The General Strike and the Specter of Anarchism in the German "Mass Strike Debate"

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In the quarter century before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, German Social Democrats engaged in strenuous disputes about the most effective forms of political action. Central to this debate was the question of the utility of the "political mass strike," a widespread work stoppage intended to achieve a political rather than an economic end, and potentially also to heighten workers' consciousness of their political power. Proponents of the mass strike, inspired by a series of politically-motivated strikes that took place across Europe from the 1880s to the first years of the twentieth century, and by the strikes that proved instrumental to the partial success of the Russian Revolution of 1905, insisted that Socialists could use the tactic to move the working classes toward a revolutionary stance. Detractors of the political mass strike regarded it as a reckless expenditure of energy that threatened to dissipate the power workers had amassed through a formidable Socialist party apparatus and a vast network of trade unions and to bring down on their heads the full force of German state power.

The Social Democratic "mass strike debate" exposed a longstanding tension in Marxist thought regarding the relationship between revolutionary theory and practice. In a famous passage of his "Theses on Feuerbach," Karl Marx addressed this relationship directly, writing that "the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point is to *change* it."[1] Despite this unambiguous declaration and the stirring call to action at the end of the *Communist Manifesto* a few years later—"The Communists . . . openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions"[2]—Marx's analysis of capitalism seemed to contradict this stance, with its emphasis on the inevitability of large-scale historical processes that did not depend on the insights or actions of individuals but on immutable laws of economic and social development. For Marx, this was precisely what marked his thought as "scientific," in contrast to "utopian" socialism, which rested on the belief that one could bring about a better world simply through implementing a dreamt-up plan. The tension between a theory suggesting capitalism would be destroyed by its own contradictions in the fullness of time and a devotion to revolutionary practice continued to dog Marxist socialists until the mid-twentieth century (when most abandoned even a rhetorical commitment to revolution).

The broad contours and many of the theoretical details of the mass strike

debate have received thorough treatment by other scholars.[3] This article focuses on an aspect of the debate that has received less systematic attention—the role of anti-anarchist rhetoric regarding the "general strike"—in shaping the development of this intra-party conflict. Throughout the mass strike debate, German Social Democrats frequently came to explain their own ideology through the prism of their antipathy to anarchism. Since the 1870s, anarchists had symbolized for Social Democrats the irrational, impatient, and undisciplined side of the workers' movement, as well as the utopianism that represented the antithesis of Marxism. Thinkers hostile to the political mass strike frequently associated it with the anarchist vision of the general strike, a universal strike intended to bring about the collapse of the capitalist system and usher in a new society, which Social Democrats ridiculed as a naïve revolutionary fantasy. In attacking the anarchists' commitment to immediate revolution, Social Democratic reformists sought to marginalize those in their own ranks who wished to act on Marx's call to revolutionary action. On the other side, proponents of the political mass strike, such as Rosa Luxemburg, accused party moderates of succumbing, like anarchists, to a bourgeois mindset. Thus, throughout the Social Democrats' mass strike debate, the accusation that one's opponents adhered to an anarchist deviation from correct Marxist thought served as a tool to delegitimize their perspective. By framing internal party disputes in such absolute terms, Social Democrats sharpened rather than blunted conflict, contributing to an atmosphere that led Luxemburg to lament the "hatefulness and difficulties of party life . . . the constant defamation of all that is fine and noble in mankind."[4] The willingness to tar one's opponents with the anarchist brush helped widen internal party fissures that would become an unbridgeable chasm under the pressures of war and revolution.

In this article, I will first trace the origins of the anarchist general strike and Socialist hostility to it, then show how the debate over the general strike and subsequently the political mass strike was directly influenced by the tradition and rhetoric of anti-anarchist thinking, and finally suggest some of the consequences of this for the development of Social Democracy.

Anarchists and the General Strike Tactic

While the idea of the "general strike" can be traced back at least to the eighteenth century, with thinkers of varying political stripes promoting a broad-based work stoppage to achieve labor goals or initiate political change, genealogists of the general strike most often pin its modern origins to the British Chartist movement, which, during the 1830s and 1840s, demanded that Parliament adopt the People's Charter, a slate of electoral reforms including universal male suffrage. Following Parliament's rejection of the second People's Charter petition in 1842, Chartists launched a mass work stoppage intended to pressure Parliament to adopt their demands. Though unsuccessful, this action provided a template for the idea of the general strike in the late nineteenth century.[5] The terminology surrounding strikes

was complex and somewhat fluid in this era, as strikes had varying scope and goals. Strikes with economic objectives could be as localized as workers in a single workplace striking for higher wages, or they could incorporate workers across an industry working for different employers, or workers across different sectors in one locality. Any of these could be referred to as a "general strike" (*Generalstreik* or *allgemeine Streik*), a "mass strike" (*Massenstreik*) or, occasionally, a "great strike" (*Großenstreik*), and other terms such as "revolutionary strike" also circulated. As with the labels embraced by radical thinkers and worker organizations, such as "socialist," "communist," "anarchist," and "syndicalist," both terms for and definitions of mass worker actions remained inconsistent and contested, even at the height of the mass strike debate.

The axis of difference that came to play a central role in the German mass strike debate was that between the anarchists' version of the "general strike," intended to inaugurate social revolution that would bring about the sudden overthrow of capitalism, and the "political mass strike," whose purpose was a matter of debate among Social Democrats but had an explicitly political goal, such as the expansion of suffrage rights or protest against a state policy or defense against state aggression. The framing of this contrast that would dominate Social Democratic discussion for half a century grew out of the split between Marxists and non-Marxists, mostly anarchists, within the International Workingmen's Association (IWA or the First International). From its founding in 1864, the IWA contained broad ideological diversity, bringing together followers of Marx, adherents of the anarchist philosophy of Mikhail Bakunin, and an array of other radical socialists. The mutual hostility, both theoretical and personal, between Marx and Bakunin increasingly divided the organization. In 1871, Marx made a power play, seeking both to define the IWA's goals as explicitly political (a direct attack on the anarchists and others who eschewed seeking political power within the capitalist state system) and to assert his authority over the organization by replacing what had previously been a loose federation among autonomous organizations with a central control structure governed by the IWA's General Council.[6] The Bakuninists and other opponents of Marx were either expelled from the IWA or left it of their own accord, and the organization soon fell apart.

Even before the split in the IWA, those antagonists of Marx who soon dubbed themselves "anti-authoritarians" had sought to explore the most appropriate tactics for furthering their revolutionary goals outside of the framework of party politics. Major strikes in Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland in the 1860s and 1870s led anarchists and fellow travelers to see the general strike as a potent revolutionary tactic. In its 1870 Chaux-de-Fonds Congress, the anarchist-dominated Jura Federation in Switzerland rejected participation in the political process, endorsing the general strike as "the sole means to assure the social revolution."[7] The new "Anti-authoritarian International," founded by Bakunin and the anti-Marxists in 1872 to replace the IWA, discussed the tactic of the general strike on multiple oc-

casions, with anarchists pushing to endorse the tactic as a precipitator of revolution. The organization's inaugural congress at St. Imier approved a resolution that offered only a very tepid endorsement and in fact did not even use the term "general strike": "We regard the strike as a precious weapon in the struggle. . .the necessary consequence of which is to make workers more and more alive to the gulf that exists between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, to bolster the toilers' organization, and . . .to prepare the proletariat for the great and final revolutionary contest."[8] The next year, at the anti-authoritarians' Geneva Congress, delegates again discussed the general strike, with many emphasizing its power to develop workers' revolutionary consciousness, whereas individual, or "partial," strikes ran the risk of demoralizing workers if they failed to achieve their narrow objectives.[9]

Opinions were divided, and the Congress's resolution on the general strike remained extremely qualified: "The Congress, considering the actual state of the International, does not regard the question of the general strike as a complete solution for the workers' movement, but believes it should be presented to the workers as an active part of socialist propaganda."[10] Over the next few years, anarchists mostly moved away from advocating the revolutionary general strike, instead embracing what the Italian anarchists called "propaganda of the deed," originally referring to exemplary uprisings meant to educate workers and peasants and spark their revolutionary fervor. The concept was in many ways a continuation of the general strike idea, in its goal of fostering workers' consciousness of their oppression and their power, thereby preparing the way for the inauguration of revolution, and both tactics fit within the anarchists' broad commitment to "direct action."[11]

Though the question of the general strike's purpose was never settled among anarchists, some seeing it as having the potential to spark immediate revolution and others considering it only to be a means of heightening worker consciousness in a revolutionary direction, the lines of the Social Democratic understanding of the anarchist general strike for the next half-century were etched in stone in Friedrich Engels's widely circulated and oft-cited 1873 pamphlet *The Bakuninists at Work*, written in the midst of social upheaval and the establishment of a fragile republican government in Spain. Engels criticized the anarchists for what he saw as destructive interventions in the Spanish situation, including their insistence on promoting the general strike when it could only hinder the republic's struggle against the reassertion of monarchical authority. He also held the anarchists largely responsible for undermining the Spanish labor movement's position within the republic, which did not survive beyond the next year. In his articles, Engels ridiculed the anarchist general strike in terms that would frequently be echoed, and even directly quoted, by German Social Democrats in later decades:

> The general strike is in the Bakuninists' program the lever which will be applied to initiate the social revolution. One fine morning all the workers in every trade in a country, or in the entire world,

> will halt their work and thereby force the ruling classes in at most four weeks either to submit or to launch an attack on the workers so that these will have the right to defend themselves, and by this opportunity overthrow the entire old society.[12]

To develop the extensive organization and amass the funds required for a successful general strike, Engels argued, they would need political power. But if they had sufficient power to do that, the general strike itself would be unnecessary. On the other hand, pursuing a general strike without this level of preparation (as the anarchists had allegedly done in Spain) could lead only to disaster and the crippling of the workers' movement. Summing up the Bakuninists' contribution to the events in Spain, Engels argued that they "either prevented any action. . .or drifted into sporadic, disorganized, and senseless uprisings. . .Of the so-called principles of anarchy . . .nothing remains but the boundless and senseless dissipation of revolutionary resources."[13] Engels's condemnation of anarchists as thoughtless, immature, destructive of the workers' movement, and intellectually self-contradictory would be invoked repeatedly in later Socialist discussions of the general strike.

