Defining the Civilian: The International Committee of the Red Cross' Response to Crisis in Bosnia, 1992–1995[1]

Helen Kennedy

Between April 1992 and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, *The New York Times* published over 1000 articles concerning the Bosnian War that referenced civilians. The majority of these articles explained the violence in the former Yugoslav republic by centering the ethnicity of civilians in ways that reinforced the nationalist rhetoric which had provoked the conflict and affected the ability of observers and policy-makers to visualize a path to peace beyond ethnic homogeneity in the region.[2] The prevalence of these narratives make it appear that analyses that subvert ethnic explanations for violence are the strict purview of academics rather than reflections of contemporary understandings of the conflict. An examination of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) press releases, however, illuminates a more complicated reality whereby civilians and non-combatants were defined more often by their most recent experience with violence than by their membership—real or perceived—in an ethnic community. This paper analyzes the ICRC's discursive construction of non-combatants to examine how humanitarian narratives provided an alternative framework to understand the complexity of a conflict that journalists and policy-makers at the time defined as ethnically-motivated. It supports existing scholarly work by reinforcing the need to think critically about the relationship between humanitarianism and other forms of intervention and the unique role humanitarian observers can play in challenging our conceptualizations of actors in ongoing complex conflicts.

 In many ways, this paper is a review of the so-called first draft of history: press releases published during the conflict that helped shape Western society's understanding of the Bosnian War.[3] Its goal is to understand how the ICRC's definitions of non-combatants can be read as a counter-narrative to the prevailing discursive themes of the war which were circulated by Western politicians and journalists. Much of the popular discourse of the Bosnian War in the West privileged an explanation grounded in understandings of ethno-nationalist groupness, while an analysis of ICRC press releases disrupts that familiar narrative by presenting a definition of groupness that was based on an individual's experience with violence. Within ICRC press releases, non-combatants were categorized more often as detainees, displaced, or locals rather than as Muslims, Bosnian-Serbs, or Bosnian-Croats. This construction of civilian identity existed alongside more traditional notions of ethno-nationalist groupness and complicated the popular conceptual-

ization of the war as being a purely ethnic conflict between the forces of the Bosnian Government, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Through a framework based on a person's most recent experience of violence, the ICRC created alternative lines of division and unity among the conflict actors that created space for challenging the nationalist rhetoric of exclusion. The ICRC treated those forced from their communities—whether Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian-Serb, or Bosnian-Croat—as *displaced,* a categorization that was meant to reflect the violence they experienced that brought them within the ICRC's sphere.

During the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, civilians played a key role in the political objectives of the war as belligerents aimed to create pockets of ethno-nationalist homogeneity to justify their territorial aspirations. In this environment, the lines between home-front and front-line, non-combatant and combatant were often blurred, particularly as nationalist rhetoric amplified the idea that violence was inevitable and Muslim, Serb, or Croat neighbours were the enemy who could not be separated from army and militia groups.[4] Max Bergolz writes in *Violence as a Generative Force* that narratives of fear and retributive violence created the conditions nationalists used to justify further violence and crystallized differences in dangerous ways.[5] These narratives redefined civilians as potential combatants and advocated pre-emptive violence. In an environment where groupness often meant the difference between life and death, the ICRC's decision to ground their categories in experiences with violence—and, more broadly, international humanitarian law—was a political act that signalled a level of frustration and satisfaction with the political parties. As Séverine Autesserre writes, narratives and discourse among interveners are important because they "orient action…they make the choice of certain actors or strategies seem natural, appropriate, and effective."[6] The ICRC's conceptualization of non-combatants highlighted an understanding of the conflict that challenged the belligerents' reliance on a narrative of homogeneity by presenting alternative ways to understand unarmed actors.

