Meriwether avoids mention of how news about Nkrumah’s growing domestic opposition in the later 1950s was absorbed in America. When local complexities could not be ignored, how were they rendered irrelevant in the newly imagined Africa? Meriwether’s own epilogue highlights the value of such questions. The end of the last classic anti-colonial liberation struggle in South Africa in 1994 finally dissolved the context in which black Americans could identify with Africans as noble nationalists. As conditions call for a new image of Africa it would be useful to understand more about the image that reigned in the late twentieth century, as well as how the previous image dissipated.

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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of VENONA, the emphasis in historical writing about intelligence has been on what “they” (foreign intelligence services and Communists) were doing to “us” (the state) not what “we” (the state) did to “ourselves” (ordinary citizens). The response of the state, be it in the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom to the attacks of September 11, however, has reiterated the importance of the domestic security environment, particularly with respect to civil liberties. David Cunningham’s book, *There’s Something Happening Here*, is a timely reminder of why.

In examining domestic security operations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the 1960s, *There’s Something Happening Here* represents a new stage in the historical writing on the topic. Previous work consisted of a mixture of memoirs, histories written by activists, and more complex studies by historians writing with greater detachment, yet who had still lived through at least part of J. Edgar Hoover’s redolent reign.

Cunningham’s study, on the other hand, is part of a welcomed stage whereby academics without any connection to the events they are writing about bring a more thorough and less emotional perspective to the subject matter. Equally significant is his sociological/historical approach to the topic which allows him to avoid simply telling us what the FBI did, as others before him have already done. Instead in a comparative fashion he focuses on what the FBI was, how it went about its work, what that work was, and the impact that it had.

In this case that work was the Counter Intelligence Program, or COINTELPRO for short, which served as a weapon of destruction for a police force
not content to watch passively but rather desiring to take the war to its enemies. Although the types of tactics associated with it predate its creation, COINTELPRO officially began in 1956 when the FBI targeted the Communist Party of the United States for obliteration. Later, in the 1960s, the Bureau’s list of targets for COINTELPRO grew dramatically, encompassing a wide range of groups on the left and even some on the right. It is here that Cunningham offers a unique approach by comparing the nature of the COINTELPRO operations directed against the amorphous New Left with those employed against right-wing “white hate groups.”

In taking this comparative approach Cunningham finds a surprising level of consistency as the Bureau employed many similar methods against both targets. Where it differed, primarily due to the FBI’s own institutional perspective, was in COINTELPRO’s goals in dealing with them. For the New Left the end objective was its complete annihilation. Driving this was the Bureau’s hostility toward activists not because of their actions but because of their beliefs. The FBI from Hoover on down perceived these as being anathema to everything the Bureau represented. On the other hand, the desired result against racist organizations was not elimination but containment. Indeed, the FBI targeted racist groups in the first place not because of their abhorrent views but because they advocated and used violence. From the Bureau’s patriotic perspective, Klan members did not “hate” America the way the New Left did, but instead were misguided or poorly educated patriots who would otherwise be harmless. This speaks to the ideological bias inherent in the FBI in its drive to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. In places the police and racists even shared a worldview: Klan depictions of Martin Luther King Jr. reflected some of the same characterizations applied to him by Hoover.

If this important book has a flaw it is in Cunningham’s failure to delve even further into the FBI’s mindset. More biographical information on the agents involved would have strengthened the work’s presentation of how the FBI as an institution viewed its respective targets on the racist right and the radical left.

Although somewhat problematic in attempting to address post-September 11, 2001 domestic security developments (the Total Information Awareness program discussed as if still active was, in fact, cancelled, in part because of negative publicity), Cunningham raises questions of relevance not just to the functioning of the FBI or any domestic security agency but to society as a whole. The lack of a clear and narrow definition of what terrorism is, coupled with, and here Cunningham does not make his point strongly enough in the conclusion, an institutional emphasis on pursuing terrorists with career rewards for those taking the most aggressively ambitious paths, will inevitably lead to significant abuses of civil liberties. Cunningham calls for vigilance against the activities of security agencies, not an easy task given the veil of secrecy that
cloaks their work. Still, his book represents an invaluable contribution through surveillance of the past to promoting alertness for the present and future.

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Although it is now commonplace to observe the way in which politics is increasingly reliant on marketing strategies to deliver its message, rarely is such an observation so rigorously and compellingly pursued as it is in Paul Rutherford’s *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*. Rutherford provides a bracing account of the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq and details how the Bush administration packaged and sold the war with great success to the American public. Bush’s address to the nation in March 2003, just days before the actual invasion began, was less a report to the citizenry on matters crucial to the nation than the culmination of the elaborate promotional campaign designed specifically to transform the idea of war against Iraq into a desirable product.

By the time the bombs starting falling on Baghdad, enthusiasm for the war had reached a fevered pitch among certain sectors of the American public, and all that was left for the Bush administration to do was to deliver this product to eager consumers. The news media served as the ideal distribution mechanism for this. Whatever the opportunities the Internet provided to assemble a dissenting or dissonant account of the events in Iraq, television retained its privileged place as the primary source for information about the war. Rutherford is at his most incisive and illuminating in detailing the experience of “real-time war” as broadcast on the trinity of twenty-four-hour news channels that control the American market: CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. But such a “real-time war” could not have occurred without the Pentagon serving as its co-producer, not simply in terms of actually waging the war that served as the raw material for television reports, but by investing in all manner of media technology to ensure that it would be the primary content provider for the media’s coverage. The quirks of advanced technology came to define a Pentagon house-style. Ranging from the greenish hue of the footage gleaned from night cams attached to soldiers’ helmets to the perpetually disintegrating pixelated images bounced from desert to satellite to newsroom, these stylistic tics served to authenticate the reports filtered, processed, and often completely assembled by the Pentagon that the news channels frequently conveyed without question or commentary.