

what extent did the transformed images reflect society's changing historical interpretations and values. Perhaps, too, the difference between the old and new narratives may not be as totally different as Dawson asserts. Both the classic and the revised versions are still firmly rooted in the romantic veneer of the western settlement and Northern gold rush and exploration periods. As Dawson astutely observes, the new story is more concentrated and certainly more consciously tailored to late twentieth century tastes and biases, but nevertheless glories in the same nation-building myths.

Michael Dawson has produced a solidly researched, well-written study, its premise compelling and intriguing. But, by devoting an entire work to an admittedly important, ground-breaking topic, a misleading impression emerges — that mythology making pre-occupies the attention of the RCMP command. On the contrary, despite its flaws, the Force does play a valued role in maintaining the peace and prosperity that most Canadians enjoy. Moreover, as Dawson demonstrates so effectively, its mythology, however one-sided, narrow, and unbalanced, had its origins in reality and also in the values of the cultures that produced it. In other words, the latest Mountie image is a product of late twentieth century consumer culture. That is us.

A.A. den Otter
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Nuclear War* (Ithaca: Columbia University Press, 1998).

Destroying the Village focuses primarily on Eisenhower's defence policy, framing it within discussions of the Truman administration and the legacy inherited by Kennedy in his first years as President. Craig takes his bearings from George F. Kennan's famous 1946 "Long Telegram" where he spelt out a view of Soviet political thinking (paranoid, brutally realistic, and sceptical towards the legality of international agreements) that was to inform U.S. defence policy for years. Craig argues that Truman's doctrine of massive retaliation was modified by Eisenhower under the conviction that the Soviets confronted crisis in a way fundamentally alien to the West. "We have no basis for thinking," he declared in 1956, "that they abhor destruction as we do." Craig pinpoints the preceding year as signalling a fundamental change in war planning when Eisenhower ordered the development of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, a process accelerated after the launching in 1957 of the Sputnik satellite. With this new technology, Craig states, the "last bit of human volition in modern war disappeared." The main thrust of his study is to explain how Eisenhower's defence policy was designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war paradoxically by threatening the Soviets with its inevitability if

any local conflicts broke out. Committed as he was to preserving American security, Eisenhower resisted the calls from his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for a policy of flexible response and by the mid-1950s was promoting a view that any war between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union would automatically escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. What might seem like political threat and confrontation from Eisenhower is glossed by Craig as a kind of Cold War realism based on a grim realization of the sheer speed with which any nuclear exchange would occur. The crises over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and over Berlin in 1959, demonstrate a studied refusal by Eisenhower to accede to calls for military response. Thus, while he recognized the Cold War orthodoxy that virtually any local conflict could inflame superpower rivalry, Eisenhower's strategy was to under-respond with studied calm, in the hope that such crises would be defused. Berlin was not, however, and in his final section Craig shows how Kennedy had to reformulate a Berlin policy from scratch. This he did by redefining U.S. interests in West Berlin as access and security in that sector. In the event, Khrushchev unilaterally solved that crisis, firstly by lifting his ultimatum for Western troops to leave the city and then by building the Berlin wall.

Craig's discussion concentrates closely on the records of defence group meetings, particularly those of the National Security Council, and so excels at tracing out the shifts – often improvised – of defence policy. He shows that Eisenhower (and to a certain extent Kennedy after him) had to fend off constant pressures from his advisers and the military when formulating “atomic diplomacy.” Dulles and the Pentagon, for instance, strongly opposed Eisenhower's apparent “all-or-nothing” policy and demands for the army to move into action over Berlin may well have influenced the President's famous warning about the military-industrial complex. Indeed the rivalry between the President and the military is a somewhat suppressed theme in Craig's study, coming into focus in the figure of General Lucius Clay who helped trigger the first Berlin crisis by his unauthorized release of new currency and who later brought about the stand-off between American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. Clay exemplified a mindset of regarding the world as made up of strategic areas ruled by one or the other superpower when in 1949 he complained “We have lost Czechoslovakia. We have lost Finland.” The attendant distrust of politicians led SAC director Curtis LeMay (parodied as the cigar-chomping Jack D. Ripper in *Doctor Strangelove*) and other top officers to form a covert plan to take over defence of the nation if it was judged necessary, a plan described in the 1962 novel *Seven Days in May*.

Clay's standpoint demonstrates what historian John Lewis Gaddis has called “geopolitical codes,” i.e. sets of operative assumptions about contemporary world developments. Craig acknowledges his debt to Gaddis as his doctoral supervisor and thereby situates his own study within a general historical revision of the Cold War which is currently taking place. Gaddis'

seminal *Strategies of Containment* (1982) mounts an interpretation which foregrounds the perceptions of leading political players rather than provable facts as shaping developments within the period and the attraction of this approach is that it opens up comparisons between diverse documents of the Cold War. Alan Nadel's outstanding *Containment Culture* (1995) has also taken a lead from Gaddis revising the latter's "codes" into narratives which inform political rhetoric, film and fiction alike. Nuclear strategy was the most hypothetical narrative of all since the threatened war could scarcely be imagined and should be avoided at all costs. In that sense Eisenhower emerges from Craig's account as the archetypal Cold War politician, threatening an ultimate event which must never happen. Within this context, politics took on a dimension of posture and theatre which emerges constantly throughout Craig's history. When McGeorge Bundy said of the closing of the West Berlin border "the problem was essentially one of propaganda," his statement was true to the game-like rules of megapolitics, but offered little comfort to those Berliners shot while trying to escape to the west. Craig's Eisenhower was enough of a realist to oppose the nuclear shelter programme because that appeared to condone limited nuclear war; but, Eisenhower objected, "there would be no way of living in a situation of such large casualties." By contrast, the Kennedy administration at the time of the Cuba crisis distributed thousands of leaflets offering largely useless advice about how to convert dens into nuclear shelters. This action showed a dangerous blindness to the message implicit within such a policy that nuclear war was imminent. Craig demonstrates how Eisenhower refused to countenance such measures because they would have compromised his conviction that nuclear war was unsustainable and because the Soviets would have inferred that actual preparations for such a war were under way. Craig thereby disposes once and for all in his study the notion that Eisenhower was a political amateur bumbling from one problem to another. On the contrary, he played a key role in sustaining a policy which minimized the risk of nuclear war.

David Seed
Liverpool University

Hakim Adi, *West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998).

Many African nationalist leaders were confirmed in their opposition to colonialism by the racism they experienced as university students in Britain. But relatively little is known about what African students actually did while they were still students. Hakim Adi has set out to fill part of that gap by studying West African students' political activities during the first six decades