Although the general strike as a tactic was never the province of anarchists alone, and indeed was utilized repeatedly by non-anarchists over the next several decades—albeit never with the purpose of bringing about immediate social revolution—the anarchist general strike as Engels depicted it became embedded in German Social Democratic discourse throughout the remainder of the German Empire as an illustration of immature and wrong-headed action, against which to measure Socialist strategy.[14] The key issues at stake in Social Democratic tactical debates in which anarchism acted as a foil were the questions of political participation's value in achieving socialist goals and of whether socialists could advance the revolution through positive action or must simply wait for the capitalist system to develop to the point of insoluble crisis.

Anti-anarchist Rhetoric and the Debate over Social Democratic Tactics

During the era of the Socialist Law (1878-90), which banned Social Democracy from all activity in the German Empire except electoral participation, the party devoted much of its energy to electioneering and parliamentary activity, as well as working with the trade union movement to develop the organizational structures that would allow workers to fight for better wages and working conditions. In this context, strikes made sense under very limited circumstances, to achieve specific economic goals rather than to advance political demands or fuel revolutionary sentiment. In fighting for self-preservation, Social Democrats cultivated an identity as responsible, disciplined, and democratic, in contrast to the authoritarian state on one side and immature, irresponsible, and undisciplined anarchists on the other.[15]

After the expiration of the anti-socialist legislation, the newly christened Social Democratic Party (SPD) achieved a massive electoral breakthrough in 1890

and continued to expand its membership and political representation over the next two and half decades, while also growing a journalistic and cultural apparatus that united socialist workers into a formidable force in German society. At the same time, the trade union movement also increased its power and reach, and while not officially part of the SPD party apparatus, exercised significant influence over it. The massive size and organization of the SPD and the working-class movement fueled tensions over the appropriate path forward, of which the debate over strike tactics was one important manifestation.

In the SPD's new program, the Erfurt Program of 1891, party theorist Karl Kautsky wedded a revolutionary radicalism taken directly from Marx (in the first, theoretical, portion of the document) to a practical agenda for economic and political change within the Reich's established framework (in the second half), a legacy of the Lassallean wing of German Social Democracy as well as the experience of the Socialist Law era.[16] Thus, the program boldly stated that the present social system "will finally lead to such unbearable conditions for the mass of the population that they will have no choice but to go down into degradation or to overthrow the system of private property," but also endorsed practical efforts "on the part of the exploited against their present sufferings," especially parliamentary activity, which "is the most powerful lever that can be utilized to raise the proletariat out of its economic, social and moral degradation." Within this explicitly Marxist context, Kautsky framed the Socialists' strategy around a clear contrast between utopianism and scientific socialism, with anarchism as the contemporary manifestation of utopianism, writing that the "proletarian utopians" of the early nineteenth century had adopted a strategy of extreme radicalism due to circumstances of the day: "Every form of the class-struggle which was not aimed at the immediate overthrow of existing order . . . seemed to the early socialist as nothing more nor less than a betrayal of humanity." He described this "primitive socialist way of thinking" as "a children's disease which threatens every young socialist movement which has not got beyond utopianism . . . At present this sort of socialist thinking is called anarchy, but it is not necessarily connected with anarchism. It has its origin, not in clear understanding, but rather in mere instinctive opposition to the existing order."[17] Social Democratic leaders viewed anarchist agitation, including for the general strike, in this context, which both accorded with Marxist doctrine and the Lassallean inclination toward state-centered reformism over revolution.

In 1889, the year before the Socialist Law's expiration, the Second International was founded to replace the defunct First International. Once again, the general strike arose as a topic of debate, after several successful strike actions across Europe achieved significant results.[18] Socialists in many countries, most prominently France and Italy, where robust syndicalist movements existed, came to see some form of general or mass strike as a potentially powerful weapon. Revolutionary syndicalists, anarcho-syndicalists, and other radical groups sought to push the international socialist movement in a more confrontational direction through the tool of

the strike.[19] German Social Democrats, acutely aware of the danger of a brutal state-sponsored crackdown in their own nation, time and again condemned this radical approach to the strike, utilizing the anti-anarchist tropes that Engels had originally articulated and that had been elaborated by the party during the Socialist Law era.[20] At the first congress of the Second International, a French delegate offered a resolution declaring the general strike "the beginning of the social revolution," to which Social Democratic leader Wilhelm Liebknecht responded, following Engels, that "if the workers have a strong enough organization to be able to carry out a general strike, they will hopefully not satisfy themselves with one, but rather make better use of their organization. For they will be the rulers the world."[21] The general strike resolution was overwhelmingly defeated. Liebknecht also prevailed on the congress in its final resolution to brand as "utopian and powerless" the use of the general strike to combat militarism, another idea promulgated by anarchists.[22] Reformist theorist Eduard Bernstein argued in *Die Neue Zeit*, the SPD's premier weekly journal, that the 1893 Belgian strike that had successfully pressured the government to expand suffrage rights would have led to disaster had it been turned toward an overthrow of the ruling society, as it had mobilized only about ten percent of Belgian workers. The general strike, in the sense that workers could put down their tools and "thereby bring about a rapid end of the present society," he wrote, "is a poetical dream, a utopia."[23] Wilhelm Düwell, who served for a time as editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, made the familiar point that a successful general strike would require massive organization and funds, and "If we already have this power, then we do not need the general strike!"[24] In 1896, the London congress of the Second International, which had excluded anarchists from participation, passed a resolution that the International saw "no present possibility of an international general strike."[25] Social Democrats fended off pro-general strike resolutions from anarchists, syndicalists, and other advocates whenever they arose, denigrating the tactic as a product of anarchist immaturity and the utopian fantasy of initiating revolution at one's own will.[26] The Socialist attitude was captured most succinctly in SPD Reichstag deputy Ignaz Auer's pithy dictum, "The general strike is general nonsense."[27]

A measure of the effectiveness of this rhetoric can be seen in a book on the general strike written by liberal evangelical chemist and Russian-German translator Karl Nötzel. Published as part of the "Problems of Our Time" series, Nötzel's book echoed the key arguments advanced by Social Democrats. The anarchist general strike, in the sense of "a sudden, simultaneous, and total work stoppage" Nötzel declared, "in its inherent utopianism marks itself as a product of bourgeois idealism." He went so far as to call the anarchist general strike "terroristic," only distinguished from "bomb terrorism" by the expansiveness of the threat it posed. Happily, he concluded, the "organized proletariat" appeared to have little taste for this tactic, instead working toward improving its lot within the current system.[28] It is hard to imagine a more Socialist-friendly conclusion from an outsider.

In the post-Socialist Law era, many prominent SPD leaders saw the suc-

cess of the party's strategy under the Socialist Law as a vindication that practical reformism could produce improvements within the dominant socio-economic system, leading to a peaceful transition to socialism. However, some thinkers sought a new vision for the party's direction, insisting that it must refocus its energy on educating workers in ways that would foster their revolutionary consciousness in preparation for the coming collapse of capitalism. The questions facing German Social Democrats in this era went to the heart of socialist practice: should the movement be oriented toward gradual reform efforts? Should it simply bide its time, preparing to take over after capitalism's collapse, what historian Dieter Groh has referred to as "revolutionary *Attentismus* [attentive waiting]"?[29] Or could the revolution be advanced by concerted action? If so, how much? While the lines separating different camps were not rigid, and many prominent intellectuals evolved in their thinking over time, three broad factions emerged among German Social Democrats: one that insisted that society could peaceably evolve from capitalism to socialism through gradual reform efforts (most associated with Bernstein, a "revisionist" who endorsed the concept of "evolutionary socialism"); another that held that the party elite must foster the radical education of workers and guide them toward revolution (often referred to as radicals); and a centrist group that included many of the party's long-term leaders (including Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel) that believed while revolution was indeed inevitable, the party must simply focus on growing the organization, strength, and self-consciousness of the working classes until the time for revolution was ripe.[30]

