build its own fighter aircraft into the 1950s. The additional time and effort Wakelam has put into the manuscript has yielded, as part of the Studies in Canadian Military
History series, a very well written final product based on solid historical research. Although Wakelam admits that there is a paucity of documents available from the Canadian industrial participants themselves, he makes good use of the other primary sources available within the National Archives and the Directorate of History and Heritage on this topic; he also supplements these with the standard secondary works in Canadian military history where defence production is the focus.

The book is focused on the fulfillment of Canada’s aircraft requirements during the early phase of the Cold War and Wakelam does not take long to conclude that, before this period, “Canada had not been particularly effective in terms of strategic planning, either in establishing an aviation industrial base or defining a coherent defence strategy leading to the acquisition of specific aircraft types” (vii). In the decade following the Second World War, however, there was a brief surge in aircraft design, production, and acquisition due to the threat of Communism and the author tells this story through the case studies of the CF-100 and F-86 Sabre. He also provides the necessary background needed to fully understand Canada’s most infamous attempt to build its own warplane – the Arrow, also designed by A.V. Roe. It is a history about how the Canadian Air Force defined its equipment needs and how the Canadian defence industry responded to them, including how foreign, economic, and defence policy were intrinsically tied when it came to arming the Air Force.

*Cold War Fighters* confronts the reality of a nation that aspired to great technological advancements in the air and how it dealt with its limitations rooted in the lack of experience designing and producing advanced military platforms. Wakelam is able to properly instill feelings in the reader that range from enthusiasm at Canada’s successes and frustration caused by the industrial failures that hindered the potential to become a world-renowned producer of jet aircraft. Although Canada had fought and won for its rights as a nation to choose when it would go to war and how it would fight, its military past was deeply tied to the industrial capacity of Britain, and later, the United States. It had usually relied on other nations to supply it with the equipment it needed to prosecute a war. As Wakelam points out, although Canada produced 16 000 aircraft during the Second World War, not one engine was designed or built in-country. *Cold War Fighters*, therefore, outlines a time when Canadian leaders, both political and military, wanted to show the world what they could do and solidify the increased international status that it had believed it had gained at the end of the war.
Although Canada aspired to lead the field of aircraft technology, the willingness of these leaders, along with the voters, to make the continued investment required for the development of cutting edge fighters was constantly challenged by Canada’s industrial inexperience and economy of scale relative to its southern neighbour. The final CF-100 was not ready, or built in sufficient quantity, to meet the increasing requirements for home defence and Canada’s international commitments during the Korean War. As a result, it was determined that the needs of the Air Force could be solved by a reliance on the American designed F-86. The Air Force officers could no longer convince the political leadership that Canada could rely solely on a domestic capability to design and build combat aircraft. After the war was over, threat assessments were reduced considerably and, with them, the defence budget.

The ability to meet both budget and schedule on the most complex military capabilities ever designed has been, and always will be, an elusive goal for most national procurement programs. There are a multitude of variables involved in a platform’s production and it is not simply the case of A.V. Roe performing poorly. Wakelam correctly argues that in the face of competing priorities, the CF-100 was a valiant effort and Canadian engineers did demonstrate exceptional skill and independence in creating an indigenous fighter capability. Although the Air Force was never able to field a fully domestic solution for its fighter needs, and Belgium turned out to be the only international customer, for a time it did provide the best jet – and engine – in the NATO arsenal. The historical analysis of case studies in Canadian equipment procurement is extremely limited and the historiography has certainly profited from Wakelam’s exploration of the interplay between government, industry, and the military during the procurement process.

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Carol Silverman has spent many years working with Roma communities in Macedonia and New York, researching them and performing with them. We have read her on the subject many times in the past, but her experience, knowledge, and insight are now gathered together in this landmark volume. Given the title, it is worth pointing out that the focus is clearly on Macedonian Roma. There are sideways glances to neighbouring Bulgaria and Kosova (cue research by Donna Buchanan and Svanibor Pettan), but not to Greece, Romania, or other parts of Former Yugoslavia. This is reflected in the bibliography, which makes