The Sources

The 120 press releases analyzed for this paper were published by the ICRC about their operations in Bosnia between 1992–1995 in the *ICRC Bulletin* (1976–1993), *Media7* (1991–1993), and *ICRC News* (1994–1995). Linguistic decisions do not "materialize out of nowhere" and a discourse analysis provides a space to examine how "particular linguistic phenomena…can be used to represent a particular stance."[7] In order to do this, I built a database of terms that the ICRC used in their press releases to describe unarmed actors in the Bosnian War

The publications I chose for consideration—*Bulletin, Media7, and News*—provided information to National Societies, journalists, and the general public (mainly donors). The *ICRC Bulletin* was a monthly publication written "in a journalistic style [with] no official character" and its audience was National Societies

and the international press.[8] As it was published in English, French, Spanish, and German, it can be broadly inferred that the publication was intended for a Western audience. *Media7* was a weekly newsletter that was published by ICRC's Press Division for three years in the early 1990s. It was aimed at professional journalists and, in its first year of publication, facilitated the dissemination of approximately 100 press releases.[9] *ICRC News* was also launched in the early 1990s as a weekly update. In addition to the *ICRC Bulletin's* languages of publication, *News* was published in Arabic, Italian, and Russian, indicating a broader audience in the post-Cold War world. Along with National Red Cross Societies, almost 400 journalists received *ICRC News* and it included telephone and fax numbers to encourage journalists to reach out directly to ICRC delegates for more information.[10] The total readership of these publications is not known, but their stated goal of providing information directly to journalists speaks to a desire by the organization to have some influence on how conflicts were being reported. The ways in which journalists adopted and reframed information from the ICRC is the subject of a larger project, from which this more focused analysis is drawn.

Contextualizing the Bosnian War
One of the familiar ways journalists and politicians contextualized the Bosnian War was by reducing it to a purely ethnic conflict, one of ancient hatreds and inevitable violence. For example, scholars such as Lene Hansen have explored how framing violence in Bosnia as inevitable allowed the West to obfuscate responsibility for supporting sustainable solutions or stopping the violence.[11] Additionally, the notion of ancient hatred reduced the complexity of the conflict to one that relied on understanding certain groups as inherently violent. That is not to argue that ethnicity did not play a definitional role in how individuals experienced the war or that ethno-religious groupness was inconsequential. The ICRC acknowledged the role of ethnicity, but their construction of non-combatants relied on the notion that non-combatants across the political spectrum shared more in common with other victims than with co-ethnic perpetrators. This understanding adhered to what Francis Kofi Abiew defines as the ICRC's chief principle to assist "the wounded and suffering without distinction, by virtue of their membership in humanity."[12] Within this conceptualization, a displaced Bosnian-Serb civilian was not more or less deserving of adequate nutrition than a Bosnian-Croat civilian. While each individual may have been displaced by different forces or support different political objectives, their basic human needs—which are the mandate of the ICRC—were defined by their position as a displaced civilian. By disrupting traditional categories of groupness and re-orienting groups around experiences with violence, the ICRC provided a framework for understanding the war that centered non-combatants and challenged political elites' claims that they spoke for unified ethnic groups.[13]

        The cause of Yugoslavia's dissolution included myriad factors and to use ethnicity as the primary, or only, unit of analysis reinforces the fear-mongering of

political elites like Slobodan Milošević. It also obscures Bosnia's position as a conflict that can provide important lessons for understanding the effect of economic upheaval on complex states. Authors such as Galina Nelaeva, Michael Kelly, Catherine Baker, and V.P. Gagnon have examined different aspects of Bosnia's war within frameworks that foreground economic and political conflicts without essentializing identity nor limiting the scope of understanding.[14] The challenge—and the responsibility—of historians is to acknowledge that a discourse of ethnicity, and even violence that is largely experienced along ethno-religious lines, does not necessarily mean that the cause of violence was ethnicity.[15]

As David Marr writes, "the world is very seldom divided between heroes and villains, innocent and guilty."[16] Manufacturing a binary experience of war while ignoring the complicated political processes that crystallized differences and resulted in communal violence shields those responsible from facing what justice can be found in the pages of our history books. Violence is not an inherent quality of any group and by examining the myriad ways contemporary observers defined conflict actors we can use Bosnia as a case study for understanding how conflict is understood today and how language plays an important role in combating essentialized debates that divide society and perpetuate notions of 'the other.'[17]

The 1992-1995 war in Bosnia was characterized by civilian-centric violence, forced population transfers, and genocide rather than by battles between organized military units of the Bosnian government, the SDS, and the HDZ. As the warring parties aimed to prove to international negotiators that they had legitimate claims to territory, minorities in almost every town in the republic were expelled, either through force or coercion. By the end of the war in November 1995, almost half of the pre-war population had been internally displaced or made a refugee.[18] One of the most enduring legacies of the violence in Bosnia was the SDS forces' genocide of Bosnian Muslims which culminated in approximately 8000 men and boys being killed at Srebrenica in July 1995.

