

assist in the construction of canals and railways, and thus continued to permit Canadians to live beyond their means. State expenditures financed from abroad, Piva underlines, were not always so positive. By the late 1850s, the flow of imported money slowed considerably. As imports continued to exceed exports, an increasing proportion of the money the Canadian government borrowed in Britain never circulated through the domestic Canadian economy. Instead, the money flowed to British investors, clipping their coupons on money they already had loaned the Canadian government. Deficit spending became a burden rather than a benefit because of one fatal flaw in the system — the export of staple products, or any other products, constantly failed to generate enough income to sustain Canadian lifestyles.

Piva thus places the state, and state spending, at the centre of the Canadian economy. State expenditures in the 1840s and 1850s not only helped create an infrastructure of railways and canals, but they actually kept the economy functioning. Piva also illustrates how the state itself was transformed by the borrowing process. As the public debt mounted and the borrowing process became strained and complex, institutions and accounting policies were put in place to acquire greater control over the economy. By Confederation, “the government of Canada was in possession of a modern administrative bureaucracy, able to exploit the full range of options open to a small country.” (217)

Unfortunately, it is easy to lose sight of these important conclusions in the welter of detail provided by Piva. In the analysis in each chapter, Piva does seem to get lost in the thickets, devoting much attention to untangling the intricate details of various foreign borrowings. Given the importance Piva attaches to the arguments about the economy and state formation in the conclusion, I feel that the chapter on Canada’s balance of trade is situated quite late in the book, and that the discussions of the impact of the debt on the institutional planning and decision-making capacity of the Canadian state are quite brief and general. Subjects such as the strategies adopted by Canadian governments to cut government spending, which might have suggested the ways in which the fiscal crises affected public sector workers, do not receive

any attention. Readers of this journal will also be disappointed that there are few explicit references to the class nature of the Canadian state, although much can be inferred from the work.

In short, this book makes a solid and important contribution to our understanding of the Canadian economy and the process of state formation prior to Confederation, but I would not put it high on my holiday reading list, or, for that matter, on the reading list of anyone not specializing in economic or public policy history.

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Mordecai Briemberg, ed., *It Was, It Was Not: Essays & Art on the War Against Iraq* (Vancouver: New Star Books 1992).

On the weekend of 16-17 February 1991 over 120 people, including representatives of 17 Ontario university anti-Persian Gulf war coalitions, met in Toronto. Two goals were shared by all participants: the need to build unity among anti-war groups, and the need for deepening activists’ understanding of the issues involved. *It Was, It Was Not* takes its cue from these two goals. It is intended, writes editor Mordecai Briemberg, “to surface your memories, to stimulate a recalling of events and personal responses, to summon these for consideration, so you can extend reflection beyond the 43-day definition of ‘reality.’” (ii) In addition to a better understanding of the issues surrounding the Gulf war, the book aims to inspire us to act and speak out: “We did more than voice our individual thoughts and feelings. We combined with others, and together we tried to prevent, and later to halt, this war ... We have not been heard enough and we will not be silent now.” (295)

The contents of *It Was, It Was Not* are arranged into four sections. The first, “War Fronts,” examines the political, military, propagandistic, and environmental aspects of the war. The second, “Rediscovering the Middle East,” introduces us to the people and politics of the region by including essays on the people of Iraq, the historical roots of its territorial border questions, Israeli-Iraqi relations, Palestinian oppression and resistance,

US policy towards the Kurds, and Canadian foreign policy. The third section, "Obstacles to Understanding," explores the stereotypes and double standards that distort how we see the Middle East. The portrayal of Arabs in Canadian literature is shown to have laid the basis for the racist dehumanization of the Arab 'enemy.' Essays on Islam and its conflict with Christianity, the double standard used by the United Nations (UN) with respect to Iraq and Israel, the writings of an Iranian feminist author, and a discussion, based on the country's Hebrew press, of inequality in Israel are presented. The final section, "Hard Choices," addresses opposition to the war and includes essays on the Canadian anti-war movement, pro-war progressives, the pro-war position of the Israeli peace camp, and the transition to Palestinian sovereignty. Interspersed with the essays are poems, songs, photographs, drawings, cartoons, and calligraphy. These add a palpable sense of the anger, compassion, and respect for the war's victims to what the essays themselves elicit. Briemberg's arrangement of the material, his introductions of the sections and sub-sections, and his own essays, give the book a smooth read and a sophisticated analysis.