While revisionists frequently came in for criticism, those who pushed too far in a radical direction risked complete ostracization. In the early 1890s, the SPD leadership battled a group of dissidents whom they pejoratively referred to as the *Jungen* ("the young ones"), who denounced what they saw as the party's petit-bourgeois turn, arguing for a more thoroughgoing revolutionary outlook that would encompass social, intellectual, and cultural change, rather than merely parliamentary and trade union struggles for the amelioration of the capitalist world. These intellectuals called for a return to a stance of pure opposition to the dominant society and building class consciousness among the proletariat to prepare it for revolution. The closeness of the *Jungen* perspective to one advocated by anarchists opened them up to attacks from the party's established leaders, who ridiculed them as dilettantish intellectuals and middle-class careerists, "half-anarchists" lacking discipline and commitment.[31] While some members of the *Jungen* did drift toward anarchism, many remained committed (if doctrinally heterodox) Marxists who nonetheless wished to see a more wide-ranging field of party activism than their entrenched leaders did.[32]

After the turn of the century, advocates of radical trade unionism, most prominently physician Raphael Friedeberg, also fell afoul of the centrist party leaders. The 1901 congress of the Free Association of German Trade Unions, which Friedeberg helped found as an alternative to the SPD-allied trade unions, passed a

resolution on "Parliamentarism and the General Strike" charging that the Social Democratic emphasis on electoral politics and reformist trade union actions had produced a "totally false education of the masses," obscuring the true goal of socialism—the "full and final liberation of the human personality."[33] These independent, localist trade unions (a small minority within the labor movement) envisioned the general strike as a means by which workers could develop their revolutionary awareness and assert themselves as active agents of social transformation. In his 1904 pamphlet *Parliamentarism and the General Strike*, Friedeberg declared, "The general strike idea should not divert the unions from the daily struggle," but at the same time, "we also need a further horizon, the unions must become aware of their work as the germ and the bearer of the new social order. And the unions can do much in this regard. Through strikes they school the workers, give them moral strength, impart a sense of solidarity, proletarian thinking, and experience."[34] This "direct and immediate education" would help liberate their "free personality," he argued. Justifying the pursuit of the heretofore anarchist tactic, he wrote, "If the weapon of the general strike. . .deepens our psychological struggle, if it prevents the dissipation of fighting energy and power among those who have the same enemies and the same goals, then it will have fulfilled a great task in the proletarian struggle." Friedeberg went so far as to call for a Socialist-anarchist rapprochement, urging Social Democrats to "fight together with those who stand alike on the ground of socialism and the class struggle."[35] Friedeberg finally persuaded SPD leaders to place the general strike tactic on the agenda for the 1905 party congress in Jena.[36]

Though opposed to the *Jungen* and the free trade union movement, Luxemburg and other members of the radical wing shared many of the same criticisms of the prevailing reformist bent of the party and broader workers' movement. In defending the radical vision against the charge of anarchist leanings, Luxemburg associated reformist ideas ("revisionism," or "opportunism") with anarchism, painting these as symmetrical errors of the right and left extremes. In October 1898, reflecting on the just-concluded Social Democratic congress in Stuttgart, she described two eras of internal Socialist tactical debates. The first era—which stretched from the late 1860s until 1891—had focused on debates about parliamentarism, which continued as long as socialists were denied voting rights (until 1871) and then the right to organize freely (1878-90). "At that time," she wrote, "the anarchist-leaning, anti-parliamentary extreme *left* was justly combated." But the party's triumph over this adversity "ended all doubt about the implications of the parliamentary struggle, and those elements that cleaved to the standpoint of pure negative agitation were forced swiftly to conclude their natural development into anarchism, that is, into political bankruptcy." Having framed the first era as a struggle against the error of anarchist anti-parliamentarism, Luxemburg addressed the second era. "Immediately the struggle against the opposite tendency began," she continued. While "previously one wing of the party had always undervalued positive everyday political struggle, inclining toward negation," now the party's success had led some

"to the other extreme, the overvaluation of positive reform work, to the tendency of opportunism." This latter error, in Luxemburg's eyes, represented the greater danger, for "since the anarchist theories are daily turned on their head through Social Democracy's practical successes. . .it is complete brainlessness to adhere to the anarchist phantasms today," yet the very successes that had undermined anarchism's credibility enhanced the appeal of opportunism.[37] Luxemburg made the same point in her anti-revisionist pamphlet of 1900, *Social Reform or Social Revolution?* The party had to navigate carefully, she warned, "between the two cliffs: between relinquishing the mass character and relinquishing the goal, between falling back into a sect and falling over into a bourgeois reform movement, between anarchism and opportunism." She asserted that the party had already overcome "the lesser danger, the childhood measles of anarchism," in its struggle against the "independent movement" (that is, the *Jungen*), while "the greater danger—the dropsy of opportunism—is currently being overcome."[38] This logic would be the basis of her later defense of the mass strike as a policy that avoided both errors rooted in a bourgeois outlook.

The "Political Mass Strike" as an Alternative to the Anarchist General Strike

While "the general strike suffered from the hereditary taint of its anarchist origins," as historian Carl Schorske put it, some radicals became increasingly convinced that the strike could be used as both a political and a pedagogical tool in Germany, leading them to formulate the idea of the political mass strike.[39] Ample evidence existed that a widespread strike to achieve a political objective could succeed. The most salient examples were the Belgian strikes in favor of widening suffrage in 1891 and 1893. Kautsky claimed (in 1914) that in an 1891 *Neue Zeit* article, he had been "the first Marxist voice in Germany to recognize the possibility that the strike could be deployed for the achievement of political ends." When at the Second International's 1893 Zurich congress, the French revolutionary syndicalist delegates put the general strike (*allgemeine Streik*) on the agenda, Kautsky put forward a counterproposal on the strike's political value that undercut the general strike in favor of the limited mass strike. According to his proposal, a worldwide strike could not be effective given the unequal economic development across countries, while a general strike in one country in peacetime could not succeed in the best case beyond an individual industry; "the mass strike can, however, under specific circumstances be a very effective weapon not merely in an economic but also in a political struggle." Kautsky claimed that this was the first time the term "mass strike" had been used to convey a direct contrast to the anarchist "general strike." In the end, his resolution never made it to the floor for debate, but the rationale behind it would recur over the next several years.[40]

The first use of the term "political mass strike," which would become the most common formulation among its supporters, appears to have come in an article series written in *Die Neue Zeit* in 1896 by Alexander Helphand (generally known by

his pseudonym Parvus). Deriding the anarchist general strike as doomed to failure because "isolated from the political context," Parvus asserted that the "political mass strike" was distinct due to its goal being "the attainment of specific political alterations that it uses not against individual capitalists but against the government itself." While conceiving of the political mass strike as a fundamentally defensive measure to be wielded against a governmental coup attempt (*Staatsstreich*), Parvus argued that its effect would be "the seizure of political power by the proletariat."[41] He thus walked a fine line between the explicit rejection of the anarchist general strike meant to initiate the revolution and the endorsement of a strike that would lead to the conquest of political power by the workers. Luxemburg likewise saw the utility of a strike that would inculcate in workers a sense of their own revolutionary power and in the end lead to the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist order. She viewed the Belgian strike of 1893 as significant due not only to its having achieved the goal of expanding suffrage, but also "its success in activating the political consciousness of the backward portions of the population."[42] While these Social Democrats adopted the term "political mass strike" deliberately to distinguish the tactic from the anarchist general strike meant to usher in the revolution all at once, their vision was not so different from Friedeberg's. They continually struggled with the problem of the anarchist association, even more so as several Socialists continued to refer to the general strike in a non-anarchist sense while anarchist general strike supporters promoted diverse ideas about what the tactic meant even within the anarchist context.

While the "mass strike debate" within the SPD occurred over a number of years, its most intensive period was from 1904 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Responding to a wave of strikes, most notably in Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy (the same events that had inspired Friedeberg's enthusiasm for the general strike), the August 1904 congress of the Second International saw intense discussion of strike tactics. The congress overwhelmingly rejected two pro-general strike resolutions, one from a French delegation declaring it "the most effective means for the triumph of worker demands as well as the securing of political rights" and another proclaiming that it could be used to initiate "revolutionary outbreaks" and also as "a means for political action."[43] A third resolution, which the congress did adopt, flatly rejected the "absolute general strike, in the sense of a complete work stoppage," as "impossible," and given the threat of a reaction that could lead to a severe setback to worker rights, warned against "the anarchist-driven propaganda for the general strike." In contrast, the resolution endorsed the "meaningful, daily struggle through trade union, political, and cooperative actions," which would build up workers' strength and organization, accepting the mass strike as a last resort, "should the strike with a political goal at some point become necessary and useful."[44] Though this resolution was understood as a rebuke of the robust use of the mass strike, the SPD party congress in Jena in September 1905, in the midst of the Russian Revolution, saw a renewed enthusiasm for the idea of the political

strike. Bebel, the party's foremost leader, delivered a speech denouncing the general strike while cautiously accepting the mass strike under limited conditions. Calling anarchism a "consistent extension of bourgeois liberalism and individualism," he argued that the anarchists regarded the general strike as a "panacea" that would end war, achieve the eight-hour workday, and "overthrow the entire bourgeois society." Social Democrats, who "do not fight for utopian foolishness [*Utopistereien*]" and "do not believe that we can dismantle bourgeois society with the general strike," should, according to Bebel, regard the mass strike as a limited political tool, to be used only in extreme circumstances. His proposed resolution on the mass strike, which the congress adopted, emphasized that "it is particularly the duty of the entire working class in case of an attack upon the universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage or the right of coalition, urgently to utilize every apparently suitable means in defense," and in such a circumstance, "*the comprehensive utilization of the mass work stoppage*" might be required, but it could only be successful with "the greatest expansion of the political and trade union organization of the working class, and the constant education and enlightenment of the masses by the labor press and oral and written agitation."[45] For Bebel, the mass strike only made sense as an effort to protect workers' rights against the imminent threat of a state *coup d'état*.