When the international community recognized Bosnian independence in April 1992, Europe and the United States were in the process of reorienting their geo-political priorities and it was not yet clear what those priorities would entail. Without the ideological binary of the Cold War, the international community was unsure how to respond to independence movements and how to determine who had the right to self-determination.[19] As a result of political uncertainty, the international response to the war was largely humanitarian. The lead agency of the international response was the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) while a peacekeeping force—the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)—was mandated by the Security Council to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the country.[20] Alongside UN agencies and hundreds of humanitarian organizations which worked under the umbrella of the UNHCR, the ICRC worked largely independently on its mandate to advocate for greater respect for international humanitarian law, provide assistance to non-com-

batants, and negotiate access to humanitarian spaces. The humanitarian response to Bosnia took place within a post-Cold War security structure that was unsure about what role international intervention could, and should, play in wars of independence.

As the Cold War gave way to the possibility of a new global order, observers and practitioners looked to the way the international community was responding to crises and sought to codify a new interventionist paradigm. Part of what Mark Duffield defined as the "new aid paradigm" was movement of humanitarianism along the "development continuum" that privileged long-term material aid.[21] In the early 1990s, this new paradigm manifested itself in the injection of humanitarian assistance into conflict zones in an attempt to limit large-scale population movements into neighbouring countries. By focusing on providing basic services in-country, the global humanitarian community saw a decline in convention refugees, but a marked increase in internally displaced populations.[22] The response to complex conflict with humanitarian, rather than political or military, action resulted in the 1990s being labelled "the so-called humanitarian decade."[23] Though a humanitarian response to violence was not a new phenomenon, the opportunity provided by the collapse of the bipolar global order to establish a new way of engaging in transnational relationships seemed to give renewed importance to understanding the possibility (and limitations) of humanitarianism.

ICRC Conceptualization of Non-Combatants in Bosnia
In April 1993, Thierry Germond—ICRC Delegate General for Europe—met with military representatives of the SDS and the Bosnian Government to urge "respect for civilians, the wounded and prisoners, and to facilitate ICRC access to all the victims…"[24] This short sentence is emblematic of the larger categorization structure within the organization's press releases. A close reading of ICRC press releases from 1992–1995 demonstrates that non-combatants were categorized in the following three groups: detainees (including former combatants); displaced (civilians who have left their place of residence, including refugees and the internally displaces); and docal population (war-affected populations who have not left their place of residence). These categories were not mutually exclusive and were further complicated by the complex relationships between war-affected populations. For example, contextual clues in press releases tell us that "the victims of the tragic events unfolding daily" in besieged communities were unarmed civilians, but they do not always indicate whether the victims were locals or displaced populations.[25] Because of the political motivations of armed actors and the central role civilian population movement played in the war, the distinction between local and displaced was not insignificant. It helped readers to frame their understanding of the conflict and define the goals of intervention. While these distinctions make the analytical work a challenge, it must be understood that categories of groupness are not structures that include—or exclude—clearly; in fact, they are attempts to make sense of the

sometimes chaotic nature of the interplay between people. The discursive strategies the ICRC employed to define non-combatants were positioned in opposition to the discourse of 'ethnically-motivated violence' that was prominent during, and after, the conflict by journalists and policymakers.

In a lexicometric analysis of 120 press releases between 1992 and 1995, the prevailing norm was to categorize civilian-plus and mere-civilians by age, sex, or health status without an ethno-national modifier. That is, groupness was discursively conveyed using phrases like "vulnerable groups," "people wounded in the fighting," "victims of the conflict," "women, children and elderly people," and "families."[26] This is not an exhaustive list, but it is representative of the way that ICRC defined identity largely based on individual experiences with violence and/or transnational constructions of vulnerability in war based on age and gender. The conceptual construction of non-combatants by the ICRC focused largely on the language of individuality, family, and personhood as opposed to other determinants of groupness—such as those based on imagined homogenous ethno-religious community—that were championed by ultranationalists and the Western press.

