

ground. The Emperor who descended upon the scene laughed uproariously, calling the already mortified soldier a “monkey” and continuing to laugh.

If anything is amiss with Marshall’s work, it is the fact that he lost an enviable opportunity to make a valuable contribution to Japanese women’s studies in the English-speaking world. For one thing, he chose not to translate Ōsugi’s account of his love affair with the journalist, Ichiko Kamichika, who tried to kill him. In “Obake o mita hanashi” [The tale of a ghost] (Sakae Ōsugi, “Obake o mita hanashi — jijoden no issetsu” [The tale of a ghost — a section of an autobiography] *Complete Works*, V. 12, 187-226). Ōsugi is a self-serving male running away from his mistress but also his wife to pursue a third woman. He also reveals that, when Kamachika failed to give him money, he went to the Minister of Home Affairs — the virtual head officer of Japan’s secret police who hunted down dissidents like himself — asked the minister for money, and received ¥400.00 which was hardly a small sum in those days. Though it neither endears or ennobles Ōsugi for Marshall’s readers, the entire “scandal” represents a significant aspect of women’s place in modern Japanese society.

Marshall also missed a precious opportunity to help women’s studies and create his own autobiography of Ōsugi at the same time. He could have accomplished the feat by translating Ōsugi’s “Shikai no naka kara” (Out of the ashes). This piece, which takes the form of a novella, is an account of the author’s early relationship with Noe Itō, the “third woman” mentioned above. It was not included in the 1930 text, but it is even more valuable to a study of Japanese women than the one on Kamichika. Itō married Ōsugi after many a travail and was murdered along with him. Before all that happened, she was the editor of the renowned journal, *Seitō* (The blue-stockings), who turned it from a literary magazine of women who wanted to be liberated into the feminist magazine of liberated women. In “Out of the Ashes,” (*Ibid.*, 229-292) Ōsugi uses her letters to him generously, which is in itself a treat to scholars in the field. Moreover, he shows convincingly that Itō found her match in him politically, intellectually, and temperamentally.

Translating works written in one language into another must be a hazardous enterprise even for the best of its practitioners. Therefore, I enter only one example to show how different Ōsugi’s voice may sound if heard through another translator.

Ōsugi via Marshall: “This grandfather died while my father was overseas in the Sino-Japanese war. Because of his death the school in Uji was forced to close for one day.” (7)

Ōsugi via Hirai: “This grandfather, who lived in Uji, died while my father was away from home in the Sino-Japanese War. Because of his death, I was forced to skip school for one day.” (See Sakae Ōsugi, *Jijoden* [Autobiography], *Complete Works*, V. 12, 9)

Ōsugi was the eldest son and had to represent his family spiritually when such serious matters as a grandfather’s death occurred in his father’s absence. His grandfather’s name was either Gonkurō or Gonschirō, not Tenkurō or Tenshichirō as told in Marshall’s translation. (*Ibid.*)

Despite minor lapses such as these, the translation as a whole is highly readable, representing the best of the simple and direct style of Marshall’s prose.

**Atsuko Hirai**  
**Bates College**

Shulamit Reinharz (with the assistance of Lynn Davidson), *Feminist Methods in Social Research* (New York: 1992).

Shulamit Reinharz’s encyclopedic new book, *Feminist Methods in Social Research*, is a veritable who’s-who-and-what-does-she-do? of feminist social research. The bibliography is invaluable and the text contributes an important analysis to the ongoing debate over feminist methods. The book’s reach and overall vision of the adventure that is feminist social research should ensure its place in the libraries of scholars from many disciplines.

Reinharz takes “What constitutes feminist research methods?” to be an empirical question, not a philosophical or political one. Thus, she happily avoids most of the justificatory rhetoric that obscures the question. To answer it, she compiled a voluminous set of examples of feminist research practices. She defined

research as the “production of a publicly scrutinizable analysis of a phenomenon with the intent of clarification.” She operationalized method as “written passages that the [researcher] called ‘method.’” And she used “the simple criterion of self-identification” to define feminist. (7-9) Having thus opened her mind to the diversity of “the voices of feminist researchers at work,” (5) Reinharz catalogued instances of nine basic research methods (interviews, ethnographies, surveys and statistical studies, experiments, cross-cultural comparisons, oral histories, content analyses, case studies, and action research) as well as examples of studies using multiple or category-defying research methods.

The resulting survey of feminist research supports Reinharz’s concluding contentions:

1. Feminism is a perspective, not a research method.
2. Feminists use a multiplicity of research methods.
3. Feminist research involves an ongoing criticism of nonfeminist scholarship.
4. Feminist research is guided by feminist theory.
5. Feminist research may be transdisciplinary.
6. Feminist research aims to create social change.
7. Feminist research strives to represent human diversity.
8. Feminist research frequently includes the researcher as a person.
9. Feminist research frequently attempts to develop special relations with the people studied (in interactive research).
10. Feminist research frequently defines a special relation with the reader. (240)

In short, “[f]eminists are creatively stretching the boundaries of what constitutes research.” (268) The specific directions of that creative stretch spring from explicit feminist commitments to viewing women as the legitimate subjects and objects, the “knowers” and the “knowns,” of social science.

