“Romantic anticapitalist” is useful. But the more generalized line of argument perpetuates stereotyped notions of the relation of Enlightenment to Romantic culture and of “the nostalgic charm of the Romantic worldview” (115). It fails to establish a coherent connection between the future-oriented utopian strain in the writing of the Romantics and their emergent sense of the past not as a pre-capitalist memory of social harmony capable of “restitution,” but as that part of the present which Marx would refer to in The Eighteenth Brumaire as “immediately found, given, and transmitted circumstances” (“unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen”).

Romanticists need to read and come to terms with Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity because of its persistent, passionate attention to a dimension of Romantic culture that has yet to be adequately examined and articulated. Socialists and others on the left should read it because it engages with a dimension of the Marxist tradition that resists being relegated to nostalgia or residual idealism antithetical to “scientific socialism.” Löwy and Sayre themselves sometimes engage in such relegation—when they characterize as “Romantic” the criticism of Stalinist state capitalism to be found in such “Trotskyite dissidents” as C.L.R. James and Tony Cliff (152), for instance, or when they cite Lenin’s definition of socialism as “the Soviets plus electrification” as an expression of “modernizing” as opposed to “Romantic anticapitalism” (29). Shelley loved electricity—and he would have understood very well that the people who work to generate and harness the power of electricity also have the power to organize society based on meeting human needs rather than on perpetuating the rule of the exploiters over the exploited.

William Keach
Brown University


The Brazilian military regime of 1964-85 was one of the longest-lasting authoritarian regimes in recent Latin American history, and had a decisive impact on Brazil’s pattern of economic and political development. Unlike neighboring Argentina and Chile, prior to 1964 the military in Brazil had not directly ruled the country in the twentieth century. The organizations and structures that facilitated military rule in Brazil, according to Shawn Smallman, were not created overnight at the time of the coup d’etat in 1964. Instead, struggles between different military factions, each allied with different civilian political groups in the decades prior reveal the gradual development of a military capable and willing to engage in direct authoritarian rule over society.
Smallman suggests that the best way to understand those factional struggles is to look at informal structures of power linking the military – here understood as the most important branch of the military, the army – and civilian groups. In this book Smallman proposes to use social history to illuminate the military’s long-term pattern of political behavior, thus moving away from two other kinds of history. The military’s own official history is written by the winners of internal conflicts and tends to exaggerate internal military unity, while conventional studies of civil-military relations often focus narrowly on formal politics and the activities of the military high command and top civilian politicians.

Against these other two approaches, Smallman argues that informal structures shaped military behavior. “Informal structures are the unwritten rules, organizations, and beliefs that shape power without official sanction or government funding. Examples of these structures would be corruption networks, civil-military alliances, army factions, racial beliefs, family ties, and regional alliances...Often, informal structures shape the military’s relationship with civilian society more than its official organization” (5). Informal structures can best be revealed in factional fights within the military, when leaders of each faction turn to civilian allies for support. Smallman examines these factional fights and concludes that “many structures that later bolstered military rule – the existence of a powerful military party, with a system of intelligence and terror to repress dissent, strong civil-military alliances, a network of corruption to provide rewards, and a clear program for the nation – existed by 1954” (6).

Smallman is thus lead to a much more directly political explanation of the 1964 coup d’état than some influential works in political science, for example Alfred Stepan’s emphasis on a “new professionalism” within the armed forces (Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 1971). Smallman also challenges the work of rational-choice theorists who explain Latin American authoritarianism largely in terms of the conscious choices of political leaders at the time of democratic breakdown (for example, Youssef Cohen, *Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries*, 1994). By showing how the dominant internationalist faction within the military used repression and terror to crush internal dissent and opposition after the end of World War II, thus paving the way for later repression throughout society, Smallman adds an important perspective to debates about Brazilian military rule.

While he is interested in social issues such as the “whitening” of the army after 1930 and networks of corruption involving military officers, he is not really able to reveal much about these topics because of limitations of data. Instead, the heart of the book is a riveting account of factional infighting that in some ways resembles the work of a previous generation of military historians such as Robert Potash and Frederick Nunn. (Robert Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina*, volume 1 [1928-1945] published in 1969, volume 2 [1945-1962] published in 1980, and [1962-1973] published in 1996; Frederick Nunn, *The Military
Like those other two scholars, Smallman links the military's role in politics to larger debates about social, economic, and political change and the connections between military factors and social groups. What Smallman adds to this approach is sensitivity to issues of class.