The ICRC's external-categorization of individuals and communities can be understood within the frameworks advanced by scholars such as Rogers Brubaker and Rebecca Sutton. While Brubaker's arguments are built largely on the ways in which the state—and state institutions—are involved in the creation and adoption of identification and categorizations *vis-à-vis* ethnicity, his theory regarding how identification (either self or external) is "fundamentally situational and contextual" is useful in understanding how the ICRC defined non-combatants.[27] In an important addition to the existing literature on how non-combatant populations are defined, Rebecca Sutton argues for three analytical categories of civilian status: civilian-plus (considered to be the most vulnerable in armed conflict, primarily women and children); mere-civilian (received no special treatment); and civilian-minus (those seen as somehow involved in the conflict and with the potential for violence).[28] The existence of these categories speaks to the nuanced way in which humanitarians conceptualize the populations they work with. The construction of civilian-ness in conflict involves a spectrum whereby individuals are ascribed a position based on their real, or perceived, relationship with violence.

International intervention in Bosnia was characterized by a commitment to a nebulous idea of humanitarianism in lieu of a cohesive political solution.[29] As a leader in humanitarian action, the ICRC's discursive construction of non-combatants contributed to a language of intervention that privileged aid over physical intervention. The definition of non-combatant was a mutually constitutive process within ICRC press releases: while an individual was defined by their experience with violence, the definition of an individual ultimately defined their experience with aid. Characterizations of civilian populations were in line with the ICRC's role as a custodial humanitarian actor and the conceptualization of groupness as prisoner, displaced, or local population was used by ICRC to frame the discourse surrounding

what types of humanitarian action were most appropriate. In Bosnia, ICRC's action was multifaceted and encompassed a wide range of interventions: the delivery of relief supplies, medical assistance, family tracing, and the dissemination of messages between and among separated families. The displaced and local populations in besieged cities, for example, were most often presented as beneficiaries of relief supplies rather than in need of physical protection while prisoners were presented as in need of release and reunification with family.[30]

These characterizations were in line with ICRC's role as a custodial humanitarian actor, but they also supported the Western international discourse which privileged humanitarianism over political solutions. Though ICRC was neutral and was not building an explicitly political narrative of intervention, its discourse can be seen reflected in conversations at the political level and in journalists' accounts of the violence that highlighted the need to maintain and facilitate the delivery of material aid rather than finding a comprehensive political solution. Constructing the language of protection, security, and non-combatant is a "many-sided story" and an analysis of ICRC documents is only one part of that story.[31] The argument here is not that political actors used ICRC's framework of linking different civilian categories to different types of assistance to justify intervention decisions; rather, the ICRC's mutually constitutive process of defining non-combatants and assistance is worthy of inclusion when considering broader justifications for international frameworks for intervention.

The ICRC's categorization of non-combatants and their related access to aid was complicated by the blurred line between the home front and the frontline in a conflict characterized by siege and communal violence. In Bosnia, the frontline of the conflict was primarily in cities and towns and soldiers routinely billeted at home with their families.[32] Therefore, combatants lived within the military structure while also maintaining tangible connections to civilian life through engaging with domestic labour, living with their families and friends, and being targeted by armed combatants in moments of civilian-centric violence.[33] The armed defenders of Sarajevo, for example, lived dual lives as combatants and so-called civilians-minus: while undeniably combatants when at the front, their categorization was more difficult to quantify when they were on leave and living as civilian victims of violence. This duality of experiences in the Bosnian War provided a challenge to international aid organizations as it exposed humanitarian operations to criticism as civilian aid was often used to feed soldiers who lived at home or returned home weekly.[34] This complexity also highlights the need to understand 'non-combatant' as a nuanced category that encapsulated a multitude of experiences in the context of communal violence.