One measure of how well these essays assist our understanding is whether they prepare us for Western military intervention after the Gulf War. In this respect *It Was, It Was Not* is useful. The dismantling of Iraq's unconventional weapons led in January 1993 to further bombing of Iraq. The so-called threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is revealed by Briemberg as a way of scaring the American public into supporting the war and the continuation of the embargo. (35-37) The disarmament of Iraq is shown by Briemberg and Jane Hunter to preserve Israel's monopoly on those types of weaponry in the Middle East. Briemberg skilfully demonstrates that the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace conferences were only made possible once the possibility of the initiative coming from Iraq, Europe, or the UN, had been dispensed with. A peace conference without a war would have left the U.S. and Israel isolated. (174-176)

While the collection cannot be faulted for every omission, a discussion of certain issues which received scant attention would help us better understand the world after the war. Most importantly there is little discussion of

the significance of the US-led victory. Briemberg, in "Negotiations or War," argues that the US goal was to preserve, in General Schwarzkopf's phrase, the "correct balance of power," in the Middle East and globally. Only war, not negotiations, could reduce Iraq's military challenge to Saudi Arabia, the U.S.'s main Arab proxy, and to Israel "the key U.S. surrogate which helps maintain the 'correct balance' in the region." (29) Only war, moreover, could justify a direct U.S. military presence. Similarly, the rise of European and Japanese competitors was undermining American global economic dominance, and the end of the Cold War signalled the decline of the justification for American political domination of its economic competitors. The key to continued American predominance, Briemberg continues, lay in its assertion of the one area in which its power remained unchallenged, the military.

But military power requires an economic base. The emergence of a unipolar world of military power and a tripolar world of economic power suggests that it was unlikely that, after the Gulf War, Europe and Japan would continue to be subservient to American interests. This is now clearly evident in the centrality of trade disputes to U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese relations in 1992 and 1993. The U.S. and Europe have also been at odds — as have European nations themselves — over how to deal with the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The current reality of a more unstable world system, in which U.S. global domination is threatened with decline, is a significant omission in *It Was, It Was Not*. Marwan Hassan even goes as far as saying that Europe is to be "indentured in a renewed vassalage to an arrogant U.S.A." This reasoning can lead to the erroneous conclusion that Europe or Japan present progressive alternatives rather than competitors to U.S. imperialist supremacy.

The section on opposition to the war contains some very important essays. Charlene Gannage's and Christopher Huxley's article on the Canadian anti-war movement is an especially important contribution. It is the only detailed attempt I have seen to assess the anti-war movement. Their survey of the movement's various constituencies and analysis of the movement's rise and decline is informative and insightful. Sadly, this section

is all too brief. Given the paucity of media coverage of anti-war activities, a survey of the millions who demonstrated against the war in the U.S., Europe, and the Arab world would have been a boost to anti-war activists who often felt isolated in the midst of the massive pro-war propaganda effort.

Nor is much said about the issues that divided anti-war organizations. The collection, does however, provide us with the means to assess these divisions. Essentially, anti-war groups were divided over how to deal with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the Toronto Coalition for Troops Out of the Gulf, the Toronto Disarmament Network (TDN, part of the Canadian Peace Alliance - CPA) and ACT for Disarmament both withdrew over the Coalition's refusal to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. TDN and ACT displayed an understanding of the war different from that of most anti-war activists. The call for the removal of Western troops from the region, the basis of unity for most anti-war coalitions, was a recognition that the main obstacle to a peaceful resolution was the presence of Western troops in the region. By elevating the importance of a condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to that of the Western imperialist onslaught, such groups were in danger of providing back-handed, and sometimes explicit, support for Western involvement.

Similarly, support for sanctions against Iraq divided the anti-war movement. This conflict is evident in *It Was, It Was Not*. Briemberg is correct when he states that "Sanctions were not introduced as an alternative to armed war, but as a stepping stone toward it ... Meanwhile by swallowing the war makers' demonization of Iraq and concentrating attention on sanctions as *the* alternative to war, significant parts of the anti-war movement underplayed the possibilities for negotiation." (24) Norman Finklestein points out the double standard in imposing sanctions on Iraq, when sanctions against Israel have frequently been vetoed by the U.S. in the UN Security Council. James Graff, however, claims "Human decency required sanctions and patience." (231) Gannage and Huxley point out that confusion over sanctions contributed to the anti-war movement's eventual demobilization. Yet in their glowing assessment of the federal New Democratic Party's so-called anti-war position they neglect to mention that the NDP

consistently supported sanctions against Iraq. Linkage of withdrawal of Western troops to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and support for sanctions against Iraq, led to an acceptance that Western forces were justified in forcing a settlement. Hence the federal NDP supported the use of Canadian troops for enforcement of the embargo.