A few months earlier, Bernstein had delivered a speech with a very similar tone, criticizing the anarchists for endorsing the general strike as the only effective tool of worker action. The idea that "one could abolish bourgeois society in one blow through a general strike is a utopia," he declared, which, if it were to spread, would be "paralyzing," as only a fool would spend time on the "detail work [*Kleinarbeit*]" of organization-building if the general strike could "reach the goal more cheaply and more quickly." The general strike "as the anarchists and closely-related socialists" advocated would lead only to suffering for workers and likely fuel a bloody and futile conflict with the state. The political mass strike, on the other hand, could be wielded effectively to defend the rights of the working classes, chiefly the suffrage, in extreme circumstances. As cautious as Bebel about the tactic, Bernstein stipulated that it would require "not only very great participation of the masses, but also the concentration of the spirit of these masses on very specific, limited goals."[46]

The same view of the political mass strike emerged in the writings of many other Socialists at the time. In a 1906 booklet on the mass strike, Swiss Social Democrat Robert Grimm decried the "expropriation general strike, such as the anarchists propagandize and which many of them see as the only and exclusive means for the overthrow of today's society" as "general nonsense" (per Auer), and he noted that it had been repeatedly rejected by Socialists in recent years. Grimm endorsed the political mass strike "with the goal of resistance to the government, against state force [*Staatsgewalt*]," arguing that workers must understand the tactic, since, while "not the holy panacea, it can under given circumstances be an extremely important means of struggle."[47] Along similar lines, Gustav Eckstein, still using the term "general strike" instead of "mass strike," wrote, "The general strike is the last,

the most serious threat of the proletariat before the storm, it can be considered nothing more, but also nothing less."[48] Rudolf Hilferding, also using the term "general strike," in a 1903 article defending the value of parliamentarism argued that in dire circumstances "behind universal suffrage must stand the will to a general strike," while repudiating the "romantic-revolutionary phraseology" of the "pseudo-revolutionary putsch" favored by anarchists, which would only invite disastrous counterrevolutionary violence.[49] Both centrists and reformists cast the mass strike as narrowly defensive, to be wielded only against an incursion on workers' rights by the state that would threaten socialism's advance via parliamentary and trade union power.

Yet even such highly circumscribed endorsements of the political mass strike proved to be too much for the leaders of the trade union movement, and after consultation with them, party leaders backed away from even its limited embrace of the mass strike, passing a resolution at the 1906 Mannheim Congress declaring that no contradiction existed between the Jena Congress's resolution on the mass strike and an earlier trade union congress resolution that had utterly repudiated the mass strike. The Mannheim Congress resolution included a clause that the party must consult with the trade unions before ever considering a mass strike.[50] At this point, some radicals like Friedeberg left the party entirely, while Luxemburg and others continued to try to win over their comrades to the value of the more expansive use of the political mass strike.[51]

Mass Strike Proponents and the Problem of Anarchism

To promote the mass strike within the mainstream of the SPD, its proponents needed to draw a clear conceptual contrast to the anarchist general strike, and moreover to any association with the entire character Socialists imputed to anarchists: irrationality, immaturity, impatience, and a utopian belief that they could bring a socialist future into existence by their own actions. Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, and other advocates of the political mass strike depicted it as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of Marxist thought, with both the anarchists and the SPD reformists ("opportunists") who opposed it succumbing to different versions of misguided bourgeois thinking. Luxemburg's well-known 1906 essay, *Mass Strike, Political Party, and the Trade Unions*, began with two chapters explaining how the mass strike had nothing in common with the superficially similar anarchist tactic. In the opening paragraph, she summed up Engels's critique of the general strike from *The Bakuninists at Work*: "either the proletariat as a whole is not yet in possession of the powerful organization and financial resources required, so that they cannot carry through the general strike; or it is already well enough organized that it does not need the general strike." The flaw in the anarchists' fantasy was that they regarded the general strike as "a means of inaugurating the social revolution, rather than as a means of the working class's daily political struggle."[52] This distinction formed the wedge that Luxemburg sought to drive between the anarchist general strike and the political

mass strike she supported. The 1905 Russian Revolution had deeply affected Luxemburg's thinking, and she considered the workers' mass strikes as central to that revolution's success, but also a model relevant to Germany. "The Russian revolution has now effected a radical revision" of Engels's decades-old critique, she claimed. "For the first time in the class struggle's history it has achieved a grandiose realization of the idea of the mass strike and. . .has even matured the general strike and thereby opened a new epoch in the labor movement's development." Luxemburg carefully avoided contradicting Engels, insisting, "It does not, of course, follow from this that either the tactic of political struggle recommended by Marx and Engels or their critique of anarchism was false. On the contrary, it is the same train of ideas, the same method, the Marx-Engels tactics that lay at the foundation of German Social Democracy's previous practices, which now in the Russian revolution are producing new momentum and new conditions in the class struggle."[53]

What separated the anarchists' utopian vision of the general strike from the practical method of the Socialist mass strike was, for Luxemburg, the anarchists' ahistoricism:

> For the anarchist mode of thought. . .what is essential is the whole abstract, unhistorical view of the mass strike, and of all the conditions of the proletarian struggle generally. For the anarchist there exist only two items as material suppositions of his 'revolutionary' speculations—first imagination, and second goodwill and courage to rescue humanity from the existing capitalist vale of tears.

By contrast, the political mass strike, which had as its goal the education of workers for political struggle, had developed out of historical circumstances. "The mass strike in Russia has been realized not as a means of bypassing the working class's political struggle, and especially parliamentarism, to leap suddenly into the social revolution by means of a theatrical coup," she averred, "but as a means, firstly, of creating for the proletariat the conditions of daily political struggle and especially of parliamentarism."[54] This distinction between the general strike and the mass strike allowed her to endorse Auer's phrase that "the general strike is general nonsense" while still promoting the mass strike as a tool to foster revolutionary consciousness.[55]

Countering "the fear of the mass strike's 'propagation' that has even led to formal anathemas against those allegedly guilty of this crime," Luxemburg used the Russian example to illustrate its total disconnection from anarchism.[56] For while the conditions in Russia "seemed as if created to be the experimental field for anarchism's heroic deeds," anarchists were playing no role in the mass strike movement there, and in fact there existed only "a handful of half-grown 'anarchists' who promote confusion and bewilderment amongst the workers to the best of their ability."

The Russian case, "the first historical experiment on the model of the mass strike, not merely does not signify a vindication of anarchism, but actually means a *historical liquidation of anarchism*."[57] At the 1910 Magdeburg party congress, Luxemburg again assured her audience that the promulgation of the mass strikes did not signal a vindication for anarchism, which had in fact been "completely trampled by the troops of the organized proletariat" (the audience responded with a cry of "Bravo!").[58] Luxemburg explained, "The revolutionary struggle in Russia, in which mass strikes are the most important weapon is. . .conducted for those political rights and conditions whose necessity and importance in the working class's emancipation struggle Marx and Engels first pointed out, and fought for with all their might in the International in opposition to anarchism." Unlike the anarchist tactic, the political mass strike, she argued, formed part of the natural evolution of the workers' political struggle.[59] It provided a crucial opportunity for workers to learn to act as political agents, for she believed that they "must be able to unfold their mass energy, their ability to act," rather than being stifled under the artificial constraints of party discipline.[60]

In his 1909 book *Tactical Differences in the Workers' Movement*, Pannekoek, a fellow mass strike proponent, rejected both anarchism and revisionism as equal, though opposite, deviations from Marxist truth and Social Democratic practice. Where anarchists gave themselves over totally to revolution, revisionists abandoned themselves to pure reform. Favourable social conditions for workers produced revisionism, whose adherents figured "that on the path to a progressive improvement . . .society's gradual transformation can be carried through." Anarchism, on the other hand, emerged during times of crisis, which led some to believe that "with a single revolutionary action, it is possible to topple capitalism, without need of patient, carefully-prepared small works." This desire for capitalism's sudden overthrow, seen in the form of syndicalism and anarcho-socialism, was rooted in an "instinctive class-feeling, which bitterly hates capitalism, but does not understand it." Pannekoek decried anarchists' lack of discipline and organization: "Anarchism, which hates this detail-work, cannot channel the revolutionary spirit, the desire for struggle, which it awakes."[61]

Revisionists, in a symmetrical error, believed that they could work with the bourgeoisie's progressive elements to achieve socialist goals, but this tactic, he declared, "extinguishes the hard-won, clear class consciousness" of the workers, making it equally damaging. Whereas anarchists failed to understand that the workers' movement must use weapons forged by the bourgeoisie (political parties, trade unions, the proletariat's industrial discipline), revisionists failed to understand that these weapons must be turned against the bourgeoisie through tactics such as the mass strike. "At first glance," Pannekoek acknowledged, "the two tendencies which we have designated with the general names anarchism and revisionism seem totally opposed to one other. They are, however, at the same time, closely related to each other, because they stand opposed to Social Democratic tactics as one-sided dis-

tortions. They are both expressions of the same bourgeois perspective." And so, he concluded, "anarchism is the petit-bourgeois ideology grown wild, revisionism the same ideology grown tame."[62]