Under IHL, if combatants were captured, they became beneficiaries of ICRC protection and were recategorized as non-combatant. The discourse surrounding detainees was in some ways more complicated than that surrounding displaced or local populations because Red Cross made use of ethnic categorizations

more often. The categorization of detainees was complex as the use of ethnic modifiers in those cases simultaneously allowed the ICRC to signal their neutrality and implicitly comment on the balance of power in the region. By reporting that the ICRC had released "61 Bosnian Croats held by the Bosnian government forces and 342 Bosnian Muslims held by Bosnian Croat forces"[35] the press releases used ethnic modifiers to quantify their own neutrality and demonstrate their active participation in the protection of non-combatants on all sides. While the ICRC's action of linking detainees to ethnic communities disrupts the notion that they provided a wholly alternative conceptualization of groupness, the data indicates that detainees were *more* often defined by recent experiences with violence than with their ethno-nationalist community.[36]

Furthermore, the ethnic categorization of detainees was also a shorthand for commenting on the status of the conflict itself. The ICRC commented publicly about the atrocities in Bosnia more than they had in any other conflict in their history, though explicit blame was rarely communicated.[37] By reporting on a higher number of Bosnian Muslim detainees than Bosnian-Serbs or Bosnian-Croats, the ICRC press releases acknowledged an imbalance of military power without compromising their neutral status.[38] Another way this was accomplished was through reports that focused not on the detainees, but on the regular "visits [to] 548 detainees held by the Croats, 1027 held by the Muslims and 2780 held by Serb forces."[39] In this way, the ICRC shifted focus to the political elites and allowed readers to conceptually link all detainees within a unified group, regardless of ethno-religious community.

That is not to say that the ICRC did not employ ethnic categories for displaced or local populations, but their use was largely limited to situations related to negotiated access. In order to carry out its work, the ICRC relied on negotiating access to war-affected populations with the armed group controlling a territory. The principle of negotiated access was not a new one for humanitarians, but it became a foundational tool for Western intervention in the post-Cold War period.[40] The need to secure access from armed actors is reflected in early ICRC press releases that reference meetings with representatives of "each of the parties to the conflict" and "of the Republic's Serbian, Croatian and Muslim communities."[41] Throughout the conflict, ICRC's use of ethnic categorization was largely limited to reports related to interactions with political representatives or humanitarian action involving the movement or training of individuals that are presented as neutral acts provided to all actors. The subtext of some of these reports indicates that in order to provide, for example, training to doctors in Bosnian-government controlled Zenica, comparable training was provided to doctors in SDS-controlled Banja Luka.[42] The use of ethnic modifiers in such situations as the training of "20 Bosnian Muslim surgeons" and "25 Bosnian Serb doctors" highlighted and reinforced not only the neutrality of ICRC's work, but their need to be *seen* as neutral.[43] Press releases that categorized non-combatants using the discursive practice of ethnicity reflected a

reality on the ground which necessitated navigating identity-based violence while signalling that the organization was actively working with all warring parties to administer assistance and aid under IHL.

Conclusion

There is an incredible responsibility that comes with writing history. The historical record becomes part of the collective memory of those who engage with it; it is used, (re)used and (re)produced across society and helps us make sense of a seemingly senseless world. In post-conflict situations, history itself is prone to become a battleground for control of the narrative.[44] And Bosnia is no exception. The Bosnian War represents both a departure in understanding the role and limits of humanitarian action and a stark reminder of the ability of some humans to negate the humanity of others. Therefore, in studying how the ICRC defined non-combatants, historians are given an opportunity to attempt to disrupt the cyclical nature of genocide, restore nuance to the study of atrocity, and participate in a construction of post-conflict narratives that help illuminate a potential path forward for the uncertain times we live in today.[45]

ICRC press releases provide us with a richer and more complex history of the Bosnian War as the construction of civilian identity beyond the parameters of ethnicity introduces a multiplicity of actors. Understanding the multiple ways civilians interact with conflict contributes to a better understanding of how violence manifested itself (or not) across communities. In this way, this paper supports the work of scholars like Ioannis Armakolas who explores why violent nationalism did not take hold in areas like Tuzla.[46] By defining groupness among non-combatants based on their most recent experience with violence rather than on their community affiliation, ICRC provided an alternative discourse that offers historians different terminology to understand the conflict and the possibilities for peace. That is, when the language acknowledges groupness in war as a shared experience with comparable violence, historians have space to examine why some communities and individuals experienced violence, and participated in the war, in ways counter-intuitive to their ethno-religious identity.[47] This reconceptualization also provides an opportunity to ensure that analyses of genocide accurately place responsibility with individuals and political-military leadership rather than supporting notions of collective retribution that may ultimately fuel future atrocities.[48]

