quality of the contributions is admirably even, and the coherence of the volume is impressive. This is both an accessible and sophisticated volume, organized by two leading scholars. The book will be of very great interest to scholars in the history of science, collecting, and early modern Europe, as well as anyone interested in following the twists and turns of how value—both spiritual and economic—has been assigned to objects and knowledge alike.

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Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre first formulated their thesis about Romanticism as an anti-capitalist and anti-modernist Weltanschauung in a 1984 article called “Figures of Romantic Anti-capitalism” (*New German Critique*). The response to their intervention by British and North American academics was somewhat delayed. But when G.A. Rosso and Daniel P. Watkins reprinted the article as the opening chapter in a 1990 volume entitled *Spirits of Fire: English Romantic Writers and Contemporary Historical Methods*, a lively and informative debate was opened up. Following “Figures of Romantic Anti-capitalism” in the Rosso and Watkins volume is a substantial and friendly but dissenting response by Michael Ferber, and then a brief “Answer to Michael Ferber” by Löwy and Sayre themselves that culminates in the assertion, “The fire is still burning.”

This tone of affirmation and advocacy runs throughout the book-length version of Löwy and Sayre’s case, published in French by Payot in 1992 and now available in Catherine Porter’s able English translation. I emphasize the chronology of genesis and publication of their argument because it has an important bearing on connections to—and particularly on disconnections from—key developments in the Anglo-American scholarship with which I am most familiar. When the *New German Critique* article appeared in 1984, Jerome McGann’s *The Romantic Ideology* (1983) was just beginning to be read and assimilated. So Löwy and Sayre engage only briefly and in passing with one of the decisive influences in turning Romantic studies towards historicist and materialist critique. Other contributors to the 1990 volume in which “Figures of Romantic Anti-capitalism” was reprinted, such as Daniel Cottom and Marilyn Butler, are prominent participants in the historicist turn signaled by McGann’s book, but their work too figures hardly at all in *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity*. In the nine years separating the French and English versions of the book an extensive and complex body of critical and methodological analysis has foregrounded questions about Romanticism as a historical category and cultur-
al phenomenon. Löwy and Sayre address this body of analysis only in the sketchiest of ways. Readers of James Chandler's *England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Historicism* (1998), for example, will be frustrated if they expect to find the organizing issues of that remarkable book taken up by Löwy and Sayre in the course of their making what is in most respects an antithetical case about Romanticism and its relation to our own moment. Those who care about the historicizing criticism of David Simpson, or Jon Klancher, or the many other scholars who do not appear in the bibliography of *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity* may feel similar frustration.

This disjunction is unfortunate because Löwy and Sayre define their project with a conceptual and political ambition that has often been missing from Anglo-American Romantic studies over the past twenty-five years. Beginning with the evident diversity and contradictoriness of Romanticism as a cultural epoch or phenomenon, they are nevertheless willing to pose a question that many Romanticists these days have abandoned: “what is the concept, the *Begriff* (in the Hegelian-Marxist sense of the term) of Romanticism that can explain the innumerable forms in which it appears, its various empirical features, its multiple and tumultuous colors?” (5). After surveying a range of actual and potential twentieth-century answers, they assert the view that “Romanticism is essentially a reaction against the way of life in capitalist societies.” And since capitalism as a socioeconomic order is historically convergent with modernity, Löwy and Sayre also claim that “Romanticism represents a critique of modernity . . . in the name of values and ideals drawn from the past (the precapitalist, premodern past)” (17).

Before looking in detail at the ways in which Löwy and Sayre elaborate, apply, and defend this thesis in their book, it may be helpful to return to the debate provoked by their original article and see which methodological, historical, and political issues come most prominently into view. After noting that Löwy and Sayre simplify or fail to engage at all with aspects of the Lovejoy/Wellek debate over definitions of Romanticism, Ferber comes to the heart of the anti-capitalist argument by asking whether mid-eighteenth-century capitalism is sufficiently continuous with “late or postindustrial capitalism” to support an account of “Romantic anti-capitalism” that extends into the present moment. He also focuses on reification as the defining feature of modern capitalist culture and asks: “At what point did reification begin to dominate the various European and American) societies?” (*Spirits of Fire*, 74-77). Both questions are important because Ferber's asking them motivates Löwy and Sayre to clarify their methodology in ways that turn out to be important for their book. They say, for instance, that their “Hegelian-Marxist” emphasis on “Romanticism” as *Begriff* “is an attempt to go beyond the empiricist approach [and beyond “Lovejoy’s nominalism”], using a dialectical method of definition/explanation” that will enable us “to understand romantic culture” by grasp-
ing “its inner core, its essential principle” (Spirits of Fire, 86). Though what this turns out to mean represents, in my judgment, an approach more Hegelian than Marxist, a “dialectical method” more idealist than materialist, it is important nevertheless to see where they turn under the pressure of Ferber’s questions. “Ferber,” they write, “is separating factors that should be dialectically conceived as a Gesamtkomplex. . . . the category of totality is crucial. . . . all these elements or dimensions of capitalism mentioned by Ferber . . . must be understood as integral parts of a common matrix” (Spirits of Fire, 87). The insistence on conceiving of capitalism as a dialectical totality is important. We are left, however, with unanswered questions about what it means to treat “Romanticism” as a category of cultural history with a dialectical totality derivable from or mappable onto the changing and contradictory totality of capitalism itself. Löwy and Sayre concede the importance of such questions when they say that “we were principally concerned with creating a general model and a typology of varieties of romanticism” and that “an historical approach . . . sensitive to particularities and modifications within the matrix of the romantic worldview will be necessary to develop our first, schematic mapping of the territory” (88). It is the separation here between “a general model” or a “schematic mapping” and “an historical approach” that is significant.

