Anthony Turner was an English Jesuit during the Restoration. Caught up in the flurry of the Popish Plot, the government of Charles II executed him in 1679. Later beatified, Turner's feast auspiciously graces Robert Ingram's *Reformation without end* as a sign of what is to come (xvi). While the book has a clear focus on the fierce religious polemic of the eighteenth century, the nearly invisible main antagonist book-ends the monograph: *Leviathan*. This biblical beast, coextensive with the increasingly modern sovereign state, casts its shadow over bitter ecclesiastical fights. In the end, *Leviathan* "wins," now free to reign, for "the 'Great Leviathan' answers only to itself." (1; 349). Ingram's work contributes to the story of the rising power of the state, now unfettered from all other authorities (especially ecclesiastical), capable of binding consciences and taking life. And this story takes place coextensively with the larger historiographical question about the dawn of the Enlightenment within the eighteenth century.

Ingram intervenes to argue, quite persuasively, that the eighteenth century was still a very religious age, where clerics of the church-state continued to engage in theological controversy with ramifications for social policy. However, these polemics were framed by England's Reformation, political, and religious constitutional problems that had not found closure. These problems only intensified as England's Reformation was now pockmarked by the crises of religious war and revolution, namely those hallowed dates of 1641 and 1688. The eighteenth century was an era haunted by revolution and the threat of anarchy and civil collapse (1–10). In his account of the time period, Ingram does a few things. First, Ingram rejects the classic dichotomy of secular enlightenment versus pre-modern sacralists. Taking the "splitter" route, Ingram argues that attention to nuance reveals that the heterodox were deeply entrenched in the problems of the past (7–8). Whether it was in conclusions or in method (Middleton and Warburton respectively), Ingram argues that the eighteenth century continued the process of using "Renaissance tools to solve Reformation problems," the same paradigms that had caused the religious wars of the seventeenth century (1). Secondly, from that Ingram argues that the eighteenth century was neither the secularized era of Hazard and Israel's respective accounts of the Enlightenment, nor was it the *Ancien Regime* of Jonathan Clark's work. Rather, the Restoration was a break with the past, but one still engaged with Reformation issues. The result was the practice of history. Bringing "supra-rational" dogmas into the mud of public polemic, scholarly suspicion made theology "worldly," secularizing thought so that God was up for debate. And since the conclusions of theology had social effects, the failure of these historical practices to conclusively solve the problem led to state sanction (8–9; 14–17). If the Church of England could not solve its problems, *Leviathan* would.
Ingram's work is a brilliant engagement with the practice of history and theology, contextualizing them in the four ministers he anatomizes. In contrast to many other accounts of early modern religious debate, Ingram is a breath of fresh air. He cogently sets the stage for numerous polemical battles, accounting for nuances in various doctrines (church, sacraments, providence, etc.), contextualizing these concepts within the lives of those who espouse them. Ingram reads these polemical texts in dialogue with clerical careers, personal letters, marginalia, to reconstruct why certain debates happened the way they did, and the significance for the aftermath (7). As just one example, Ingram brilliantly exposits how Conyers Middleton shifted towards heterodoxy as his own clerical career was frustrated. Feeling blocked, Middleton became increasingly anti-clerical, fueled through his patronage to the anti-clerical whig Lord Hervey (143–156). Ingram has a good ear for theological nuance, social policy, and their overlap.

However, I have reservations about how Ingram assesses the practice of history, which appears as a static “Renaissance tool” put to different purposes. Rather, Ingram’s account shows differing hermeneutical strategies that are themselves varied. As just one example, Daniel Waterland accused Samuel Clarke, a student of Newton and architect of a Newtonian Arianism, of a flawed method in using “metaphysics” in their debate. Unlike Waterland’s historicist patrology, which helped to solve ambiguities in Scripture, Clarke appealed to *a priori* first principles. Yet both reeled when confronted with Henry Dodwell, a venerated Patrologist, who not only argued for mortalism (i.e., the soul is not immortal) from patristic sources but denied that Athanasius and Gregory Nyssen were reliable witnesses to the miracles they recorded (8–9; 171). Dodwell was up to something somewhat different than Waterland, despite the latter’s claim to a primitivist hermeneutic. But besides this point, there are marked differences between how Waterland and Clarke were using history. Believing dogmatic truth is grounded in history, the former’s work was freighted with much more significance than the latter. In contrast, Clarke’s *a priori* “metaphysics” were safe from historical challenge, which motivated his skeptic’s eye. Where Waterland might extend trust, Clarke would snort with incredulity. Attention to hermeneutical strategies and epistemological concerns could demonstrate changes in the tool kit. Through different use, the practice of the past changed significantly in its relationship to theological inquiry, social effect, and discipline of history itself.

This evaluation raises a larger question concern about how to frame the Enlightenment. If there were subtle, and perhaps transformative, variations in the practice of history, it may very well be that this practice was not simply the use of Renaissance tools. And if that be the case, then we might question whether these divines really believed they were simply rehashing the Reformation with extra steps. What if, instead, the effects of the revolutions opened various pathways beyond confessionalization to deal with the new phenomenon of social pluralism? These options, as state actors developed, embraced, and/or discarded them, were the
process of Enlightenment, with the Reformation a backdrop, not a static set of parameters, to fight over these new directions. Therefore, theological polemic did not damn England to Leviathan mastery but reflected the Church of England's complex, though continuous, complicity in growing the beast. In contrast, English Protestants were not locked into creating a Hobbesian state, and historicizing theology did not create a secular totem. Instead, the strange career of a Henry Dodwell could offer an alternative path on the practice of history and the development of Leviathan.

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Lawrie sets out to explore how “black proletarianization was mediated through the state and how progressives came to understand these processes in deeply corporeal terms” (5). Lawrie examines government documents, industry records, and the personal papers of Progressive-era authors, academics, and reformers to effectively paint a sobering picture of how race science and eugenics, rationalized labour management, social services, and segregationist impulses coalesced around an imagined black body to reinforce, augment, and repeatedly recreate nineteenth and twentieth-century “Negro Problems.”

Lawrie’s account prioritizes the social and economic dynamics of the First World War, as well as broader public concerns. He not only highlights the pivot from black sharecropping and the beginnings of black industrial labour, but also the anxieties regarding African Americans’ role on the domestic front, in military service, and, at the conflict’s end, their place within the nation. Documents from three governmental bodies make up the bulk of Lawrie’s sources here: the Department of Negro Economics (DNE), which drew upon Chicago School sociology to attempt to integrate black labourers into the wartime economy; the Committee on Anthropology (COA), which examined the first million U.S. army recruits, a mixed-race workforce at a shipbuilding site in Philadelphia, and 100,000 demobilized men at war’s end to evaluate the health of the “Negro type” and link race, soldiering, and working to the wartime state; and the Federal Board of Vocational Education (FBVE), tasked with rehabilitating disabled black veterans. In fact, Lawrie helpfully builds upon the work of Katherine Kudlick, Barbara Young Welke, and others who view bodily ability as key to regimes of citizenship.

Lawrie examines several figures, like Frederick Hoffman and Lothrop...