English Canadian nationalism is another factor that weakened the anti-war movement that receives inadequate attention in *It Was, It Was Not*. Gannage and Huxley point out that, "Recourse to military force rather than diplomacy has been consistent with the sorry record set by the Canadian government in responding to crises within its own borders." (300) They also argue that nationalist sentiments which initially inspired a call for Canada to distance itself from the US turned, when the bombing began, into support for 'our' troops, and for the war itself. (313) Yet Gannage and Huxley proceed to quote favorably nationalist statements from Canadian Auto Workers president Bob White, (310) and NDP Member of Parliament Svend Robinson. (302) Graff argues that "Canadian economic interests clearly favoured Canadian alignment with the Gulf states as a whole, though not Kuwait individually, against Iraq." (225) He, nevertheless, mourns the erosion of "the independence and moral character" of Canadian foreign policy. (231) Such nationalist sentiments resulted in a failure among Canadian anti-war activists to see that their enemy was not just pro-war American politicians, but their counterparts on this side of the border.

Gannage and Huxley's piece also contains a troubling focus on established groups that obscures the degree to which organizing against the war was grassroots-based. They do say that "spontaneity and imagination marked the early protest," (301) but instead of focusing on this spontaneity they only highlight the role of established groups. Moreover, Gannage and Huxley give a misleading account of the anti-war positions of two of the main anti-war organizations. The CPA is credited with announcing a nation-wide campaign in November 1990 calling for the formation of coalitions. The CPA was, however, slow off the mark. Coalitions were being organized in Toronto, Ottawa, and Kingston in October. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women called for the immediate with-

drawal of troops as early as August 21. (308) The CPA also made Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait their top demand, eventually resulting in a split in the Toronto Coalition.

The federal NDP is given credit for opposing both the military buildup and the war itself. This was contrary to pro-war social democratic parties in Britain, France, and Australia, and the federal Liberals whose meek opposition evaporated once the bombing began. The NDP's position was, however, sharply different from that of most of the anti-war movement. The NDP supported sanctions against Iraq, the presence of Canadian troops in the Middle East to enforce sanctions, and war as a last resort. While many individual members of the NDP did participate in anti-war organizing and demonstrations, the party as a whole cannot honestly be credited with a central role in building opposition to the Western war drive.

Rather than springing from established groups, the anti-war movement was a spontaneous gathering of thousands of people across Canada who were angry and frightened at the prospect of war, and at the Canadian government's complicity in the march to war. For inspiration they looked, not to the CPA or NDP, but to the growing anti-war movement in the U.S. which had mobilized thousands by September 1990.

If the war had lasted a year, *It Was, It Was Not* would have strengthened the anti-war movement by motivating and informing activists. However, despite its success at improving our understanding, and contributing to the fight against the war, it omits essential issues and reproduces some of the same confusions that inhibited the anti-war movement.

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Albert Schrauwers, *Awaiting the Millennium: The Children of Peace and the Village of Hope, 1812-1889* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993).

The study of religion in English Canadian history has been marked by a focus on denominational and theological issues, a focus that has frequently overlooked questions

about the historical place of religion in its broader social context. This problem is even more acute in Upper Canadian history, where religion and religious issues have customarily been of interest only in their relation to political affairs. Albert Schrauwers' study of the Children of Peace, however, takes a rather different approach in its treatment of religion in the past (Schrauwers is an anthropologist and this monograph originated as his masters' thesis in the University of Toronto's Anthropology department). So, while he is interested in questions concerning the social role of religion and its relation to political and economic events and processes in the nineteenth-century community of Sharon, his methodological and organizational approaches to these issues differ somewhat from those used by the majority of Canadian religious historians.

Schrauwers has divided his study into three distinct periods that, he argues, were of critical importance to the Children of Peace: their split from the Quaker Meeting on Yonge Street during the War of 1812 and their establishment of the Sharon community north of York; the changes in the community's organization after the construction of the Sharon temple in 1832; and the effects on the Children of the 1837 Rebellion, ending with their dissolution in 1889. The Children's break from the Yonge Street Monthly Meeting was prompted by theological disputes that were linked to other conflicts over the social and political direction of the Society of Friends. David Willson, the founder of the Children, felt that the particular "moral economy" of simple living and quietism originally propounded by the Quakers was endangered by the increased dominance of an elite group of wealthy Friends in the Society. Willson believed that this group's adoption of an evangelical stance alien to Quaker beliefs and its involvement in urban capitalism imperilled its commitment to the Society's ideals of egalitarianism.

In his call for a rejuvenation of the Society Willson's was far from being a lone voice; Schrauwers argues that the Children were a local example of the late-eighteenth century New Light movement in post-revolutionary America and the British colonies. He also points to the role played by the Upper Canadian state in this schism. Those who sided with