The opening chapter of Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity, “Redefining Romanticism,” builds upon some of the points of difference that emerge in the exchange with Ferber. Now, for example, instead of conceding Ferber’s point that the relative backwardness of German capitalism in the eighteenth century makes it difficult to explain the early emergence of Romanticism there on their terms, Löwy and Sayre claim that “Germany underwent large-scale industrialization in the eighteenth century” and, following Henri Brunschwig, that Prussia under Frederick the Great became “the country of state capitalism” (Société et romantisme en Prusse au XVIIIe siècle, Paris: Flammarion, 1973, p. 56). They are more inclined in the book than in the article to speak plurally of “various Romanticisms” (49), of “more than one Romanticism” (55) — without, however, a sense that such formulations threaten the fundamental unity of their Begriff, their Gesamtkomplex. One valuable dimension of this chapter is its emphasis on Austro-German and French scholarship that has been slighted or neglected altogether in Anglo-American scholarship — on Ernst Bloch, Karl Mannheim, Ernst Fischer; on Henri Lefebvre, Lucien Goldmann, Pierre Barbès. In Chapter 2, where Löwy and Sayre attempt to recognize the “various politics of Romanticism” and offer a “typology” reflective of this variety, it is tellingly Max Weber’s theory of “ideal types” that guides their construction of a “Restitutionist Romanticism,” a “Conservative Romanticism,” a “Resigned Romanticism,” a “Reformist Romanticism,” a “Revolutionary and/or Utopian Romanticism,” a “Jacobin-Democratic Romanticism,” a “Populist Romanticism,” a “Utopian-Humanist
Socialist Romanticism,” “Libertarian Romanticism,” and “Marxist Romanticism.” Though the mere listing of these categories may make them sound a bit like Polonius’s “pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral” and so forth, they are not without their suggestiveness in showing “how Romanticism unfolds from one end of the political gamut to the other” (83).

What remains problematic, though, is “anti-capitalism” as a sociohistorically-based concept that functions convincingly across Romanticism’s “political gamut.” Most, if not all, of the cultural texts conventionally included within eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism represent aspects of the contradictoriness and alienation generated by an increasingly dominant capitalist society. But does it follow that “anti-capitalist” is the best generalizing designation for such patterns of representation? Let’s consider the case of first-generation British Romantics. Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey are sometimes explicitly anti-capitalist in their later phases as Tory reactionaries. But they are also increasingly given to fervent patriotism in a post-Napoleonic period when British power was as much commercial as military; they each celebrated the most advanced capitalist nation on earth. Is such celebratory patriotism not an aspect of their Romanticism? During the early 1790s, by contrast, when these writers were in their twenties, they ardently supported the French Revolution. Even if you have doubts about the classic Marxist account of this event as a bourgeois revolution (Löwy and Sayre accept that the Jacobins were radical bourgeois revolutionaries who “sanctified” private property “in their legislation,” 118), it still seems odd to characterize pro-French Revolution Romantic culture as “anti-capitalist.” When Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey turned against the Revolution, it was certainly not because it had opened the way for the advance of capitalism in France. The French Revolution was saturated with the contradictions inherent in capitalism at this historical stage—but this does not mean that either Romantic support for or condemnation of the Revolution can on principle be deemed “anti-capitalist.”