Henriette Roland-Holst's 1905 study *General Strike and Social Democracy* likewise distinguished between the anarchist tactic—which she categorized under the "economic-social general strike" in her four-part typology—and the political mass strike by emphasizing the importance of political maturity and discipline to the latter. The former originated in lands where there existed "socialist feeling without Social Democratic consciousness, longing for salvation from the hell of capitalism without a clear insight into the economic, political, and organizational conditions for the transformation of society from capitalism to socialism." Quoting Swiss Social Democrat Hermann Greulich's statement that "The general strike is a childish dream of poorly organized workers," she argued that to build their strength and learn to act effectively, workers must gain knowledge of their true situation through scientific socialism without "taking refuge in dangerous dreams."[63] But like other mass strike advocates, Roland-Holst regarded as an error the notion that the tactics of parliamentarism and the political strike were in conflict. Anarchists on one side viewed the general strike as an "absolute universal means, which can be utilized successfully in all places and circumstances," and reformists on the other side succumbed to an "overvaluation of parliamentarism" as "the only method" through which the proletariat could reach its goals. In fact, there was no more contradiction between the two, Roland-Holst argued, than between "organization and enthusiasm or discipline and revolutionary energy," pairs that were unquestionably complementary. She inveighed against reformists who undervalued the mass strike, thinking economic conditions would automatically lead to socialism and workers would simply be able to take political power through elections.[64] She emphasized the necessity of the mass strike to prepare workers for revolution while they continued to work through parliamentary and trade union organization until the time for revolution was right.[65]

Mass Strike Opponents and the Taint of the "General Strike"

Opponents of the mass strike, on the other hand, depicted the tactic as only one step removed from the anarchist general strike, and they utilized the full panoply of critical anti-anarchist rhetoric to make the case. At the peak of the mass strike debate, several pamphlets warning of anarchism's danger to the Socialist movement appeared. While targeting the attempts by Germany's tiny anarcho-syndicalist movement to make inroads into the labor movement, in the way that Friedeberg had tried to do, their sharp attacks on the logic of the general strike took aim at the mass strike tactic by association. Wilhelm Herzberg's 1906 pamphlet *Social Democracy and Anarchism* noted that since "anarchism has attempted in the form of anarcho-socialism to break into the party- and union-movement," the time seemed right "once again to draw the borderline between Social Democracy and anarchism." Much of

Herzberg's analysis of anarchism relied on Social Democratic anti-anarchism's familiar tropes, criticizing anarchists for espousing contradictory ideas and the "almost unending flood of senseless phrases" one heard out of their mouths.[66] Attacking the general strike, Herzberg insisted that the achievement and protection of basic rights—freedom of association, speech, coalition, and suffrage—better served the struggle for proletarian emancipation than this utopian revolutionary fantasy.[67] Proclaiming that the core of Social Democrats' "social cohesion lies in their discipline . . .the individual's subordination to the whole," he rejected spontaneous mass action, and without repudiating the mass strike completely, he cautioned that "if used too often it fritters away the strength of the workers."[68] Herzberg's complaint that "The anarchists muddle the proletariat with phrases encouraging self-deception about their power" clearly called into question the view of the masses' revolutionary potential held by supporters of the mass strike.[69] Herzberg rejected the idea of a united front between anarchists, who incited the proletariat to rash action, and Social Democrats, who "teach it to coolly calculate" and so foster in the masses "ordered, disciplined organization."[70] While most mass strike supporters likewise rejected working with anarchists, they also opposed what they saw as the excessive disciplining of workers and refusing to take their revolutionary potential seriously.[71]

Revisionist Simon Katzenstein's 1908 pamphlet *Anarchism and the Workers' Movement* followed the same line of thinking, decrying the anarchist idea of the general strike as nonsense and as "the kernel and primary content of the entire socialist undertaking, as the single means for capitalism's elimination and socialism's creation." While conceding that the mass strike could be beneficial in the very narrow circumstances articulated by Bebel in Jena, he strenuously objected to the idea of using it for the kind of educational purpose that many mass strike backers advocated. Katzenstein explained that only the "working class's organization and schooling—through political, trade union, and cooperative work, and socialist education" would ensure their long-term victory.[72] Lambasting the anarchist faith in "the unrestrained will of the unorganized masses, who in their unfathomable wisdom. . . move toward all that is good," Katzenstein rejected the sentiments expressed in Luxemburg's *Mass Strike*, in which she had urged the party to remain in the "closest possible contact with the mood of the masses" and not to underestimate "the political maturity. . .of the unorganized proletarian mass."[73]

In the same year, Franz Laufkötter remarked, in an article on "Utopian Ideas in Modern Socialism," "The catastrophe theory which flared up in the idea of the economic mass strike rests on the analogy of the volcanic eruption," yet "whoever has observed how difficult it is to carry out social revolutions, precisely because they penetrate so deeply into human life, will lose the utopian faith in social revolution's magical power." He charged that the "work of the present is so frequently neglected in favor of future-entranced radicalism" by those who wished "to instill revolutionary enthusiasm in the mass of the people."[74] "Here he referred to the kinds of activities mass strike proponents were committed to—in 1905, rad-

ical journalist Kurt Eisner had asserted that the "kindling of enthusiasm" was "the most important educational problem facing the party," sparking a heated intra-party debate about "enthusiasm."[75] Laufkötter warned: "A battle of decision is in store between utopianism and socialism, between children who still believe in miracles and hope for the miraculous, and the calm men who wish to transform the world through serious work." Reinforcing the link between anarcho-socialists and mass-strike supporters, he urged Socialists to be on guard against those who "hold fast to childish beliefs which they wrap in the cloak of scientism, but who in fact have not outgrown utopianism."[76]

Georg Stiékloff, in a 1911 *Neue Zeit* article series on "Marx and Bakunin," pronounced that Marx "condemned categorically the vain attempt of an impatient and frivolous minority that strives to identify its own wishes with the objective laws of historical processes," noting that this applied not only to anarchists, but all "insurrectionists" who, though rejecting the anarchist label, "were nonetheless prepared to follow anarchist methods." Stiékloff described a fundamental battle between an ideology that encouraged the newly awakened masses' "instinctive, and in their impulsiveness stormy" tendencies, and "the representative of an experience-rich proletariat that has reached a readiness for power, that strives with consciousness, through organization and methodical action, for its true and surely imminent emancipation."[77] Stiékloff's criticisms were addressed not only to anarchists but to all who shared a faith in the masses' instinctive revolutionism.[78]

The threat of anarchists taking over the German trade union movement or dominating within the SPD was nonexistent, and even where anarchists enjoyed their greatest influence (chiefly Berlin and Hamburg), they remained a distinct minority. The focus in these works on the anarchist specter, however, served an important role in making the more radical use of the political mass strike anathema, a quasi-anarchist if not wholly anarchist tactic, based as it was on the utopian notion that the instinctive revolutionism of workers could be cultivated by leaders through the mechanism of the general or mass strike. This concern remained salient in Europe from 1905 to 1914, due to the continued prominence of strike actions, some of which achieved success, but others of which damaged the credibility of Social Democracy. For example, the 1909 Swedish general strike's failure fueled recriminations against party leaders and even a turn by some workers to anarcho-syndicalism, while the 1913 Belgian general strike for universal suffrage did prompt the government to consider the matter but ultimately led to no change in the franchise.[79]

Kautsky, though accepting the political mass strike as a conceptual possibility, also fiercely attacked the approach of Luxemburg and Pannekoek in anti-anarchist terms.[80] Distilling the socialist tactical dispute into a contest between the "strategy of attrition" (preparing for the revolution in the manner of "revolutionary attentiveness") and the "strategy of overthrow," directly linked to anarchism, Kautsky promoted the "strategy of attrition" as the tactic that had guided Social Democrats successfully through the Socialist Law era, "against both the demands by

the followers of Most [anarchists] for utilizing the strategy of overthrow, and the attempts by the revisionists of the era. . .to win bourgeois sympathy by weakening the fighting character of our movement." Kautsky charged Luxemburg with the same ahistorical thinking Socialists criticized anarchists for, alleging that she "does not derive the necessity of the mass strike from the conditions of the given situation, rather from general psychological considerations, which are valid for every mass action, wherever and whenever these may occur." He warned that under current conditions in Germany, the worst approach would be to initiate a mass strike that would fail and turn the workers against Socialism. Instead, he advised, "Today we must intensify our agitation not for the mass strike, but for the coming Reichstag elections."[81]

In response to his criticism of her alleged ahistoricism and focus on psychology, Luxemburg upbraided Kautsky for trotting out the "*anarchist specter* of the mass strike" as a means of criticizing her, noting that a recent anarchist congress had denounced the political mass strike as ineffectual to make the point that the anarchists understood full well that her position was opposed to theirs.[82] All the way up to 1914, Luxemburg continued to advocate for the mass strike, insisting that Social Democrats did not "prophecy in such a utopian fashion" that they could say exactly what means of struggle was correct for all time, so they should be prepared to use "in every case that means that seems most effective," including the political mass strike.[83] Yet the 1913 SPD party congress, once again held in Jena, came to the same conclusion about the mass strike as it had previously. Rejecting the tactic as "an infallible and always applicable means for the elimination of social ills in the sense of the anarchist view," the party leadership offered a resolution stating that "the political mass strike can only be undertaken with the complete unity of all organs of the workers' movement by class-conscious masses," and emphasizing that party comrades therefore "have the duty to work untiringly for the building of political and trade union organizations." The radicals, led by Luxemburg, proposed a motion to substitute several paragraphs of more radical language about the mass strike's usage, but these were peremptorily voted down.[84] In the end, despite the energetic agitation of Luxemburg and others, the centrists and reformists prevailed, with the party never backing the radicals' vision of the political mass strike.