The most vivid parts of the book are chapters 4-7. Chapter 4 shows how the rise of the U.S. after World War II incited a profound division within the Brazilian army. On one hand, internationalist officers saw Brazil's interests as compatible with U.S. hegemony, and favored an elitist and hierarchical anti-communist alliance with the U.S. that pursued liberal economic policies with the assistance of foreign capital. Nationalist officers, on the other hand, wanted to create a mass-based, popular alliance that would pursue state-led development in defiance of the U.S. This split widened when former dictator Getúlio Vargas was elected president of Brazil on a nationalist-populist platform in 1950.

The first round of the struggle went to the nationalists. Nationalist officers mobilized civilians against the military hierarchy in the campaign for the nationalization of oil, using the slogan O Petroleo é Nosso (The Oil is Ours). Communists supported this campaign, and the high command used this fact to label the campaign Communist and to try to repress it (100). However, the high command was not able to prevent the eventual creation of a state monopoly in the oil sector, accomplished in 1953. Unlike the Peronists in the Argentine military, however, nationalists in the Brazilian military never formed strong bonds with trade unionists. Brazil's trade unions were also weaker than their Argentine counterparts, and Brazilian industrialization was less advanced in the 1950s than in Argentina. This comparative insight helps to explain that while the nationalists won the battle for the nationalization of the oil sector, they eventually lost the war for the control of the Brazilian armed forces and society.

Chapter 5 is a thoughtful exploration of the ideologies on both sides of the nationalist-internationalist conflict. Chapter 6 discusses the changing nature of the conflict between 1949 and 1951, while Chapter 7 chronicles the defeat of dissident nationalist officers and the wave of terror and purges that was unleashed against them by the high command (repression that was completed in the aftermath of the 1964 coup). Smallman shows how the rise to prominence of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG or Superior War College), created in 1948, and its promulgation of national security doctrine signaled the victory of the high command and its internationalist vision of the role of the military.

This book succeeds on many levels. At the most basic level, it challenges accounts of the Brazilian military regime that are content to analyze the precipitating causes of the coup d'état without taking into account long-term factors. Second, on its emphasis on informal contacts between military officers and civilians, it challenges accounts that rely on official military history or conventional frameworks of civil-military relations. Finally, by suggesting that a kind of underground social history can subvert the military's official view of itself,
Smallman is opening up a potential new pathway for research. (Although, as his own book reveals, such social histories can be blocked by the non-cooperation of the military itself!)

Some aspects of Smallman's argument are demonstrated better than others. For example, Chapter 7 is very good in showing the development of an intelligence and terror apparatus that was used inside the military itself to root out dissent. Smallman is also insightful on the programmatic preferences of the internationalist officers who won the internal battle by 1954. However, he is less illuminating about the link between internationalist military officers and the União Democrática Nacional (UDN or Democratic National Union), the chief civilian party in favor of the internationalists, and he also has little direct evidence of corruption. One also wishes that he had provided a few more links between 1954, when he essentially ends his story, and the coup of 1964 — to posit a general connection is plausible, but a lot happened over those ten years, and the direct impact of the events he analyzes on the coup is left rather unexplored. In addition, some words about the endurance of nationalism within Brazil's military might have been useful. For example, the ESG was widely seen as a center of intellectual resistance to neoliberal economic reform in the 1990s, and the majority of military personnel apparently voted for Lula in the presidential elections of 2002. This suggests that the internationalist/nationalist split that Smallman diagnoses in the 1950s still exists, in a different form, in the Brazilian military today.

This reader found several minor errors in the text — for example, it should be Delegação (not Delegacion) Especial de Segurança Política (3); Ilha Grande is an island offshore of Angra dos Reis, and is not in the bay of Rio de Janeiro (93); and it should be Escola Superior de (not da) Guerra (107). Nevertheless, this book is well researched and written and offers suggestive insights to scholars interested in the origins of authoritarian rule, civil-military relations, and Brazilian political history. Smallman engages with a variety of other scholars in defense of his own lively interpretation of the development of the Brazilian army, and the book deserves a wide readership and careful attention.

Anthony W. Pereira
Tulane University


For those of us who are not trained legal professionals, habitual criminals, or serial plaintiffs, films and television series about the law and its processes provide most of the images that shape our understanding of these issues. This is particularly the case in American theatres and households, where motion pictures and