gender is a project that must be undertaken before any synthetic statements about middle class masculinity can be made. I also believe that the small group Rotundo does study was not as unified along gender lines as he believes.

On the up side, Rotundo’s discussion of the invention of homosexuality adds an interesting dimension to gay history. Building on the work of George Chauncey, Rotundo argues that the “homosexual” was created as a “negative referent” to the “passionate” type of manhood that emerged out of the gender panic of the late nineteenth century. By viewing the creation of the homosexual as something more than the product of medical discourse [Katz and Foucault] or of the demographic changes that accompanied the shift to industrial capitalism [D’Emilio and Weeks], Rotundo is able to add structure to the important bridge that needs to be built between the history of sexuality and the history of gender. In this area and many others, Rotundo shows the potential held by the history of masculinity for the writing of social history in general.

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For anyone regarding the West German Greens as harbingers of a new and more humane era in organized politics, their catastrophic defeat in the German reunification election of 2 December 1992 must have come as a shock. In his carefully researched book, Thomas Poguntke provides some hope: the circumstances were exceptional and had to do more with Gorbachev’s perestroika than with a general decline of interest in Green issues. Caught by surprise, the Greens responded incoherently, campaigning without engagement in an election dominated by an “unfavourable political agenda.” (50)

Poguntke successfully demonstrates that Green issues are here to stay, that “New Politics parties” will not disappear again, and that the significance of the German Green Party reaches far beyond what some may have considered, at least early on, as yet another case of “German exceptionalism.” All this is done from a strictly behaviouralist perspective, based on “the measurement of individual-level attitudinal changes,” (6) giving Inglehartian theories of postmaterialist value change “central importance” (22): “Postmaterialist value orientation is the single most important explanatory factor for the emergence of the New Politics and — as a consequence — the Green Party vote.” (59)

In this firm commitment lies Poguntke’s greatest strengths as well as a few considerable weaknesses. The central part of the book (chapters 5-9) is a systematic examination of the Green Party’s main characteristics and dilemmas: composition of its electorate and activists; internal factionalism and its reflection in party programs; grassroots democracy commitment and party organization; party activism oscillating between parliamentary responsibility and civil disobedience. In all instances, a wealth of empirical data shows convincingly that the Green Party is indeed a “New Politics party” in the sense defined at the outset (10-11): it is more committed to ecological values than economic growth, peace than military security, etc.;
it is committed to "unconventional participation" rather than "conventional, elite-directed participation." The discrepancy between membership and leadership composition (the "iron law of social oligarchy") is less pronounced than in conventional parties. Unlike conventional parties, it endorses "illegal action" when its cause is considered legitimate.

The main value of the book to my mind lies precisely in this comparative approach. This is not another self-indulgent portrait from within, but a sober look at real differences between the Green Party and the main other German parties, Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU), and Liberals (FDP). The comparative perspective also explains some of the Green Party's problems in distinguishing itself from the other parties' policy agendas: from a superficially similar commitment to decentralization within the CDU, from the SPD's "leftist" equality concerns, and from a general human rights approach within the FDP.

In the first section of the book (chapters 1-4), Poguntke provides a generally thoughtful and clear theoretical introduction which can easily be understood by readers not specialized in behavioural empirical social science. After defining the characteristics of "New Politics," the author reviews some of its main theoretical explanations, and then constructs a model of the "New Politics party" as the basis for his empirical investigation. A key concept of "New Politics" is "unconventional participation." In comparison to "Old Politics," the Green Party as well as its "subcultures" rely less on party-controlled "organizational reinforcement" and more on informal (media) communication and networking. (32-33)

Of particular importance is that the "New Politics party" cannot only be distinguished from conventional "old" parties, but from the — likewise unconventional — "New Right" as well: far from providing conservative answers to the same set of "New Politics" questions and issues, the success of the "New Right" appears to be based on the "populist" exploitation of general political "disaffection" associated with perceived or real "social deprivation as a result of economic problems and immigration." (12)

It is in his review of major theoretical explanations of the "New Politics" phenomenon that some limits of Poguntke's grasp become visible. Despite the author's intention to base his analysis on a broad and "complementary" theoretical basis, and to place the measured "attitudinal reservoir" within the larger "historical situation," he relies almost exclusively on empirical and behavioural explanations. The vast field of new social movement literature outside the narrow confines of empirical behaviouralism, and especially most of what would qualify as "critical" or "leftist," is for the most part ignored. At least in one instance, this may have led to a misrepresentation. According to Poguntke, Jens Alber would explain the success of the Greens as predominantly based on "an economically deprived academic proletariat" that has "chosen a 'counter-elite' strategy in order to find redress for its grievances." (18) What Alber also says in the article cited, however, is that the Greens may be a party of those "removed from economic normality." That normality is the daily grind of job competition and market exchange in a capitalist system. Based on this insight, therefore, explanation of the Greens' success would seem to require a thorough analysis of the underlying social forces dominating and manipulating the German capitalist system, thus...
going beyond even the most accurate measurement of “individual-level attitudinal changes.”

Not surprisingly, then, the radical or leftist element in the “New Politics” remains somewhat underexposed. Acknowledging that “the New Politics is not independent from the traditional left-right dimension,” Poguntke has only a “few remarks” about the “logical links” between New Politics and left-wing policies: “...the quest for autonomy and more participation have repercussions for the preferred organisation of industrial production, business life and democratic governance. Furthermore, ecologically adapted industrial production cannot be enforced without a substantial degree of political control.” (38) These few remarks raise expectations that Poguntke’s analysis later cannot fulfill. His insight, cited at the outset of this review, that the Greens lost out in the 1992 election because they responded incoherently and campaigned without engagement in an election dominated by an “unfavourable political agenda” all of a sudden sounds a bit hollow. Who set that political agenda? Which dominant ideology provided campaign coherence for what interests? Could the German Greens have given a “coherent” answer without losing their integrity as a New Politics party?

Answers to these questions obviously would require a different book, and the criticism is therefore unfair. Poguntke has written an intelligent and mostly compelling analysis of Green politics. But from the kinds of critical perspectives left history (and many Greens) are committed to, one may at least be permitted to ask whether the “New Politics” phenomenon can be understood in its entirety without asking such questions. And more generally, one may ask how much further the usefulness of empirical behaviouralism can be driven before the measurement of the measurable needs to be reconnected with the more “conventional” tools of critical social science.

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Police historiography has, within the last few years, established a respectable niche within the broader spectrum of Canadian social history. Professional and amateur historians, sociologists, and journalists have all turned their attention to chronicling the development and exploits of local and national police organizations. Such themes as the rise of a professional police force; the coercive function of the police in breaking strikes and maintaining public order; the social welfare role of local police departments; the impact of technology on crime fighting; public relations; and the romantic myths associated with one of the country’s national symbols, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, have all been explored with varying degrees of success. The publication of Greg Marquis’ Policing Canada’s Century, signals the maturation of police history by providing a comprehensive look at how the governing body of Canadian police, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, operated. It also marks the first attempt by a scholar to combine the disparate themes of police studies into a single volume.