At the same time, as Hans-Uwe Guettel has shown, a political mass strike to push Prussian suffrage reform remained a genuine possibility in the years immediately prior to the war: "by the early summer of 1914, at least in Berlin, a significant number of SPD leaders were willing to give serious consideration to extraparliamentary actions—with a mass strike as the most powerful weapon at their disposal—in order to democratize the Prussian voting system." And in fact, though the 1913 Jena congress had rejected Luxemburg's language on the mass strike, "the party's executive committee. . .ended its meeting acclaiming either 'democratic suffrage or mass strike.' The SPD's new chairman, Friedrich Ebert, proclaimed in front of all the delegates that 'either we will have free elections in Prussia or we will have

the mass strike (stormy applause).'" Even Kautsky by 1914 accepted that the Prussian suffrage question might lead to a mass strike.[85]

This situation highlights the dual situation of Social Democracy at the end of the Kaiserreich. In the interpretive debate about "the extent to which constitutionality, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and parliamentary norms were operative during the *Kaiserreich*," I fall into what Matthew Fitzpatrick calls the "optimistic" camp.[86] Not only Social Democrats' own decades-long commitment to parliamentary participation, free and open public debate, and the rule of law, but also many of their bitterest detractors' acceptance of the right of Socialists to participate in public discourse on an equal footing suggest this.[87] Even so, as Guettel, James Retallack, and others make clear, Social Democratic culture continued to embrace a revolutionary rhetoric that both inspired many party members and terrified their opponents, who sought to contain the threats posed by robust democratization.[88] Almost forty years ago, Vernon Lidtke captured this situation in his critique of the concept of "negative integration," about which he commented, "It underestimates the degree to which various elements of the socialist labor movement were in fact positively integrated into the larger society and, on the other hand, it dismisses too easily the seriousness of the labor movement as a destabilizing force."[89]

Conclusion

Despite Social Democrats' one-dimensional caricature of the anarchist general strike, anarchists themselves were engaged in lively debates about what the tactic involved, and the vision of the general strike pilloried by Socialists was not one promulgated by most anarchists in the early twentieth century. Italian anarchist leader Errico Malatesta went so far as to declare in 1907, in words that could have come from a German Social Democrat, "We are told that by means of halting production abruptly the workers will succeed in a few days in starving out the bourgeoisie who, dying with hunger, will be obliged to surrender. I can think of no more grandiose absurdity. . .The general strike as it is foretold to us is a pure utopia."[90] Similarly, German anarchist Siegfried Nacht noted that "no one is expecting the general strike to break out tomorrow in Germany or Austria where there are perhaps a few dozen conscious followers of the idea."[91] Anarchists contrasted the general strike as an economic tool to the Socialists' mass strike as a political tool to advance workers' power within the dominant social system. Nacht considered the Socialist goal of taking power through parliamentary means as merely seeking to replace the current regime with one that would be no better. "The utopian dream" of the "professional politicians," expressed in the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," actually meant "the dictatorship of Social Democratic Reichstag deputies."[92] An anonymous anarchist pamphlet from the same era complained that the trade union movement, "in the hands of a bureaucratic representation," had lost all connection to the idea of the "socialist class struggle" that used to animate the working-class movement.

Insisting that the "general strike is no utopia," the author proclaimed that it would bring an end to "parliamentary dissimulation" and the reign of "political majority-rule Social Democratic utopians."[93] For anarchists, the general strike in its economic aspect held the potential to bring about a genuine reconfiguration of social relations, unlike the politically-focused mass strike.[94]

At the same time, anarchists emphasized its value for schooling the working classes in revolutionary thinking. According to Nacht, workers beaten down by the drudgery of unremitting daily labor, who "could never be inspired with enthusiasm for the ballot paper" and who had never "followed the call of revolution," would, amid a general strike, "feel themselves instinctively drawn to action." Even general strike propaganda itself contained an inspirational value for workers, while also serving to dissuade the ruling class from using violence against workers.[95] This perspective was not so far from ideas propounded by mass strike enthusiasts, even if neither side would acknowledge it. Even more similar to the views articulated by Luxemburg, Pannekoek, and other Socialist radicals were those of an Austrian anarchist active in Germany, Pierre Ramus (pseudonym for Rudolf Grossmann). Like his fellows, he emphasized the "bankruptcy of parliamentarism," which had achieved little in forty years, and he viewed small strikes as ultimately ineffectual. For Ramus, the general strike was neither the revolution itself nor the automatic igniter of it, but rather "nothing other than a practical means of the contemporary class struggle," a weapon in the struggle "for essential social reforms in the present, to protect the proletariat from immiseration" while it also "schools it for the final struggle of the social revolution." While this viewpoint certainly appeared similar to that of believers in the political mass strike, Ramus himself distinguished the two, saying that while the general strike had economic goals, "The political mass strike will put the economic power of the organized proletariat in the service of the long since bankrupt parliamentarism."[96] While Ramus and Luxemburg clearly understood themselves to be opponents, Social Democratic critics of the political mass strike could be forgiven for seeing at the least a family resemblance. Regardless, the Social Democratic debate regarding the mass strike and its relationship to the general strike had little space for taking the thinking of anarchists seriously, so antithetical to the Socialist disposition was genuine engagement with anarchists.

That anarchists no less than Social Democrats struggled to unite around a single path toward achieving a socialist future in the early twentieth century is unsurprising, given the complexity of the situation on the ground, and the fact that social, political, and economic conditions had in many ways changed profoundly between the 1850s and 1860s when modern socialist and anarchist movements had emerged and the first decades of the twentieth century. The successful expansion of parliamentary democracy across swathes of Europe, the blockages to democracy elsewhere (and in Germany, at the state level in many parts of the empire, most importantly Prussia), the effective utilization of strikes for both economic and political purposes in many situations, the failure of strikes in other cases, trade union suc-

cesses at advancing workers' interests, and the deep reformist bent of most trade unions, and many other factors besides, all proved difficult to parse.

The tactical issues facing the German Social Democrats from 1890 to 1914 were not straightforward, and it is not surprising that deep divisions emerged about what the movement should focus its energy on. The mass strike debate was only one important intra-party conflict, but representative of the tenor of such debates, and I have tried to illustrate here how the mobilization of anti-anarchist rhetoric made this particular debate sharper and more acrimonious. Insisting on the complete irrationality and folly of anarchists, and attributing to Socialist opponents those same failures, shaped the party's internal debate on other issues as well, making understanding and compromise more difficult than they otherwise might have been.[97] This is not to say that the core differences in the movement would otherwise have been reconcilable, only that a less fraught discussion might have been conceivable. And certainly, cooperation among Socialists and anarchists also proved impossible in this era. While the role of anti-anarchism in Socialist discourse did not *produce* what Schorske called the "great schism" in the party, it certainly deepened the internal cleavage within the Socialist movement, upping the stakes of tactical discussions to the level of core issues of identity. While it is too simple to see a rigid dichotomy between radicals and moderates in the party, as alliances shifted over time and the acrimony of some conflicts was overcome as circumstances changed, and even "moderates" at times seemed to accept the necessity of revolutionary action to overcome the forces thwarting the peaceful development of socialism. With that said, the radical wing's ideological isolation and stigmatization set the stage in some ways for the split within the Social Democratic movement that would generate powerful and enduring antagonisms within the German left throughout the Weimar Republic.[98] The Social Democratic faction most stigmatized as anarchistic, the radical advocates of the political mass strike (and opponents of the war), who remained suspicious of trade union reformism and political coalition-building with liberals, broke from the Social Democratic Party, first calling themselves "Independent Social Democrats" and ultimately claiming a new identity as the German Communist Party (KPD).

The depth of enmity between Social Democrats and Communists in the Weimar years certainly had wartime and Weimar-specific causes, but it built on a foundation of incendiary polarizing rhetoric exemplified in the anti-anarchist language invoked in the mass strike debate. For example, Kautsky's condemnation of the Bolsheviks in Russia, *Terrorism and Communism*, penned in 1919, included a long section titled "The Communists at Work," which criticized the Bolsheviks through a careful echo of Engels's critique of the Bakuninists from 1873. Kautsky began the chapter by arguing that "Bolshevism is, in many respects, foreshadowed in that work," and went on to draw the parallel between the Bakuninists in Spain and the Bolsheviks in Russia, accusing the latter of having betrayed the potential of the revolution by repudiating parliamentary democracy. As in his criticisms of Luxemburg

earlier, he suggested that the Bolsheviks had thrown aside discipline in favor of "introducing anarchy in the country" by encouraging the rash impulses of the populace: "By making the blind will of the masses the motive force of the Revolution, they threw overboard the Marxist system."[99] Almost immediately, both Lenin and Trotsky published rebuttals denouncing Kautsky as no more than a bourgeois liberal and branding his fetishizing of democracy as a betrayal of the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat.[100] The same back-and-forth paralleling the arguments from the mass strike debate and earlier also surfaced in the antagonism between the SPD and KPD throughout the Weimar Republic.