The language of groupness worked as a kind of shorthand for the work in which ICRC was involved, but it also provided readers with an alternative way of conceptualizing the conflict. Within the Western press and among Western governments, the Bosnian War was presented as a conflict of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' for which there were no sustainable solutions. The narrative of ethno-religious collective violence provided a relatively straightforward entry-point to understand the conflict, but it failed to signify the complexity of the situation. Additionally, recent scholarship has amplified the argument that a reliance on ethno-religious discourse

reifies and legitimizes the linguistic violence that was advanced by ultranationalist leaders. As Jasminka Udovički notes, Slobodan Milošević fomented fear and violence among the constituent nations of Yugoslavia "for his own purposes, which had nothing to do with the plight of either [group]."[49] When international observers and historians repeat the language of essentialized categories they contribute to a legitimization of the othering and violence that flowed from the discourse of difference.

This analysis sits at an uneasy nexus between the past and the present as it seeks not to uncover a forgotten moment of the past but rather to prompt readers to consider how they frame the present. The ICRC's discursive framing of non-combatants during the Bosnian War was not widely adopted by Western audiences. Instead, newspapers and policymakers privileged a simplified discourse that essentialized and at times victimized and villainized civilians without critically engaging with larger discourses that help to understand who perpetrates violence, and why. The importance of this framing lies in the fact that it does not ignore national responsibility for atrocities or deny the realities of communal violence; rather,, it places non-combatants at the centre of the narrative and seeks to create a space where civilian protection rises above nationalism. The ongoing and renewed violence in Ukraine highlights the relevancy of this research as Western audiences are once again faced with watching indiscriminate civilian-centric violence play out in Europe on the nightly news and across social media. This case study highlights how engaging with humanitarian sources can give Western audiences a different language with which to speak of violence that facilitates protection and looks to a future where the individuals perpetrating violence are called to account.

NOTES

[2] See for example, Roger Cohen, "Siege is Resumed in Bosnian Town: Serbs Assert Muslim Forces Killed Civilians in Truce," *The New York Times,* 9 September 2021. For an examination of the use of ethnicity in the British press and an analysis of why we should be wary of its usage as the primary explanation for violence, see Gregory Kent, *Framing War and Genocide: British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia* (New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2006), 68.

[3] Jack Shafer, "Who Said it First? Journalism is the 'First Rough Draft of History,'" *Slate,* 30 August 2010, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/08/on-the-trail-of-the-question-who-first-said-or-wrote-that-journalism-is-the-first-rough-draft-of-history.html (accessed 26 March 2021).

[4] *We Are All Neighbours*, directed by Debbie Christie (1993; United Kingdom: Disappearing World Series, YouTube Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG-bYqsXNBbI.

[5] Max Bergholz, *Violence as a Generative Force: Identity, Nationalism, and Memory in a Balkan Community* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

[6] Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 37–38.

[7] Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery, *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 20-21.

[8] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report* (Geneva,1976), 47.

[9] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report* (Geneva, 1991), 141.

[10] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report* (Geneva, 1994), 290.

[11] Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 50.

[12] Francis Kofi Abiew, "Humanitarian Action under Fire: Reflections on the Role of NGOs in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations," *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 2 (April 2012): 205.

[13] See Tara McCormack, *Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches* (Taylor & Francis, 2009), 118 and James Ridgeway, "Preface," in *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia*, eds. Jasminka Udovi ki and James Ridgeway (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), vii.

[14] Galina Nelaeva, "Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Dealing with the 'War Raging at the Heart of Europe,'" *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2011): 100–108; Michael Kelly and Catherine Baker. *Interpreting the Peace: Peace Operations, Conflict and Language in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); V.P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic*

War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[15] V.P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 11.

[16] David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), xxv.

[17] Jasminka Udovički, "Introduction," in *Burn This House,* 6.

[18] Marie E. Berry, *War, Women, and Power: From Violence to Mobilization in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 130.