Löwy and Sayre’s argument encounters still more resistance in the writing of second-generation British Romantics. Hazlitt, admirer both of Burke and of Bonaparte and a defiantly individualist liberal, says of his own prose that he tries “to employ plain words and popular modes of construction, as were I a chapman and dealer, I should common weights and measures.” The image here is not just that of the marketplace of ideas, but of the marketplace of language. Shelley’s grasp of the principles of surplus value and of finance capital is conceptually and politically sharper than that of any of his contemporaries; some of the writings of 1819, such as “Song: To the Men of England” and A Philosophical View of Reform, are clearly anti-capitalist. It is wrong to say, as Löwy and Sayre do, that Shelley “never goes so far as to challenge private property” (76). But his explicit anti-capitalism is not what links him to other writers of his moment—it is what
distinguishes him from them. As for Byron, his recurrent staging of an aristocratic disdain for commercial culture and bourgeois morality needs to be seen, as Jerome Christensen shows in Lord Byron’s Strength (1993), in its contradictory relation to Byron’s own unprecedented commercial success. “Lord Byron” became the name of a cultural commodity. His aristocratic rebelliousness and alienation were brilliantly marketed by his publisher John Murray, transmuted into profits that Byron eventually agreed to accept some share of.

The case of Byron takes us back to the debate Ferber initiates with Löwy and Sayre over the status of reification in Romantic literary culture. Byron is intensely aware that he and his contemporaries do not simply encounter the transformation of social processes into objects in the broader society; their own literary production and identity are caught up in this dynamic. Their “words are things,” as Byron put it on several occasions, in ways that make it hard to differentiate between rhetorical efficacy and literary commodification, between aesthetic realization and the sale of writing. When Terry Eagleton says in The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990) that the “commodity . . . is a kind of grisly caricature of the authentic [aesthetic] artefact” (208), he formulates an idea that is at times deliberately enacted in Byron’s writing and that haunts all Romantic texts. Ferber touches on this configuration when he asks “Have Romantic artists . . . resisted reification in the form of their works?” and cites critical work that sees in Blake’s visionary formal difficulty a resistance to capitalist culture (Spirits of Fire, 79). Löwy and Sayre do little to explore this kind of “resistance to reification.”

So while the attempt to grasp late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism as a whole in terms of “anti-capitalism”valuably foregrounds kinds of motivation and representation that have often been slighted or neglected altogether in recent decades, Löwy and Sayre offer a concept of “anti-capitalism” that is at once too diffuse and too constricted, too broadly applied and too narrowly formulated. These difficulties become more rather than less apparent in assessing the book’s claim that “The fire is still burning” – that a “Romanticism” historically, politically, and discursively continuous with that of Coleridge and Byron, or of Herder and Hölderlin, continues through the twentieth-century. At least half the book is devoted to writers from the later nineteenth and the twentieth century, and some of the discussion – in the sections on Charles Péguy, Ernst Bloch, and Christa Wolf in Chapter 5, for instance – is insightful and informative. But the fundamental historical and conceptual problems remain. These problems become sharply evident in Chapter 3, “Excursus: Marxism and Romanticism.” It is a strength of their analysis that frequently unappreciated influences from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century are emphasized: Schelling, Sismondi, and Maurer on Marx and Engels; Sismondi again and the American anthropologist Lewis Morgan on Rosa Luxemburg. Their account of the limitations in Lukács’s use of the term
"Romantic anticapitalist" is useful. But the more generalized line of argument perpetuates stereotyped notions of the relation of Enlightenment to Romantic culture and of "the nostalgic charm of the Romantic worldview" (115). It fails to establish a coherent connection between the future-oriented utopian strain in the writing of the Romantics and their emergent sense of the past not as a pre-capitalist memory of social harmony capable of "restitution," but as that part of the present which Marx would refer to in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* as "immediately found, given, and transmitted circumstances" ("unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen").

Romanticists need to read and come to terms with *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity* because of its persistent, passionate attention to a dimension of Romantic culture that has yet to be adequately examined and articulated. Socialists and others on the left should read it because it engages with a dimension of the Marxist tradition that resists being relegated to nostalgia or residual idealism antithetical to "scientific socialism." Löwy and Sayre themselves sometimes engage in such relegation—when they characterize as "Romantic" the criticism of Stalinist state capitalism to be found in such "Trotskyite dissidents" as C.L.R. James and Tony Cliff (152), for instance, or when they cite Lenin's definition of socialism as "the Soviets plus electrification" as an expression of "modernizing" as opposed to "Romantic anticapitalism" (29). Shelley loved electricity—and he would have understood very well that the people who work to generate and harness the power of electricity also have the power to organize society based on meeting human needs rather than on perpetuating the rule of the exploiters over the exploited.

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The Brazilian military regime of 1964-85 was one of the longest-lasting authoritarian regimes in recent Latin American history, and had a decisive impact on Brazil's pattern of economic and political development. Unlike neighboring Argentina and Chile, prior to 1964 the military in Brazil had not directly ruled the country in the twentieth century. The organizations and structures that facilitated military rule in Brazil, according to Shawn Smallman, were not created overnight at the time of the coup d'État in 1964. Instead, struggles between different military factions, each allied with different civilian political groups in the decades prior reveal the gradual development of a military capable and willing to engage in direct authoritarian rule over society.