While in many ways the Great War produced a radical rupture in Germany political culture, with significant realignments within the Socialist movement based on individuals' attitudes toward the crisis of the war and how to respond to Germany's participation in it, in other ways there exist clear continuities from the Kaiserreich to the Weimar Republic. The broad contours of the half-century-long debate about the merits of parliamentary participation and economic reform versus revolutionism, and especially the framing of this conflict in terms of the clash between Social Democracy and anarchism, shaped German Socialists' self-conception in the imperial era but also in the Weimar era and beyond. Though German anarchists were few and wielded little political or social influence, the shadow of anarchism played a larger role in Social Democratic development, as the repeated invocation of the anarchist "general strike" reveals within the discussion of the appropriate usage of the strike tactic both before and during the mass strike debate.

NOTES

[1] Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *Marx: Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1994), 101.
[2] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in *The Communist Manifesto: A Road Map to History's Most Important Political Document*, ed. Phil Gasper (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), 89.
[3] For example, Ralf Hoffrogge, *Sozialismus und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland und Österreich: von den Anfängen bis 1914*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Schmetterling, 2017), 151-158; Joachim Eichler, *Von Köln nach Mannhein: Die Debatten über Maifeier, Massenstreik und das Verhältnis der Gewerkschaftern zur deutschen Sozialdemokratie innerhalb der Arbeiterbewegung Deutschlands 1905/06 Zur Entstehung der "Mannheimer Abkommens"* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1992); Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 32-58; Stanley Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany, 1887-1912* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 186-204, 229-244; Phil H. Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike from the French Revolution to Poland* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1984), 157-208; Angela Vogel, *Der deutsche Anarcho-Syndikalismus: Genese und Theorie einer vergessenen Bewegung* (Berlin: Karin Kramer, 1977), 56-60.
[4] Quoted in Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 254.
[5] F.C. Mather, "The General Strike of 1842: A Study in Leadership, Organisation, and the Threat of Revolution during the Plug Plot Disturbance," in *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History, 1790-1920*, ed. R. Quinault and J. Stevenson (London: Routledge, 1974): 115-140; Mick Jenkins, *The General Strike of 1842* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980); Niles Carpenter, "William Benbow and the Origin of the General Strike," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 35, no. 3 (May 1921), 497, 499.
[6] Jacques Freymond and Miklós Molnár, "The Rise and Fall of the First International," in *The Revolutionary Internationals*, 1864-1943, ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966), 27-32.
[7] Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 38-39.
[8] "The St. Imier Congress (1872)," in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*, ed. Robert Graham (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 100.
[9] Max Nettlau, *Geschichte der Anarchie*, vol. 2: *Der Anarchismus von Proudhon zu Kropotkin: Seine historische Entwicklung in den Jahren 1859-1880*, ed. Jochen Schmück (Potsdam: Libertad, 2020; originally published 1927), 213.
[10] Quoted in Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 44-45; see also Max Nomad, "The Anarchist Tradition," in *The Revolutionary Internationals*, 69.
[11] See Nunzio Pernicone, *Italian Anarchism, 1864-1892* (Princeton: Princeton Uni-

versity Press, 1993), 118-128, 141-145, for one of the most famous examples of the original conception of "propaganda of the deed" as insurrection to spark revolution; Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 46. T. R. Ravindranathan, *Bakunin & The Italians* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988) addresses the direct influence of Bakuninist revolutionism in Italian anarchism.

[12] Friedrich Engels, *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit* (Berlin: Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1920), 15-16. This pamphlet originally appeared as a series of articles in *Der Volksstaat*.

[13] Engels, *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit*, 29-30.

[14] On the association of the general strike specifically with anarchists, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "General Strike," *Rethinking Marxism* 26, no. 1 (2014), 9-14.

[15] This is the central focus of my book: Elun T. Gabriel, *Assassins & Conspirators: Anarchism, Socialism, and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014).

[16] Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 4-6; Hoffrogge, *Sozialismus und Arbeiterbewegung*, 111-114. Famously, Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* (New York: International Publishers, 1938), not published at the time, lambasted the 1875 program of the united Social Democratic Party as far too reformist and indebted to Ferdinand Lassalle's thinking. On Lassalle's influence over the early German socialist movement, see Toni Offermann, *Die erste deutsche Arbeiterpartei: Organisation, Verbreitung und Sozialstruktur von ADAV und LADAV 1863-1871* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002).

[17] Karl Kautsky, *The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program)*, trans. William E. Bohn (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1910), 90-91, 188, 196-198.

[18] On the transnational significance of strikes, see Christian Koller, "Local Strikes as Transnational Events: Migration, Donations, and Organizational Cooperation in the Context of Strikes in Switzerland (1860–1914)," *Labour History Review* 74, no. 3 (December 2009), 305-318.

[19] Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe, eds., *Revolutionary syndicalism: an international perspective* (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, 1990); David Berry and Constance Bantman, eds., *New Perspectives on Anarchism, Labour and Syndicalism: The Individual, the National and the Transnational* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010); Ralph Darlington, *Syndicalism and the Transition to Communism: An International Comparative Analysis* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2008).

[20] In addition to *The Bakuninists at Work*, Engels's 1880 booklet *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* was enormously influential.

[21] *Protokoll des Internationalen Arbeiter-Congresses zu Paris*, ed. Wilhelm Liebknecht (Nürnberg: Wörlein, 1890), 126.

[22] Richard Hostetter, "The S.P.D. and the General Strike as an Anti-war Weapon, 1905-1914," *The Historian* 13, no. 1 (Autumn 1950), 34-36. At an international socialist congress in Brussels in 1893, Liebknecht again derided what he called "childish conspiracies in the barracks" as utterly ineffectual.

[23] "Der Strike as politische Kampfmittel," *Die Neue Zeit* 12, no. 22 (February

1894), 694.
[24] Wilhelm Düwell, "Zur Frage des Generalstreiks," *Die Neue Zeit* 23, vol. 1, no. 8 (November 1904), 253.
[25] Hostetter, "The S.P.D. and the General Strike," 36.
[26] German Social Democrats were acutely aware of the power of the state could bring down on them, having survived twelve years of persecution, including the "minor state of siege" imposed on many cities in which socialist agitation was perceived to present a danger.
[27] Socialists almost universally ascribed this phrase to Auer from 1904 on, though I have been unable to locate its first usage. See, for example, Karl Liebknecht, "Für den politischen Massenstreik" (20 September 1904), *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften* 1 (1900-1907) (East Berlin: Dietz, 1958), 85; Rosa Luxemburg, "Der politische Massenstreik und die Gewerkschaften," *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2 (1906-1911), 467.
[28] Karl Nötzel, *Der Generalstreik als soziales Kampfmittel* (Munich: Hans Sachs-Verlag, 1912), 8, 10, 35-37.
[29] Dieter Groh, *Negative Integration und revolutionäre Attentismus: die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1973), describes this doctrine in detail.
[30] There were considerable nuances among these factions, and crossover on different issues. On Bernstein, an exemplar of this complexity, see Manfred B. Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 16-20; 69; Stephen Eric Bronner, "Eduard Bernstein and the Logic of Revisionism," in *Socialism Unbound: Principles, Practices, and Prospects*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 55-76.
[31] Dirk H. Müller, *Idealismus und Revolution: Zur Opposition der Jungen gegn den Sozialdemokratischen Parteivorstand 1890 bis 1894* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1975), especially 88-109, 128-133; Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 12-22. See also Vernon L. Lidtke, *The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 308-309; Josef Mooser, "Revolution oder Reform? Revisionismusstreit und Massenstreikdebatte 1890 bis 1914," in *Deutsche Sozialdemokratie in Bewegung, 1848-1863-2013*, ed. Anja Kruke and Meik Woyke (Berlin: Dietz, 2012), 80-81.
[32] Müller, 151-168, recounts the struggle within the *Jungen* (Union of Independent Socialists) between the anarchist and non-anarchist wings from 1892-94. See also Hoffroggen, *Sozialismus und Arbeiterbewegung*, 128-132.
[33] Quoted in Vogel, *Der deutsche Anarcho-Syndikalismus*, 56. See 56-60 for Vogel's detailed discussion of Friedeberg's vision.
[34] Raphael Friedeberg, *Parlamentarismus und Generalstreik* (Berlin: Verlag "Die Einigkeit," 1904), 26. This use of this conception of the general strike, as "myth," was a central theme of Georges Sorel's 1906 *Reflections on Violence*.