[19] Neil Middleton and Phil O'Keefe. *Disaster and Development: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid* (London: Pluto Press in assoc. with ETC, 1998), 25.

[20] Michael Pugh and S. Alex Cunliffe, "The Lead Agency Concept in Humanitarian Assistance: The Case of the UNHCR," *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 1 (March 1997): 20-22.

[21] Mark Duffield, "NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (1997): 530.

[22] Duffield, 530.

[23] Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 1.

[24] The ICRC's chosen style for press releases privileges the use of non-serial commas, so the above sentence denotes three separate categories of war-affected individuals: civilians, wounded, and prisoners. A close study of ICRC press releases show limited-to-no use of the serial (or Oxford) comma. As such this interpretation of the style guide is analytical rather than attributable to any specific such document produced by the ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross, "Eastern Bosnia: ICRC Unable to Assist Conflict Victims," *Communique de Presse* 1744 (17 April 1993).

[25] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Eastern Bosnia: ICRC Unable to Assist Conflict Victims," *Communique de Presse* 1744.

[26] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Intolerable, *Communique de Presse* 1719 (27 May 1992); International Committee of the Red Cross, "On Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *ICRC Bulletin* 197 (June 1992); International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC Returns," *ICRC Media7* 60 (25 June 1992); International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC Transfers 1,500 Bosnian Croats to Croatia," *ICRC Media7* 108 (10 June 1993); International Committee of the Red Cross, "One Million Red Cross Messages Exchanged," *ICRC Media7* 109 (17 June 1993).

[27] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 41.

[28] Rebecca Sutton, "Enacting the 'Civilian plus': International Humanitarian Actors and the Conceptualization of Distinction," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 33, no. 2 (June 2020): 432.

[29] N. Morris, "Protection Dilemmas and UNHCR's Response: A Personal View

from within UNHCR," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 9, no. 3 (July 1, 1997): 496.

30 See for example: International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Relief Supplies Arrive, Detainees Visited," *ICRC Media7* 63 (16 July 1992); International Committee of the Red Cross, "Year in Review," *ICRC Bulletin* 20 (January 1993); or International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Tuzla: ICRC Bringing Aid to 55,000 People," *ICRC News* 10 (10 March 1994).

31 Thomas Pegelow Kaplan, *The Language of Nazi Genocide: Linguistic Violence and the Struggle of Germans of Jewish Ancestry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 274

32 *We Are All Neighbours*, directed by Debbie Christie (1993; United Kingdom: Disappearing World Series), YouTube Video.

33 *We Are All Neighbours.*

34 Barbara Demick, *Logavina Street: Life and Death in a Sarajevo Neighborhood* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2012), 161.

35 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Simultaneous Release of Detainees," *ICRC Media 7*, no. 91 (February 11, 1993).

36 Key categories of prisoner used in ICRC press releases include: people hors de combat, detainee(s), prisoner(s), people held in connection, persons detained, people detained, people arrested, people interned, people who surrender, prisoners of war, captured persons, persons held, people held, persons captured, civilian and military prisoners, detained combatants, ex-detainees, inmates, individuals detained, and those who have suffered detention.

37 Kirsten Young, "UNHCR and ICRC in the Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina," *International Review of the Red Cross* 83, no. 843 (n.d.): 804.

38 See for example, International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC Visits Second Prison in Sarajevo," *ICRC Media7* 93 (25 February 1993).

39 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC Continues Visits to Detainees," *ICRC Media 7*, no. 85 (December 17, 1992).

40 Mark Duffield, "NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (1997): 534.

41 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Humanitarian Agreement Signed Under ICRC Auspices," *Communique de Presse* 1718 (24 May 1992).

42 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seminars on War Surgery Held in Banja Luka and Zenica," *ICRC Media7* 95 (11 March 1993.).

43 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seminars on War Surgery Held in Banja Luka and Zenica."

44 James Waller, *Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 315.

45 Waller, *Confronting Evil,* 283.

46 Ioannis Armakolas, "The 'Paradox' of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-Nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 2 (March 2011): 229–61.

47 Udovički, "Neither War Nor Peace," 281.
48 Waller, *Confronting Evil,* 151.
49 Jasminka Udovički, "Kosovo" in *Burn This House,* 322.