By taking this empiricist approach to feminist methods, Reinharz succeeds admirably at pouring oil on the troubled waters of feminist social science. The book serves as an introduction to the rich variety in feminist social research, and astutely notes what it is that feminists see themselves as doing that is truly creative and challenging. The book makes a resounding rebuttal to the disciplinary parochialism and methodological snobbery that still occasionally besmirch the investigative lenses of contemporary social science. For that, we must all thank Reinharz for organizing these masses of wonderful material.

The strengths of the book provide grounds for a note of critique, as well. One inevitable problem is that to me it reads like a reference book. At times, it seems as though an avid reader has met a bibliographic software package run amok, and sheer volume substitutes for analysis. More critically, some readers may find the book oddly tendentious, given its apparent commitment to an open-minded description of feminist research practices. Although Reinharz strains to preserve a certain neutrality, the text reads at times like a combination of an elaborate apology for quantitative and experimental methods and an almost mystical account of the pains and pleasures of interview, ethnography, and text-based research. I think this explains the observed asymmetry in the reception this book receives from different practitioners. Some seem relieved that Reinharz is giving them the methodological green light to persevere in their practices in the name of feminism. Others seem to feel more patronized and less well-represented.

Behind this difference is the more serious problem with the book. Reinharz uses empirical inquiry to skirt the *Scylla* of contentious political and philosophical feminist debates over method. Unfortunately, she runs smack into the *Charibdis* of pluralism. In her laudable celebration of the diversity of feminist methods, she never explains what all the fuss is about. This is true at two levels. Firstly, Reinharz gives short shrift to the analyses the authors she has collected provide about why certain methods are legitimated and rewarded while others are dismissed and derided. Second, she offers no explanation of her own of the politics of conflict over method, within or between disciplines. Thus, the uninitiated reader is bemused by the passions that these debates have obviously aroused, without being enlightened as to the stakes and actual contours of the contestants’ positions. And the reader to whom these debates are old hat, or life’s blood — the participant in some of these sometimes acrimonious struggles — feels analytically short-changed.

I confess I have something of an axe to grind here, so I will use the example of my own work, which I think Reinharz has used to poor effect precisely because she missed the point of my methodological critique. Reinharz notes that my statistical study of battering

was "motivated by an attempt to overturn sexist research methods" and quotes my brief summary of alternative methods of inquiry that might better serve feminists attempting to understand violence. (89) But she passes over my discussion of the political economy of research funding, that is, my material explanation of what Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne call "the missing feminist revolution in sociology." ("The missing feminist revolution in sociology," *Social Problems* 32 (1985), 301-316.) I claimed that part of what was wrong with mainstream methods of sociological research on battering was that the people with the funding were committed to one sort of research, of which the people committed to *women* were extremely critical. But what troubles me about Reinhartz's omission is not that my (admittedly inelegant) analysis drops by the wayside. The problem is that her empiricist approach, and her effort to provide a constructive digest of feminist research methods, erases the feminist analysis of knowledge (and therefore method) as being fundamentally about power.

*Feminist Methods in Social Research* is a conciliatory monument to contentious times. The sheer mass of the proof that feminists have persisted in building a lively and creative body of social research is a welcome addition to the literature. Reinhartz treats the reformist (or revolutionary!) agendas of feminists in the social sciences with the respect they deserve. Moreover, her "just do it!" approach to social research is a potent antidote to the epistemological handwringing engendered by the resistance so many of us encounter in our engagements with our disciplines. Reinhartz's pragmatism is not only attractive but probably right. My only wish is that we simultaneously sustain the critique, not just of non-feminist scholarship, but also of the conditions under which we choose our methods, our questions, and our battles.

Lisa D. Brush  
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Georges Sioui, *For an Amerindian Autohistory, An Essay on the Foundations of a Social Ethic*, trans. by Sheila Fischman (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1992).

The time has finally come, after five hundred years of Amerindian culture on the defensive, for 'the Americanization of the World.' This is one of the concepts underlying the daring redefinition of history in Georges Sioui's *For an Amerindian Autohistory*. The understated aim of the essay is to present guidelines for the study of Native History from an Amerindian point of view.

What Sioui has done is to sketch out the theoretical basis for an elaboration of an alternative paradigm, used here in the dual sense ascribed to it by Kuhn. Sioui presents a "global paradigm" or alternative vision of the world with all the beliefs, values ... and techniques common to people functioning within it and an 'orientation paradigm' that defines for social scientists and historians a new set of problems to examine, questions to ask, and solutions to posit." (See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*) Sioui argues that this alternate world view does not imply any inherent superiority in an Amerindian view. Rather, it is the result of the isolation of the Americas and thus developed according to ideological concepts fundamentally disconnected with those that animated and motivated the non-Americans. (11)

The first half of *For an Amerindian Autohistory* defines Amerindian Autohistory as both a vision of the world and a methodological orientation. Sioui argues that Western Civilization has been trapped in a myth of evolution and enthralled by a belief in the superiority of European culture and morality, which has served as the ideological foundation for the acquisition of other peoples' territories and resources. The myth's 'scientific' name is the theory of social evolution, which Sioui demonstrates as effectively leading to attitudes reminiscent of Kipling's "white