[35] Friedeberg, *Parlamentarismus und Generalstreik*, 3, 4.
[36] Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 35.
[37] Rosa Luxemburg, "Nachbetrachtungen zum Parteitag," in *Gesammelte Werke* 1 (1893-1905), book 1, ed. G. Adler et al. (Berlin: Dietz, 1972), 242-244.
[38] Luxemburg, "Sozialreform oder Sozialrevolution?" in *Gesammelte Werke* 1, book 1, 443-444.
[39] Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 34.
[40] Karl Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik* (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1914), 23-24. See also Dick Geary, *Karl Kautsky* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 60.
[41] Parvus, "Staatsstreich und politisicher Massenstrike," part 6, *Die Neue Zeit* 14, vol. 2, no. 39 (June 1896), 389, 394. For a discussion of this article series and the observation that this appears to be the first use of the term "political mass strike" as a direct contrast to the anarchist "general strike," see Eichler, *Von Köln nach Mannheim*, 45, n. 231. Eichler, 42-58, provides the most detailed recounting of the debates about the general strike within Social Democracy from 1893 to 1905.
[42] Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 34.
[43] Eichler, *Von Köln nach Mannheim*, 48-49.
[44] Eichler, *Von Köln nach Mannheim*, 49. See also Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 139-140; Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 189.
[45] August Bebel, *Der politische Massenstreik und die Sozialdemokratie: Sonderabdruck der Verhandlungen auf dem Parteitage in Jena* (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1906), 19, 26, 63. See also Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 162-165.
[46] Eduard Bernstein, *Der politische Massenstreik* (Breslau: Volkswacht, 1905), 8, 10-12, 39-4.
[47] Robert Grimm, *Der politische Massenstreik* (Basel: Verlag des Arbeiterbundes Basel, 1906), 5-6, 10-11, 38.
[48] Gustav Eckstein, "Was bedeutet der Generalstreik?," *Die Neue Zeit 22*, vol. 1, no 12 (December 1903), 363.
[49] Rudolf Hilferding, "Zur Grade des Generalstreiks," quoted in Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik*, 58, 60.
[50] Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 42-45, 49-53; Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 190-193.
[51] On Pannokoek's attempts to theorize "the source and nature of a proletarian socialist consciousness," see Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 236-239.
[52] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2 (1906-June 1911), 93-94. My translations of a few passages in this text draw on Rosa Luxemburg, *The Mass Strike: The Political Party and the Trade Unions and the Junius Pamphlet*, trans. Patrick Lavin (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971).
[53] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, 95.
[54] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, 97, 96.
[55] See, for instance, Luxemburg's 1910 speech, "Der politische Massenstreik und die Gewerkschaften," in *Gesammelte Werke* 2, 467.

[56] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, 99-100.
[57] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, 95-96. Luxemburg's charge that the Russian anarchists were associated with bandit activity and the lumpenproletariat were repeated in later speeches and writings. See "Der politische Massenstreik," 470.
[58] Luxemburg, "Der politische Massenstreik," 469.
[59] Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, 95-98.
[60] Michael L. Hughes, "'The Knife in the Hands of the Children'? Debating the Political Mass Strike and Political Citizenship in Imperial Germany," *Labor History* 50, no. 2 (May 2009), 120.
[61] Anton Pannekoek, *Die taktische Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung* (Hamburg: Erdmann Dubber, 1909), 41, 43.
[62] Pannekoek, *Die taktische Differenzen*, 44, 58, 61. For a detailed discussion of Pannekoek's ideology in the context of Dutch socialism, anarcho-syndicalism, and the conflict with Kautsky, see Philippe Bourrinet, *The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900-68): 'Neither Lenin nor Trotsky nor Stalin!'–'All Workers Must Think for Themselves'* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 100-116.
[63] Henriette Roland-Holst, *Generalstreik und Sozialdemokratie*, 2nd revised and expanded ed. (Dresden: Kaden, 1906), 24-25, 30-31, 55. See also 185-186.
[64] Roland-Holst, *Generalstreik und Sozialdemokratie*, 126-127, 140-141.
[65] Roland-Holst, *Generalstreik und Sozialdemokratie*, 183-184.
[66] Wilhelm Herzberg, *Sozialdemokratie und Anarchismus* (Ludwigshaven am Rhein: Gerisch, 1906), 3-4.
[67] Herzberg, *Sozialdemokratie und Anarchismus*, 21, 24.
[68] Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 187-189; Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 14, 35.
[69] Herzberg, *Sozialdemokratie und Anarchismus*, 32.
[70] Herzberg, *Sozialdemokratie und Anarchismus*, 18, 32.
[71] See Hughes, "'The Knife in the Hands of the Children'?," esp. 115-117.
[72] Simon Katzenstein, *Der Anarchismus und die Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1908), 5.
[73] Katzenstein, *Der Anarchismus*, 15; Luxemburg, *Massenstreik*, quoted in Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 191, 192. See also 190-193; Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, 54-58; Hughes, "'The Knife in the Hands of the Children'?," 117-118.
[74] Franz Laufkötter, "Utopistische Ideen im Modernen Sozialismus," *Sozialistische Monatshefte* 12, no. 21 (22 October 1908): 1342, 1343.
[75] Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 187. See also the whole section on "The Problem of 'Enthusiasm'" (187-193).
[76] Laufkötter, "Utopistische Ideen," 1345.
[77] Georg Stiékloff, "Marx und Bakunin," part 1, *Die Neue Zeit* 29, no. 50 (September 1911): 844-846.
[78] Two years later, Stiékloff expanded these articles into the short book, *Marx und die Anarchisten* (Dresden: Kaden, 1913), in which he described anarchism as a "childhood disease which the workers must survive before they work their way up

to class consciousness" (68-69).
[79] See Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 178-180, on the Swedish general strike, and 199-205 on the Belgian general strike.
[80] Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals*, 240-241.
[81] Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik*, 231, 233, 243. This attitude was reminiscent of Kautsky's claim in an 1893 speech, cited in Mooser, "Revolution oder Reform?," 81, that "Social Democracy is a revolutionary, but not a revolution-making party." Goodstein, *The Theory of the General Strike*, 182-199, covers the vociferous debate between Luxemburg and Pannekoek on one side and Kautsky on the other. See also Daniel Egan, "Rosa Luxemburg and the Mass Strike: Rethinking Gramsci's Critique," *Socialism and Democracy* 33, no. 2 (2019), 51, 60.
[82] Rosa Luxemburg, "Ermattung oder Kampf?" in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, 360.
[83] Ottokar Luban, "Rosa Luxemburg zum Massenstreik: Zwei unbekannte Reden vom Sommer 1913," in *Rosa Luxemburg: Ökonomische und historisch-politische Aspekte ihres Werkes*, ed. Narihiko Ito et al. (Berlin: Dietz, 2010), 82.
[84] Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik*, 292-293.
[85] Jens-Uwe Guettel, "Reform, Revolution, and the 'Original Catastrophe': Political Change in Prussia and Germany on the Eve of the First World War," *Journal of Modern History* 91, no. 2 (June 2019), 312, 319, 325-326.
[86] Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, "A State of Exception? Mass Expulsions and the German Constitutional State, 1871–1914," *Journal of Modern History* 85, no. 4 (2013): 774-775. Important works making this argument include Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Brett Fairbairn, *Democracy in the Undemocratic State: The German Reichstag Elections of 1898 and 1903* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Benjamin Carter Hett, *Death in the Tiergarten: Murder and Criminal Justice in the Kaiser's Berlin* (Harvard, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
[87] This is one of the central arguments of my book, *Assassins & Conspirators*, especially chapter 7 (190-211), covering the period 1903-1914.
[88] For a nuanced take at the regional level, see James Retallack, *Red Saxony: Election Battles and the Spectre of Democracy in Germany, 1860-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). The chapter "Deflecting Democracy" (359-392) is especially illuminating about the contested nature of suffrage reform, both in Germany's regional states and outside of Germany.
[89] Vernon L. Lidtke, *The Alternative Culture: Socialist Labor in Imperial Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 6.
[90] Errico Malatesta, "Syndicalism: An Anarchist Critique" (1907), in *Anarchism: A Documentary History*, 210-211.
[91] Siegfried Nacht, *Der Generalstreik und die Soziale Revolution* (N.p., 1902), 32.
[92] Nacht, *Der Generalstreik*, 13.
[93] *Generalstreik! Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung und der Klassenkampf* (Berlin: Freier Ar-

bieter-Verlag, 1905), 11, 14-16.
[94] Nacht, *Der Generalstreik*, 19.
[95] Nacht, *Der Generalstreik*, 21, 31-32. Nacht revisited and elaborated many of these ideas in Arnold Roller (Siegfried Nacht), *Der Soziale Generalstreik* (Berlin: M. Lehmann, 1906). See Angela Vogel, *Der deutsche Anarcho-Syndikalismus*, 180-183, for a detailed discussion of Nacht's ideas.
[96] Pierre Ramus (Rudolf Grossmann), *Generalstreik und direkte Aktion im proletarischen Klassenkampfe* (Berlin: Verlag- und Sortiments-Buchhandlung, 1910), 27, 29, 59.
[97] It is also important not to overstate the extent of intra-party hostility. For Dieter K. Buse's positive view of how factionalism was largely overcome in the SPD, see "Party Leadership and Mechanisms of Unity: The Crisis of German Social Democracy Reconsidered, 1910-1914," *The Journal of Modern History* 62, no. 3 (September 1990): 500. William Smaldone, "Rudolf Hilferding and the Theoretical Foundations of German Social Democracy, 1902-33," *Central European History* 21, no. 3 (September 1988), 275-276, also highlights the importance of intellectuals trying to hold the party's extremes together.
[98] By contrast, Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, emphasized the role of external economic and political pressures in driving the party toward its eventual schism.
[99] Karl Kautsky, *Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the Natural History of Revolution*, trans W. H. Kerridge (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1973), 81, 82.
[100] V.I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (New York: International Publishers, 1934); Leon Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961).